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Background of the Study
The public schools are a uniquely powerful group of institutions. 
They are accorded by law certain resp on sib ilities  and powers which, 
for a large part of each day for three-fourths of the year, put them  
in alm ost com plete control of every non-disabled person between the 
ages of seven and eighteen who (1) cannot or does not choose to attend 
private school, or (2) has not completed four years of high school.
In Oklahoma, school laws require that every public school student 
must attend and comply with the rules of his school under the fo llow ­
ing restr iction s:
(1) He m ust attend the school to  which he is assigned by 
the school offic ia ls in the d istr ic t in which he liv e s .
(2) He may not transfer to another d istrict at his own 
choice but may be granted a  transfer only at the 
d iscretion  of the officia ls o f the sending and 
receiving schools.
(3) He is  exp ressly  forbidden to  quit school before he is  
eighteen or has completed four years of high school, 
but school offic ia ls may at th eir  d iscretion  suspend  
or expel him.
(4) He and h is parents or guardians are exp ressly  forbidden  
to exhibit any a g gressive  action, either real or threatened,
1
against a school em ployee, but the school personnel 
are perm itted  by law to use force against the student.
5. Both the student and his parents or guardians are 
subject to  im prisonm ent and fine if  they violate the 
school law s.
From  a reading of Oklahoma's school laws the conclusion may 
be reached that a ll rights have been reserved  to the schools and their  
officia ls and that the rights of parents and students have been totally  
abrogated. This conclusion rece iv es  som e support from  judicial 
d ecisions which uphold the view that ". . . the state is  perm itted to 
invade the liberty of the individual in order that the state may be 
protected. " ^
That the schools are in fact established and maintained not for
the sake of the individual but for the public good is  firm ly  rooted in
legal precedent. The Supreme Court of New Ham pshire stated in 1912:
The prim ary purpose of the maintenance of the common school 
system  is  the prom otion of the general in telligence of the 
people constituting the body politic and to thereby in crease  
the usefu lness and effic iency of the citizens upon which the 
government of so c ie ty  depends. F ree  schooling furnished by 
the state is  not so much a right granted to pupils as a duty 
im posed upon them  for the public good. If they do not 
voluntarily attend the schools provided for them they may 
be com pelled to  do so . While most people regard the schools  
as the m eans of great personal advantage to the pupils, the 
fact is  too often overlooked that they are governm ental m eans 
of protecting the state from  the consequences of ignorant and 
incompetent citizensh ip .
^Robert R. Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and Public  
Education, (Chicago: The Foundation P r e ss , Inc. , 1941), p. 18.
^Fogg V. Board of Education, 82 A t l . 173 (New H am pshire, 1912).
While the power of the sta tes is v irtually  absolute in the estab ­
lishm ent and maintenance of public sch o o ls , the Constitution of the 
United States reserv es  to individual c itizen s certain rights and f r e e ­
dom s which must not be violated . When the rights of the state and 
the rights of the individual are in conflict, the court must rule. 
H istor ica lly , the courts have upheld the schools where the te st of 
reasonableness could be applied. On th is point Edwards has said:
In determ ining whether school o fficers or teach ers have 
authority to enforce a particular rule or regulation govern ­
ing the conduct of pupils, the courts universally  apply the 
test of reasonableness . . . .  The courts are, indeed, 
very reluctant to  declare a board regulation unreasonable. ^
On the other hand, recent court cases  have affirm ed the rights of
the individuals over the rights of the school, and a whole chorus of
v o ic es  has been raised  on behalf of the human rights of public school
children.
In a recent paper Nat Henthoff deplored the routine violation  of
the Constitutional rights of high school students, although he did see
a trend toward m ore recognition of th ose  rights:
Such basic rights of an A m erican citizen  as freedom  of 
speech and assem bly, protection from  invasion of privacy, 
and the guarantee of due p rocess of law do not ex ist for 
the overwhelm ing m ajority of A m erican high school 
students.
They /th e sch o o lsj are recognizing that other people do 
very much perceive c iv il liberties in the sch ools as an
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Newton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools (Chicago: 
The U niversity of Chicago P r e s s ,  1948), p. 564.
issu e . In the past decade, a rising number of students 
and their parents, . . have been bringing, and increasingly , 
winning su its . . . . ^
The Com m ittee on Education and Human Rights of Phi Delta Kappa 
issued a statem ent in which it named certain  basic human rights 
highly prized by our soc ie ty  and secured at great cost over the ages.  ̂
The Phi Delta Kappa Statem ent a sserts  that while education is  a 
powerful and effective  means by which society  can im plem ent human 
rights, it cannot do so  in schools which do not teach  and practice these  
rights and the dem ocratic values upon which they are based.
Prominent educators such as Henthoff and the m em bers of the 
Phi Delta Kappa C om m ission are calling for changes in practices in 
our public sch oo ls . But such critics are what Hamilton and Mort 
refer to as "the fron tiers of change, " and it is  not to  these authorities 
but to legal enactm ents and judicial decisions that one must turn to 
search  "for the trends, the com m onality, of changes in law . . . . ^
Statem ent of the Problem  
The problem for th is investigation is  (a) to d iscover and analyze 
the significant recent leg isla tion  and judicial decisions relating to  
selected  basic hum an-civil rights of students in the public schools,
'^Nat Henthoff, "Why Students Want Their Constitutional Rights, " 
Saturday Review, May 22, 1971, pp. 60-61,
^"Education and Human Rights: A Statement of the C om m ission  
on Education and Human Rights of Phi D elta Kappa, " 1971.
^Hamilton and Mort, 3.
and (b) to  identify possib le lega l trends and directions in the in ter ­
pretation of th ese rights, and to analyze their im plications for the 
behavior of public schools.
Need for the Study 
H istorica lly , loca l school boards have been granted great power 
over the system s which they represent. Lacking leg isla tive  enact­
ments to guide them, school boards make their own ru les, but because 
no system  of rules can be com pletely codified, much is left to the 
discretion  of the sch o o ls’ adm inistrators and teachers. Individual 
patrons have little  recou rse  when sch ool policies and actions seem  to 
them harsh, inhumane, in effective , or in any way unsuitable. When 
other methods fa il, they may turn to the courts.
A patron initiating litigation  is  taking a step of great consequence 
to the future, since a case  once decided becom es a precedent for 
future c a se s . As W allace Good pointed out:
In our lega l system , while the m ajor concern of the court is  
with the im m ediate ca se , the decisions becom es the guideline 
for action  or restraint in countless other situations. D is ­
cu ssion s of recent appellate cases  involving regulation of 
student conduct, then, should indicate the kinds of problems 
for which lega l solutions are being sought, rev ea l trends 
concerning the authority of school personnel to regulate 
student conduct, and hint of changes in what our society  
expects of the school sy stem . ^
^W allace E. Good, "Regulations of Studait Conduct, " The 
A m erican School Board Journal, CLV (July, 1967), p. 23.
Litigation over m atters of pupil control, rights o f parents and 
students with regard to the schools, the doctrine of in  loco parentis, 
and other areas related  to human and c iv il rights of school children  
seem  to  be on the in crea se . This in crea se  in litigation, while perhaps 
not so great in Oklahoma as in other sta tes , may indicate a gap 
between what society  wants from  the schools, and what the schools  
are providing
There is  a need for students and parents to know what their legal 
rights and opportunities are . If a parent fe e ls  that a problem of 
extrem e im portance is  unresolved in his school system , it is  essen tia l 
for him to know what chance he has of resolving that problem in court. 
This can be learned by studying the resu lts  of previous litigation.
L ikew ise, school adm inistrators and teachers need to be aware 
of litigation which has grown out of conflicts in the sch oo ls . If, as 
Good sa y s, judicial d ecisions indicate the kinds of problem s for which 
legal solutions are being sought, revea l trends, and hint of changes 
which our society  wants from  the schools, then school personnel ought 
to be in p ossession  of th ose fa c ts .
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this resea rch  is  to  investigate leg isla tion  
and judicial decisions having to do with the handling of students in the pub­
lic schools with regard to the according of certain basic hum an-civil 
rights to  school children in  public school situations. Im plications of
those laws and d ecision s, and apparent legal trends and directions 
in the interpretation of the rights of public school students, as w ell 
as their im plications for the behavior of teachers and adm inistrators 
in public sch ools, w ill be reported.
The inform ation gathered in th is study ought to serve  school 
teachers and adm inistrators in their efforts to educate children, 
aid them in understanding the school's responsib ility  in protecting 
students in the ex e r c ise  of their rights, and help clarify  in  the m inds 
of parents and students those rights and opportunities which our lega l 
system  attempts to uphold for a ll c itizen s.
Scope and Lim itations
Litigation with regard to handling of pupils in public schools has 
been so extensive in recent years that a satisfactory  study of it can  
not be made in a single effort. T herefore the following lim itations 
were im posed upon th is research:
(1) Statutory laws studied are those of the State of Oklahoma only;
(2) Judicial decisions studied are those rendered in F ederal D istrict 
Courts and by state and federa l appellate courts including the United 
States Supreme Court, as reported in the National Reporter System ;
(3) The period studied includes the years 1954 through 1972.
(4) C ases studied are those which relate to certain hum an-civil 
rights se lected  from  the lis t  com piled by the Phi D elta Kappa 
C om m ission on Human Rights and Education. Those selected  hu man 
c iv il rights are as follow s:
a) The right to be secure in the person;
b) The right to protection against unlawful search  and 
se izu re .
c) The right to due p rocess.
d) The right to freedom  of expression;
e) The right to freedom  of speech;
f) The right to freedom  of the press;
g) The right to freedom  of relig ion .
(5) C ases having to do with achieving ra c ia l balance or racial 
desegregation  of the schools are excluded from  this research .
Methodology
This research  is  a h istorica l study using the method of legal 
research . In investigating legal enactm ents and judicial decisions  
the following sou rces were used:
For Oklahoma laws - Oklahoma Statutes Annotated
For d iscovering ca ses  - Oklahoma D igest
Corpus Ju ris  Secundum  
W est's D ecennial D igest
For case  reports - The N ational R eporter System
A search  was conducted of Oklahoma's statutory laws and the 
resu lts  of that search  are contained in Chapter III of this study.
Judicial decisions rendered by United S tates D istrict Courts 
and by state and federal appellate courts including the United
States Supreme Court, w ere searched for cases involving the 
selected  hum an-civil rights as those rights were applied to 
children in the public schools. D ecis io n s were read and sum­
m arized . Chapter IV of this study is  divided into sections c o r r e s ­
ponding to each of the selected  hum an-civil rights. Each of these  
section s provides a table of ca ses  briefly summ arized and an 
an alysis of the ca ses  investigated.
A d iscussion  of possible trends and directions in litigatio i 
concerning the handling of public school children is contained in 
Chapter V, Conclusions and Recom m endations.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
The nation's public school system  is  under attack on so many 
fronts one wonders if it w ill be able to survive the barrage. While 
th is statem ent by Edwin A. R oberts, Jr. may be extrem e, critics of 
our schools have within recent years voiced a wide variety  of su g g es­
tion s for change. Ivan Illich  takes the view that the schools are 
"bridges to nowhere, " and that our society  ought to be "deschooled. " 
I llich  says:
Children are protected by neither the F irst nor the 
Fifth Amendment when they stand before that secular  
p riest, the teacher. The child must confront a man who 
w ears an invisib le triple crown, like the papal tiara , the 
sym bol of trip le authority combined in one person. For 
the child, the teacher pontificates as pastor, prophet, and 
p r ie s t- -h e  is  at once guide, teacher, and adm inistrator 
of a sacred  ritual. He com bines the claim s of m edieval 
popes in a society  constituted under the guarantee that these 
cla im s shall never be exercised  together by one established  
and obligatory institu tion--church  or state.
Defining children as fulltim e pupils perm its the teacher 
to ex er c ise  a kind of power over their persons which is  
much le s s  lim ited by constitutional and consuetudinal 
restr iction s than the power wielded by the guardians of
^Edwin A. R oberts, J r . ,  "Perfect Equality and the Importance 




other so c ia l en claves. Their chronological age d isquali­
f ie s  children from  safeguards which are routine for 
adults in modern asylum --m adhouse, m onastery, or 
ja il. ^
John Holt, when asked what one giant step forward could most 
be desired for A m erica 's sch ools, answered:
It would be to make our sch ools, instead of what they 
are now, which is  ja ils  for children, into a resource for 
free  and independent learning which everyone in the 
community, of whatever age, could use as much or as 
little as he wanted. ^
Another outspoken cr itic  is Charles Silberm an who said that 
the m ost important ch aracteristic  schools share in common is  a 
preoccupation with order and control. In C risis  in the C lassroom
Silberm an d escr ib es incident after incident of m indless, inhumane 
treatm ent of child by teacher. He does, however, see  some hope:
Fortunately, th ere are signs of change, in part as a 
response to  student d issen t, in part as a result of the 
growing d istaste  a number of teach ers and adm inistrators 
fe e l for the way schools are run, and their conviction  
that schools can be m ore humane, that students can handle 
and benefit from greater freedom  and responsib ility . 
Whatever the reason s, there would appear to be a growing 
ferm ent in high schools around the country, . . ,
Like it or not, m ore and m ore high schools are going to 
have to  make m ore and m ore changes of these so rts . In 
California, New York, and Connecticut, for exam ple, 
as w ell as in a number of other sta tes , schools that have
^Ivan Illich , D eschooling Society, (New York: Harper & Row, 
1970), pp. 31-32.
3
John Holt, The Underachieving School, (New York: The Pitman 
Publishing Company, 1969), p. IX.
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tried to enforce codes governing d ress  and grooming in 
the traditional w ay--suspending the offending student or 
denying him "class p riv ileges " --have had their codes 
overruled by the courts. . . .
Whether or not it is  a panacea, how ever, freedom  
happens to be a constitutional right; as the Supreme 
Court has put it, "neither the Fourteenth Amendment 
nor the B ill of Rights is  for adults a lone. " M oreover, 
the notion that students have constitutional rights which 
the school cannot infringe is  no whim of the moment; 
it is  firm ly  rooted in the law. As far back as 1943, 
the Supreme Court made it c lear that com pulsory school 
attendance did not mean that students surrendered their 
rights at the schoolhouse door. The Fourteenth Amend­
ment, the Court declared , "protects the citizen  against 
the State its e lf  and a ll of its crea tu res--th e  Board of 
Education not excepted. They have, of course, 
important delicate and highly d iscretionary functions, 
but none that they may not perform  within the lim its 
of the B ill of Rights. That they are educating the young 
for citizenship  is reason for scrupulous protection of 
Constitutional freedom s of the individual, if we are not 
to strangle the free mind at its  source and teach youth 
to discount important principles of our government as 
m er platitudes.
Another champion of the c iv il rights of children is  Thomas 
Gordon who said  that in most schools students are blatantly denied  
c iv il r igh ts--th e  right of free  speech , the right to wear what they  
want, the right to due p rocess , and he advises parents to "goto  
bat to protect their children's c iv il rights.
These exam ples from  well-known educational w riters illu strate  
the ser iou sn ess of the charges which are being brought against
'^Charles Silberm an, C risis  in the C lassroom  (New York: 
Random House, 1970), pp. 336-337.
^Thomas Gordon, Parent E ffectiven ess Training, (New York: 
P eter  Wyden, In c ., 1970), p. 247.
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A m erica 's schools. When authorities such as these speak with such 
vehem ence in behalf of our public school children, it is  no wonder 
that parents and students are voicing their own convictions in court.
This burgeoning body of w ritings coupled with the growing m ass of 
court decisions must eventually influence a ll schools.
Edward T. Ladd sounds this warning for the professional 
educator:
When the decision  has to be made just where to draw 
the line between the freedom  of som e and the authority of 
others, deep personal feelings come into play. This is 
now happening in schools throughout the United States, a 
fact evidenced by the number of students and parents ready 
to go to  court. The professional educator who would deal 
safely  with th ese  fee lin gs, which involve him personally  
as w ell as professionally , must have an inform ed under­
standing of the various facets of the problem. ^
Other w riters, including w riters of textbooks, have given
attention to the increasing w illingness of federa l and state courts
to  accept cases involving the internal affairs of public education.
In view  of the traditional and lega l bounds which make public
education a function of the states rather than a function of the federal
governm ent, it is  somewhat surprising to d iscover the extent of
federa l litigation  which d irectly  affects the public sch oo ls . With
regard to th is , Fellm an commented:
The impact of the national government through le g is ­
lation and appropriation upon the A m erican educational 
system  is at m ost tangential and ind irect. . . . The
^Edward T. Ladd, "Civil L ib erties, Yet Another P iece  of Baggage 
for Teacher Education?" Reprinted from  The Journal of T eacher  
Education, Vol. 20, No, 2 (Summer, 1969).
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United States Constitution, however, is  the supreme law 
of the land, and as such i s  u ltim ately enforceable by 
the Supreme Court. Insofar as the Constitution im poses 
lim itations upon the s ta tes , the sta tes are bound by them, 
and by the interpretations which the Suprem e Court 
attaches to them .
Fellm an points out that it was through the Fourteenth A m end­
ment that broad lim itations w ere placed on the states for the purpose 
of protecting the rights of individuals. This Amendment makes the 
B ill of R ights operable in the field  of education, and in the century 
sin ce the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified the Supreme Court 
and other courts have been called  upon many tim es to set lim its 
upon what the states could do in the field  of education.
Hamilton and Mort said:
The problem of the courts is  c lear . They are faced with 
the n ecessity  of deciding a conflict between the rights of 
individuals on the one hand and the principle of state 
determ ination of its educational p o lic ies  on the other. Any 
protection of individual rights pro tanto lim its lim its the 
state in the e x e r c ise  of its  power under the stated principle.
The task  of the courts is  to  p reserve  a reasonable balance 
between the two concepts. In general it may be said that 
courts are inclined to allow  the sta tes wide discretion in 
the form ulation and alteration of their educational polic ies. 
There is ,  however, a point beyond which they may not go,
Just where this point is  cannot be determ ined as an abstract 
m atter, and the final determ ination of the validity of any 
leg islation , educational or otherw ise, is  not dependent upon 
som e rigid lega l principle, but upon the judicial opinion as 
to the socia l desirab ility  o f the resu lt sought to be effected  
through the leg islation  in question.®
7
David Fellm an, The Suprem e Court and Education, (New York: 
T eachers College P r e s s , 1969).
g
Hamilton and Mort, 26.
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The schools th em selves  are som etim es caught in the middle 
when sta te -ex erc ised  rights seem  to be in conflict with the con sti­
tutionally guaranteed rights of individuals. T eachers trained to act 
in authoritarian m odes may find th em selves critic ized  and even  
prosecuted. The whole educational establishm ent has come under 
much cr itic ism  for fa ilure to practice the dem ocratic principles 
which it teach es. As Phi D elta Kappa's Chairman on Human Rights 
in T eacher Education wrote:
Many people view  the education establishm ent as 
exceptionally resistan t to change. Young people are 
demanding that our government and other institutions 
begin to act in accordance with the m oral and political 
values and human rights which lie  at the root of the 
so -ca lled  A m erican politica l dem ocracy,
Phi D elta Kappa's Teacher Education Project aim s to alert
teacher education institutions to their resp on sib ilities  in training
th ose who w ill teach in the public schools so that th ese  new teachers
can help prepare the young to understand and com m it them selves to
dem ocratic values and human rights.
There is  evidence that the youth of A m erica are impatient
with waiting for their e ld ers to act in accordance with dem ocratic
idea ls. Out of this im patience has grown an era of student unrest
which reached a peak in the 1960's and was marked by violence on
the cam puses of c o lleg es  and high schools. While the m ilitance
^Glenn R, Snider,"Human Rights: A High P rior ity  in Teacher 
Education, " Phi D elta Kappan, Novem ber, 1971, p, 172,
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m anifest during the last decade may be waning, the d issatisfaction  
with our treatm ent of students is  not. One w riter said, "Students 
at a ll levels  are demanding their rights as human beings and are 
challenging ru les, regulations, and actions of individuals and 
organizations that infringe on such rights.
The term  rights as it applies to m inors, however, i s  slippery. 
What are the rights of an individual who has no legal personhood: 
who can neither sue nor be sued in his own right; who cannot contract; 
who cannot choose where he w ill live; and who cannot choose that he 
w ill or w ill not attend school.
In d iscussing  the significant freedom  of religion  versus com ­
pulsory education case , W isconsin v. Y oder, recently heard by 
the United States Supreme Court, Stephen Arons said:
The ex istence of this paternalistic tug of war between 
the state and parents for the control of children  
exposes the fact that young people th em selves have 
few rights and alm ost no lega lly  acknowledged 
individuality.
In 1943 the Supreme Court handed down a decision which seem ed  
to open new doors of freedom  for school children. In West V irginia  
Board of Education v. Barnette, a landmark freedom  of relig ion  case  
the court proclaim ed that "educating the young for citizenship  is
^^Dale Gaddy, "Rights and Freedom s of Public School Students: 
D irections from  the 1960s,"ED 048 666, ERIC, 1970.
^^Stephen Arons, "Compulsory Education: The Plain People  
R esist, " Saturday Review, January 15, 1972, p. 57.
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reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedom s of 
the individual, . . . .
Unfortunately, the freedom  so tantalizingly offered did not really  
m ateria lize, and even today with young people becoming m ore and 
more vocal in their demands, the schools are considered by many 
to  be enclaves of totalitarianism . The A m erican C ivil L iberties  
Union observes that th is totalitarian atm osphere may be fostered  
because adm inistrators d istrust the rela tively  immature student and 
consequently em phasize the need for order rather than the need for 
freedom .
The AC LU s tr e s se s  the im portance of academ ic freedom  and
civ il liberties to the secondary schools and says:
If each new generation is to  acquire a feeling for c iv il 
lib erties , it can do so only by having a chance to live  
in the m idst of a community where the principles are 
continually exem plified. For young people, the high school 
should be such a community.
In practice th is m eans, f ir s t , that school adm inistrators  
should widen the area of teacher and student in itiative and 
responsib ility , and should accept and act upon as broad 
a construction of the rights of teachers and students as is  
com patible with their resp on sib ilities . It should be possib le  
to strike a balance between the principle of order and that 
of liberty, w ell within the outer lim its where the one 
approaches regim entation and the im position of authoritarian  
discip line, on the one hand, and licen se  and anarchy on the 
other. •
^^West V irginia v. Barnette, 319 U .S . 624 (West V irginia, 1943).
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Second, that aspect of A m erican academ ic tradition  
which s tr e s s e s  the free  contest of ideas should be a vital 
elem ent both in the developm ent of the curriculum  and in the 
classroom  teaching. N either outside o ffic ia ls nor school 
adm inistrators should perm it lim itation of expression  of 
points of view  to those currently  acceptable in the locality, 
or the region, or even the country. Contemporary accepted  
opinion needs to be transm itted  in the secondary schools, 
but never exclu sively .
No step should be neglected  which w ill enable students 
to hear and to learn to evaluate strange and unpopular ideas.
Third, opportunities for free  speech and assem bly  
should be accorded our students as early as is  practicable. 
Only by practicing som e of the rights of c itizen s, can they 
grow to the p o litica l and so c ia l maturity consonant with 
dem ocracy.l3
In the pages that follow , the lega l enactm ents of one state, 
Oklahoma, and the judicial d ec ision s emanating from  the highest 
courts  in our land w ill be review ed and analyzed to attempt to 
determ ine the m ore significant of th ese  as they relate to our 
nation's school children and the rights of those children to  the f r e e ­
dom about which th ese various authors have w ritten.
^^American C ivil L iberties Union, A cadem ic Freedom  in the 
Secondary S ch ools, A Report P repared  by the A cadem ic Freedom  
Com m ittee (New York: A m erican C ivil L iberties Union, 1968).
CHAPTER I I I
A SURVEY OF OKLAHOMA'S SCHOOL LAWS RELATED 
TO THE HUMAN-CIVIL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
A rticle XIII of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma is the 
authority upon which the state's school system  is founded. Its eight 
sections contain the following provisions.
Section 1 - provides for the establishm ent and maintenance of 
public schools and for their financial support;
Section 2 - requires the establishm ent of institutions for the 
deaf, dumb, and blind ;
Section 3 - provides that separate schools be provided for white 
and colored children ;
Section 4 - se ts  out com pulsory attendance requirements;
Section 5 - v ests  in the Board of Education the instruction in 
the public school and provides for the Board's officers ;
Section 6 - sets  up a textbook system  for the schools;
Section 7 - requires that instruction be provided in agriculture, 
horticulture, stock feeding and dom estic science; and
Section 8 - relates to higher education.
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Judicial decisions and statutory enactments have brought about 
elaboration and changes to  the constitutional provisions, including 
the repeal in 1966 of Section 3.
Title 70 of the Oklahoma Statutes contains the Oklahoma School 
Code, the purpose of which is  to provide for a state system  of public 
school education and for its establishm ent, organization and 
support. The School Code was written by the Oklahoma Legislature  
in 1949 at which tim e the state's school laws were revised  and su p ­
plemented. In 1971 the School Code was again revised  and various 
sections of T itle 70 w ere repealed or renumbered.
One purpose of th is research , as previously stated, is  to 
analyze Oklahoma's lega l enactments pertaining to the following 
hum an-civil rights of public school children: (1) the right to  be 
secure in the person, (2) the right to protection against unlawful 
search and seizu re , (3) the right to due p rocess, (4) the right to 
freedom  of expression , (5) the right to freedom  of speech , (6) the 
right to  freedom  of the p r e ss , and (7) the right to  freedom  of religion , 
A reading of the Oklahoma School Code revea ls that human- 
civ il rights, as such, are not mentioned th ere in , However, the 
following extracts from  the Code define the school, describe the 
powers which statutes have delegated to school o ffic ia ls , and/or 
relate d irectly  to the handling of students.
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The public schools of Oklahoma shall consist of a ll free  
schools supported by public taxation. . , .
A school year for a ll public schools in Oklahoma shall 
consist of at least ten months of four (4) weeks each. .
The residence of any child for school purposes shall be 
the legal residence of the parents. . . .
A ll children between the ages of five . . . and tw enty-one. 
shall be entitled to attend school free  of charge in the 
district in which they resid e.
The board of education of each school d istrict shall have 
the power to  make rules and regulations. . . •
Any person who str ik es , threatens to strike, or otherwise 
abuses any employee of the school district shall be guilty  
of a m isdem eanor. . . ,
The teacher of a child  attending a public school shall have 
the same right as a parent or guardian to control and 
discipline such child during the tim e the child is in 
attendance in or in transit to or from  the school or any 
other school function authorized by the school d istrict  
or c lassroom  presided over by the teacher.
It shall be unlawful and a m isdem eanor for any teacher to 
reveal any inform ation concerning any child . . . .
2 2
Any school d istrict may provide transportation for each  
child who should attend any public elem entary or high school.
It shall be unlawful for a parent, guardian, custodian or 
other person having control of a child who is  over the age of 
seven (7) years and under the age of eighteen (18) years, and 
who has not finished four (4) years of high school work, to  
neglect or refuse to cause or com pel such child to attend 
and com ply with the ru les of som e public, private or other 
school . . . .
No sectarian or re lig iou s doctrine shall be taught or in cu l­
cated in any of the public schools of th is state, but nothing 
in this section  sh a ll be construed to prohibit the reading of 
the Holy Scrip tures.
Any pupil who is guilty of im m orality or persistent violation  
of the regulations of a public school may be suspended by 
the principal teacher of such school, which suspension  
shall not extend beyond the current school year; provided, 
the pupil suspended sh a ll have the right to  appeal from  the 
decision  of such principal teacher to the board of education  
of the d istr ic t, which shall, upon a full investigation of the 
m atter, determ ine the guilt or innocence of the pupil and 
its  decision  shall be final.
The superintendent or principal of any public school in the 
state of Oklahoma shall have the authority to detain and 
authorize the search  for dangerous weapons or controlled  
dangerous substances, as defined by House B ill No. 1100 . . 
The superintendent or principal authorizing such search  
shall notify the loca l law enforcement agency which shall 
be responsib le for obtaining any warrant or other authoriza­
tion n ecessary  to conduct such search.
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Any parent or other person who sh a ll w illfully or m aliciously  
beat or injure, torture, maim, or use unreasonable force  
upon a child under the age of seventeen  (17) . . . shall be.' 
punished by im prisonm ent in the state penitentiary not 
exceeding five y ea rs , or by im prisonm ent in a county ja il  
not exceeding one year, or by a fine of not more than 
F ive Hundred D ollars , . . .
Provided, however, that nothing contained in this Act s h a ll  
prohibit any parent, teacher, or other person using ordinary  
force as a m eans of d iscip line, including but not lim ited  
to spanking, sw itching, or paddling.
Summary
The public school system  of Oklahoma is  adm inistered by the 
State Department of Education which has statutory regulative and 
adm inistrative pow ers.
A public school year must consist of 180 days of instruction .
A ll children age five through twenty-one may attend school free  of 
charge; children seven  through eighteen must attend school until 
they have com pleted four years of high school.
Local school d is tr ic ts  are governed by locally  elected  boards 
whose rules have the force  of law. A child must attend school in 
the d istr ic t in which h is parents and he may transfer only with  
approval of the receiv ing  and sending schools, if the tran sfer serv es  
his best in terests  as defined by the sch oo ls .
Parents neglecting or refusing to  send a child to school w ill 
be guilty of a m isdem eanor and punishable by law.
l^ L e slie  F ish er , School Laws of Oklahoma, 1971.
Inculcation of sectarian  or relig ious doctrine is  forbidden in the 
sch ools, although scrip ture may be read,
A parent or student who str ik es , threatens, or abuses a school 
em ployee is  guilty of a m isdem eanor.
The teacher has the sam e right as a parent to control and 
discip line a child, including the right to use reasonable corporal 
punishment. However, a person who w illfu lly  or m aliciously beats 
or injures a child is  subject to crim inal prosecution.
A pup'l may be suspended by the principal for the remainder of 
the school year; he has the right to appeal to the board of education 
whose decision  is  final.
The superintendent or principal is  ex p ressly  authorized to 
detain and have searched students suspected of concealing dangerous 
weapons or substances. Law officers are to be called to conduct 
the search  and they are responsib le  for obtaining warrants.
A student found to  p o sse s s  dangerous weapons or substances may 
be suspended.
CHAPTER IV
AN ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED IN CASES 
INVOLVING CERTAIN HUMAN-CIVIL RIGHTS 
OF SCHOOL CHILDREN
C ases Involving the Right to  Be Secure 
in the P erson
The Fourth Amendment to  the United States Constitution says 
"The right of the people to be secu re in their persons . . . shall not 
be violated" and the Eighth Amendment adds, . . nor cru el and 
unusual punishments inflicted . The Phi D elta Kappa C om m ission  
relates th ese  basic rights to th ose contained in the Fourteenth Am end­
ment: "No person shall be . . , deprived of life, liberty, or property  
without due process of law. . . . "  and says:
The right to secu rity  of person . . .  is  basic to freedom  as 
A m ericans define freedom . If the person is  not held inviolate  
and if  property rights are not maintained, then none of the 
other human rights can rea lly  ex ist. The right to secu rity  
of person is  c lo se ly  akin to the right of privacy and protects  
the person from  insult or injury by others. ^
With the burgeoning of law suits relative to the hum an-civ il rights 
of students in our public sch oo ls , the dearth of cases pertaining to 
violation of the person is  e sp ec ia lly  notable. Since 1954 eight cases
^U. S. , Constitution, Am endm ents, Art. IV, Art. VIII.
^Phi D elta Kappa C om m ission on Human Rights and Education,
"A Rationale for Analyzing H um an-C ivil Rights, " 1971.
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have been published in which a school child through his parents or 
guardians has sued a teacher or other school officia l for assault or 
injury to his person. In none of these cases has the plaintiff appealed 
to the Constitution or claim ed violation of h is  basic human rights.
On the contrary, these are damage cases in which the plaintiffs 
appeal to the court for re lie f based on permanent mental or physical 
injury to the person because of excessive  punishment. Of th ese eight 
ca ses  (sum m arized in Table 1, following) five resu lted  in clear  
verdicts for the teacher, two were decided in favor of the injured 
student, and another was remanded to a jury. T hese assau lt and 
battery ca ses  w ere heard in state courts.
The fir st such case to be investigated was brought before the 
Supreme Court of Alabama in 1954.^ Here a school boy, eight and 
one-half years old, was whipped by a teacher for being unruly and 
insubordinate. There was conflicting evidence with regard to the 
instrum ent used on the boy but it appeared that five  licks w ere  
administered, the skin was not broken, and the boy m issed  no school. 
A fter a jury tr ia l in which the verdict was rendered in favor of the 
teacher, the case was appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama 
upheld the verdict of the lower court which had noted that the teacher  
was not angry at the tim e of the punishment, that he had no legal
^Suits V. Glover, 71 S o .2d 49, 260 A la. 449, 43 ALR 2d 465, 
(Alabama, 1954).
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m alice or wicked m otives, and that he did not inflict permanent
injury to the child. The appellate court added:
A schoolm aster is  regarded as standing in loco parentis and 
has the authority to  adm inister m oderate correction to 
pupils under h is care . . . . In determ ining the reasonable­
n ess  of the punishment or the extent of m alice, proper 
m atters for consideration are the instrument used and the 
nature of the offense com m itted by the child, the age and 
physical condition of the child and the other attendant 
circum stances.
The case of People v. B aldini, a New York lawsuit, a lso  resu lted  
in a decision  for the t e a c h e r .H e r e  a teacher was sued for assau lt  
because of striking a child with an open hand and a clenched fis t . As 
a result of th is punishment the boy had a bloody nose and a scratch  
on his back. The Court found that the fifteen -year-o ld  boy had a 
record of being unruly, that he suffered no permanent injury, and 
that judgment should be in favor of the defendant teacher. The Court 
said:
It is  the thought of the court that the teacher must be suprem e  
in his c lassroom , like any other person placed in authority, 
he must u se the authority vested  in him  w isely  and never 
e x ce ss iv e ly . The court fe e ls  that the leg islature has cloaked 
the teacher with d iscretion  so that he may maintain the authority 
and decorum  n ecessa ry  for the proper conduct of c lassroom . 
Instruction can only be properly and su ccessfu lly  given by one 
who has the authority over his pupils and who has their resp ect. 
The teacher is  vested  with the right to  give orders and as a 
concomitant of the sam e he should have the sanctions to  
enforce them .
^People ex re l Ebert v . Baldini, 159 NYS 2d 802 (New York, 1957).
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In 1958 an appellate court in Connecticut reached a sim ilar con­
clusion in the case of A ndreozzi v. Rabano.  ̂ A fifteen -year-o ld  boy 
sued a teach er for strik ing him a cross  the face with the back of his 
hand after the pupil had assum ed a belligerent attitude and uttered a 
vulgar rem ark. The teach er testified  that he believed the boy intended 
to strike him .
The court viewed the striking of the student as a corrective  action  
rather than punishment and relieved  the teach er of all liability . The 
court stated:
. . . the defendant acted, not for the purpose of inflicting  
punishm ent, but to resto re  order and discip line. It is  
m anifest from  a ll the facts and circum stances that unless 
the defendant had taken prompt and effective action, he 
would have been hum iliated in the eyes of his pupils and the 
order and d iscip line of the c lassroom  would have been  
ser io u sly  affected.
Tinkham v . Kole, an Iowa case , involved a th irteen-year-o ld  boy 
who was slapped sev era l t im e s  by his teach er  for being slow to rem ove 
a pair of g loves from  his hands.  ̂ Although m edical evidence tended 
to show that the boy had a ruptured ear drum as a resu lt of the 
incident, the tr ia l court d ism issed  the ca se  saying, ". . . we should 
stop this foo lish n ess right here and now. The teacher had a right 
to d iscip line the student and to use such fo rce  as was n ecessa ry  to do 
so . . . . ” The Supreme Court of Iowa agreed  that proper d iscip line
^Andreozzi v. Rubano, 141 A. 2d 639 (Connecticut, 1958). 
^Tinkham v. Kole, 110 N. W. 2d 258 (Iowa, 1961),
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is of v ital im portance but reversed  and remanded the case to a jury
saying, " . . .  the reasonableness of the punishment here was a
question of fact for the jury, not one of law for the court, "
In 1963 a corporal punishment case came before the Supreme
Court of Indiana.”̂ In Indiana State P erson n el Board v. Jackson,
the defendant was a teacher in a state school for the m entally retarded
who spanked a pupil in violation of a school regulation against corporal
punishment. D ism issed  by the P erson n el Board, the teacher asked
for a judicial review , as was provided by st atute, and was reinstated.
The Personnel Board appealed.
In upholding the reinstatem ent of the teacher, the Supreme Court
expressed  doubts that a "rule" could deprive a teacher of the right
to  use physical force to elim inate a d isturbance. A judge of the
court in a concurring opinion said:
As long as teach ers or parents are obligated under the law 
to educate, teach  and tra in  children, they may not be denied 
the n ecessary  means of carrying out their responsib ility  as 
such teach ers or parents.
In 1967 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana rendered  
a decision  in which a teacher and his school board were held liable
g
for ex ce ss iv e  punishment of a pupil. The principals in F rank v. 
Orleans P arish  School Board w ere a fourteen year old boy weighing
^Indiana State P ersonnel Board v. Jackson, 192 N. E. 2d 740  ̂
(Indiana, 1963).
^Frank v. Orleans Parish  School Board, 195 So. 2d 451,
(Louisiana, 1967).
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one hundred pounds and a thirty-four year old teach er weighing about 
230 pounds. The court found that the teacher lifted , shook, and dropped 
the boy, and that such actions were c learly  in e x c e ss  of that physical 
force n ecessa ry  to either d iscip line the boy or protect the teacher.
The court found the defendants to be liable for the injuries incurred  
from the punishment. As to the legality  of corporal punishment, the 
court stated:
We exp ressly  refrain  from  making any judicial pronouncement 
as to whether it is  objectionable per se  for a teacher in a 
public school to p lace h is hands upon a student: common 
sense would dictate, however, that the individual facts and 
environm ental ch aracter istics  emanating from  each case  
would d isc lo se  both the right and the reasons for a teacher  
to do so , and the degree of force , if any, which may be 
used under particular or peculiar c ircu m stan ces, A general 
rule in the negative relative to th is problem may encourage 
students to flaunt the authority of their  tea ch ers. On the 
other hand, a genera l rule permitting physical contact 
between teacher and student in any instance, without 
qualification, would obviously encourage the one who 
occupies a position  of superiority to take advantage of 
those who are in a le s s  favorable position, s in ce  they are 
subject to  their authority.
City of Macomb v . Gould is  an Illin o is case occurring in 1969,^
Here the defendant was a school teacher convicted in the circuit 
court of violating a city ordinance prohibiting fighting. The teacher  
appealed his conviction. The appellate court, in reviewing the facts  
found that the teacher had allegedly struck a fifteen year old student 
severa l tim es while charged with the duty of keeping a crowd away
*^City of Macomb v, Gould, 244 N, E, 2d 634, 111, App, 2d 361 
(Illinois, 1969),
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from  the fence between stands and playing field during a ball gam e. 
The appellate court held that whether the teacher had m aliciously  
inflicted corporal punishment upon the student was a question for the 
tr ier  of fact and affirm ed the lower court's decision.
A s im ila r  case with a different outcome was tried  in A rizona in 
1970. La Frentz y. Gallagher involved a suit for dam ages against a 
teacher who pushed a boy during softball c la ss . The lower court 
found that the punishment was not unreasonable and declined to  award 
dam ages to the plaintiff. Supreme Court of Arizona upheld that 
decision  noting that corporal punishment which is  reasonable in 
degree is  "privileged" since the teacher stands in loco parentis.^̂  
Within the last year two cases have been tr ied  in United States 
D istrict Court in which plaintiffs sued to  enjoin public school system s  
from  adm inistering corporal punishment to students in the schools.
In both c a se s  the Court has decided in favor of the school's right to 
use corporal punishment, and in both the Court decreed  that such  
punishment is  not "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the 
Constitutional amendment.
On June 4, 1971, the United States D istrict Court for the Northern  
D istrict of Texas, Dallas D ivision , rendered its d ecision  in the case
10La Frentz v. Gallagher, 462 P . 2d 804, 105 A r i z .  255 
(Arizona, I970,y
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of Ware v, Estes.  ̂  ̂ In this case Douglas Ware, a minor represented
by his father, sued the superintendent of the D allas schools, asking
for an injunction restrain ing the defendants from adm inistering
corporal punishment in the D allas schools without the prior perm ission
of the parent or student. A rule of the school system  declared:
P rincipals are authorized to  adm inister any reasonable 
punishment, including detention, corporal punishment, 
suspension for a period not to  exceed  ten school days at 
one tim e, or recom m endation for expulsion from school.
The plaintiffs declared that corporal punishment adm inistered  
without consent v io la tes  rights guaranteed by the Eighth and F ou r­
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. B esides  
violating their rights to due p ro cess , the plaintiffs charged that 
corporal punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
The court noted that there was evidence that the practice of 
corporal punishment in the D allas Independent School D istrict has 
been abused by som e of the seven  thousand teachers in that system , 
but said , "This does not, however, show that the policy itse lf is  
unconstitutional. "
In rendering its  decision  against the plaintiffs, the court stated  
as follow s:
The Court does not find that corporal punishment as author­
ized by the sta te law and the ru les of the Dallas Independent 
School D istr ict amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.
^^Ware v. E ste s  et a l . , 328 F . Supp. 657 (Texas, 1971).
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It must be pointed out in  th is context that if  the corporal 
punishment is unreasonable or ex cess iv e , it is  no longer 
lawful and the perpetrator of it may be crim inally  and 
c iv illy  liable. The law and policy do not sanction child 
abuse.
In closing th is opinion, the Court fe e ls  com pelled to utter 
a general precept in light of the many cases it has had to 
entertain in  the recent past embodying allegations of 
constitutional violations by the loca l school d istr ic t. The 
following quote w ill su ccin ctly  and accurately describe  
the Court's attitude with respect to these c a s e s .
"Judicial in terposition  in the operation of the public 
school sy stem  of the Nation ra ises  problem s requiring 
care and restra in t. * * By and large, public educa­
tion in our Nation is  com m itted to the control of 
state and lo ca l au thorities. Courts do not and cannot 
intervene in the resolution  of conflicts which ar ise  
in the daily operation of school system s and which do 
not d irectly  and sharply im plicate basic constitutional 
valu es."  Epperson V .  A rkansas, 393 U .S . 97, 104,
89 S.C t. 266, 21 L. Ed. 2d 228, 234 (1968).
With that the court d ism issed  the plaintiffs' complaint.
In Sim s v. Board of Education , a case tr ied  in United States
D istr ict Court for the D istr ict of New M exico, a s im ila r  judgment
was handed down. A m inor boy, Zebediah S im s, suing on behalf
of h im self and a ll other person s sim ila r ly  situated, through his
parents, asked the court to enjoin the schools in Independent School
D istr ict No. 22 from  adm inistering corporal punishment to pupils
in the system . The suit was brought on the grounds that such
punishment v io la tes the rights of the plaintiffs under the F irst, Eighth,
^ ^ S i m s  V . Board of Education of Independent School D istrict 
No. 22, 329 F. Supp. 678 (New M exico, 1971).
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and Fourteenth A m endm ents. Here as in Ware v. E stes , the fed era l
court declined to substitute its  judgment for that of state law and
school board regulation, and said:
This Court cannot, under the applicable law, and would not 
if applicable law perm itted the ex er c ise  of such discretion , 
substitute its  judgment for the judgment of the defendants 
in the case at hand on what regulations are appropriate to 
maintain order and insure respect of pupils for school 
discip line and property. This Court w ill not act as a 
super school board to second gu ess the defendants. If 
acts v io lative of reasonable school regulations be not 
discouraged and punished, those acts can resu lt in the 
disruption of the schools th em selves . If our educational 
institutions are not allowed to ru le th em selv es , within 
reasonable bounds, as here, experience has dem onstrated  
that others w ill rule them  to their  destruction .
Let there be no m isunderstanding as to  the p rec ise  holding 
herein . The role of a fed era l court in adjudicating claim s 
that state school regulations v iolate the constitutional 
rights of pupils is  re la tiv e ly  narrow. I do not hold that 
any school regulation, however lo o se ly  fram ed, is  
n ecessa r ily  valid . I do not hold that school authorities have 
the authority to require pupils to  lay asid e any constitu­
tional rights when he en ro lls . I do not hold that school 
authorities may act arb itrarily  or capriciously  in the 
form ulation or in the enforcem ent of school regulations.
I do hold that the defendants have the power to promulgate 
and to enforce reasonable regulations governing students 
in attendance with power to im pose responsib le nondiscrim - 
inatory corporal punishment for breaches thereof without 
violating any federa lly  protected constitutional rights 
of pupils.
So saying, the Court d ism issed  the case for fa ilure to state a 
claim  on which r e lie f  can be granted.
Summary
Corporal punishment ca ses  fa ll into two groups: (1) those brought 
in state courts and charging assault and battery, and (2) those brought
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in United States D istrict Courts and charging violation of C onstitu­
tional rights.
Of the eight c a se s  reported since 1954 in which students have sued 
teachers for assault and battery or ex cess iv e  punishment, five have 
been decided in favor of the teacher. The common thread running 
through these decisions is  that of "reasonableness. "
Of the three ca ses  in  which the decision  was not in favor of the 
teacher, one was reversed  and remanded to a jury. The other tv/o 
d ecisions indicate that there are types of punishment which courts 
w ill find "unreasonable":
(1) A case where a two hundred thirty pound teacher lifted
a one hundred pound boy, shook him against the b leachers, 
lifted him from the ground and dropped him with such  
force that he suffered a broken arm;
(2) A case where a teach er attacked a boy on a baseball 
field and struck him about the head severa l tim es so 
that the teacher was arrested , tried and convicted of 
fighting.
The two federal c a se s  indicate the unwillingness of fed era l judges 
to interject the courts into the operation of the public schools. In 
these two cases, both c la ss  actions, no violation of Constitutional 
rights was found.
In general, the following statem ents can be made based upon a 
review  of reported cases:
(1) Both state and fed era l courts have upheld corporal punishment 
as legal and proper, where it is  "reasonable. "
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(2) Both state and federal courts have upheld the schools' right 
to prom ulgate and enforce ru les of conduct for students.
(3) No court has found corporal punishment to be a violation  
of the Constitutional rights of pupils in public schools.
(4) In determ ining reasonableness, courts w ill take into account 
the conditions under which the punishment is  adm inistered, the size  
and condition of the child, the nature of the offense, and the m otives 
of the person adm inistering the punishment,
(5) Teachers adm inistering punishment to an "unreasonable" 
degree may be convicted of assault and battery and may be a sse ssed  
dam ages. M em bers of school boards and other school officia ls  
may be held liable for dam ages where a teacher within the system  
is  responsib le for adm inistering excessive  punishment.
(6) Courts have relied on the doctrine of in loco parentis
in support of the schools' right to adm inister corporal punishment.
T A B L E  1
CASES INVOLVING A L L E G E D  IN F R IN G E M EN T  OF 
THE RIGHT TO B E  S E C U R E  IN THE P ER SO N  
AND OTHER RIGHTS^
C as e D i s  po s i t ion
Suits  V .  G lover ,
71 So. 2d 49,  260 A la .  449,
43 A L R  2d 465 (Alabam a,  1954)
Suit by fa th er  of young boy c la im in g  d a m a g e s  for  a s s a u l t  
and b a t te r y  by t e a c h e r  upon ch i ld .  Ju ry  found for  
the  t e a c h e r  and S u p r e m e  Court of A la b a m a  a f f ir m e d .
P e o p l e  ex r e l  E ber t  v. B ald in i ,  
159 NYS 2d 802 (New York, 1957)
A s s a u l t  and b a t te r y  suit  a g a in s t  s c h o o l  t e a c h e r  who  
struck a child w i th  an open hand and c le n c h e d  f i s t .  
Court held fo r  the  t e a c h e r . -0
A n d r e o z z i  v. Rubano, 141 A. 2d 639  
(Connect icut ,  19 58)
F i f t e e n - y e a r -  old boy sued t e a c h e r  who s t r u c k  him  
a c r o s s  the f a c e  a f ter  the pupil  a s s u m e d  a b e l l i g e r e n t  
attitude  and ut tered  a v u lgar  r e m a r k .  The  Court found 
for  the  t e a c h e r .
T inkham v. K o le ,
llO N. W. 2d 258 (Iowa, 1961)
A 13- y e a r - o l d  boy s u e s  h is  t e a c h e r  fo r  a s s a u l t  and 
battery  a f ter  the t e a c h e r  s t r u c k  the  boy about the head.  
Although  m e d i c a l  ev id en ce  in d ic a te d  the  boy had a 
ruptured e a r  d r u m ,  the  t r i a l  court d i s m i s s e d  the c a s e .  
S u p r e m e  Court of Iowa r em a n ded  the c a s e  to a jury .
& E xcept  for  the two f e d e r a l  c a s e s  rep or ted  in th is  tab le ,  the  c o r p o r a l  pun ishm ent  c a s e s  descx-ibed  
h e r e  a r e  not c iv i l  r ig h ts  su i t s ,  but a r e  d a m a g e  s u i t s .
T A B L E  1 - -  Continued
Indiana State  P e r s o n n e l  Board v. J a c k s o n , 
192 N. E, 2d 740 (Indiana, 1963)
T his  c a s e  involv ed  a t e a c h e r  in s ta te  s c h o o l  fo r  m e n ta l ly  
re ta r d e d  who paddled a student  in v io la t io n  of s ta te  
s ta tute .  A fter  be ing  f ir e d ,  t e a c h e r  a sk ed  foi" a ju d ic ia l  
r e v i e w  and was  r e in s t a t e d .  P e r s o n n e l  Board  app ea led .  
S u p r e m e  Court of Indiana upheld the r e v i e w  boai'd and 
o r d e r e d  the t e a c h e r  r e in s ta te d .
F  rank v. O r lea n s  P a r i s h  S ch o o l  B o a r d , 
195 So. 2d 451 (L o u is ia n a ,  1967)
Suit a g a in s t  t e a c h e r  for  a s s a u l t  and b a t te r y  upon a 
14- y e a r - o l d  boy who s u f fered  a f r a c t u r e d  a r m  when he  
f e l l  or  w as  thro w n to the  flooi' .  The  court  found for  
the  student  on the ground the  p un ish m en t  w as  e x c e s s i v e .
OJ00
City of M a c o m b  v, Gould,
244 N . E .  2d 634 ( I l l ino is ,  1969)
D efendant  s c h o o l  t e a c h e r  w as  c o n v ict ed  in c i r c u i t  court  
of v io la t in g  c i ty  o r d in a n c e  prohibit ing  f ight ing  and he 
ap p ea led .  The a p p e l la te  court held that w h e th e r  he  
s tr u c k  15- y e a r - o l d  student  with u n r e a s o n a b le  f o r c e  
w h i le  cha rg ed  with duty of keeping  crowd away f r o m  
f e n c e  b e tw e e n  s tand s  and playing  f ie ld  w as  q u e s t i o n  for  
t r i e r  of fa c t .  Vei'dict  a f f i r m e d .
La F r e n tz  v. G a l l a g h e r ,
462 P .  2d 804 (A rizona ,  1970)
T e a c h e r  sued for  a s s a u l t  b e c a u s e  he pushed a boy during  
s o f t b a l l  c l a s s .  S u p e r io r  Court found for  the t e a c h e r  and 
CO - d e f e n d a n t s . S u p r e m e  Court of A r iz o n a  upheld d e c i s i o n  
s a y in g  that c o r p o r a l  punishm ent  which i s  r e a s o n a b le  in 
d e g r e e  i s  " p r iv i le g e d .  "
T A B L E  1 — Continued
S im s  V, Bo ard of Ed uca t ion  of  
Independent Sc h o o l  D i s t r i c t  No.  22,
et a l , 329 F ,  Supp.  
1971)
680 (New M e x ic o ,
This  i s  an ac t io n  in United S ta tes  Distric.., Court,  
D is t r i c t  of New M e x ic o ,  to  enjo in  a d m in is t r a t io n  
of c o r p o r a l  punishm ent  in  s c h o o l s .  The Court ruled  
that the  s c h o o l  o f f ic ia l s  had pow er  to i m p o s e  r e a s o n ­
able  n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  c o r p o r a l  punishm ent  and that  
su c h  pu n ish m en t  did not v io la t e  co n st i t u t io n a l  p r o h i b i ­
t ion  a g a in s t  c r u e l  and un usu al  pu n ish m en t .
W are v.  E s t e s ,  et al ,
328  F .  Supp. 657  ( T e x a s ,  1971)
C l a s s  a c t io n  to r e s t r a i n  c o r p o r a l  punishment  in 
D a l la s  independent  s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t .  The United State s  
D i s t r i c t  Court foz' the  N o r th e r n  D i s t r i c t  of  T e x a s  
held  that e v id e n c e  fa i le d  to  show that d i s t r i c t  pol icy  
r e la t in g  to  c o r p o r a l  pu n ish m en t  w as  a r b i t r a r y ,  
c a p r i c i o u s ,  u n r e a s o n a b le  or w h o l ly  un re lated  to  
c o m p e t e n c y  of s t a te  in d e t e r m in in g  i t s  ed uca t io n a l  
po l ic y .  Court ruled that c o r p o r a l  punishment  as  
a u th o r ized  by T e x a s  law and r u l e s  of D a l l a s  independent  
s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  d o e s  not amount to  c r u e l  and unusu al  
punish m en t  as def ined by U. S. C onst i tut ion .
OJ
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Cases Involving A lleged Infringement 
of the Right to Freedom  Against 
Unlawful Search and Seizure
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution contains 
th ese  words :
The right of the people to be secu re in their persons, houses 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search es and 
se izu res, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issu e , 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirm ation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized .
Today the Constitution of every state in the union contains such a
provision.
But it is  only in very recent tim es that this guarantee has been
viewed as extending to the young citizen s who populate our public
schools. During this investigation, four such ca ses  were discovered
to have been heard in appellate courts. In three of the ca ses , school
officia ls and others w ere attempting to find illic it  drugs, and in the
fourth stolen goods. These ca ses  are summ arized in Table 2,
In State v. Stein, a Kansas ca se , the defendant, a high school
boy was convicted in Franklin County D istrict Court on burglary
14charges, from  which conviction he appealed. His appeal was based
l^U. S. , Constitution, Am endm ents, Art. IV.
“̂̂ State V. Stein, 456 P. 2d 1, cer t. den. 90 S. Ct. 966, 25 L. Ed. 
2d 128 (Kansas, 1969).
40
41
on the allegation that he was not warned of his right to remain silent 
and his right to counsel prior to the tim e his locker was searched by 
the school's principal and his effects brought to the school office.
On appeal to  the Supreme Court of K ansas, that Court held that 
evidence obtained in the search  was adm issib le because a high  
school principal has custodial control of school lockers and having 
a cce ss  thereto, and p ossessing  a m aster list on a ll locker com bina­
tions and a key to open any locker, he is  empowered to open and 
search  the sam e for contraband upon the request of o fficers. The 
Supreme Court upheld the conviction. C ertiorari was denied by 
the United States Supreme Court.
Another 1969 case took place in New York.^^ People v. Overton 
began in Mount Vernon City Court where high school boy was being 
prosecuted on charges of p ossessin g  ille g a l drugs, evidence for 
such prosecution having been obtained by a search  of the boy's 
school locker. Motions were made to suppress the evidence and 
d ism iss  the inform ation, but the city court denied such m otions. 
Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, Appellate Term , which 
reversed  the lower court's d ecision . The plaintiff. People of New 
York, appealed that decision. Reargument was had before the Court 
of Appeals which held that where the police presented the high school 
with a warrant directing locker search of two students, and where
15 People V. Overton, 249 N .E . 2d 366 (New York, 1969).
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respondent student, after a search  of his person yielded nothing, 
indicated that marijuana was in h is locker, the v ice  principal had 
authority to allow the o fficers to search  respondent's locker. The 
Court of Appeals reversed  the order of Appellate Term , and adhered 
to the original decision  of the City Court.
In 1970 the Court of Appeals of California heard a case involving 
an alleged illeg a l search  of a student's locker/^* In this ca se  the 
vice principal of a school obtained inform ation that a student was 
in p ossession  of ille g a l drugs. He searched the boy's locker without 
consent and d iscovered  m arijuana c igarettes . The cigarettes w ere 
used as evidence in court. The student contended that the court was 
in error in using evidence obtained during an ille g a l search . The 
Court of Appeals rendered its  judgment in favor of the school and 
stated that the prim ary purpose of the school o ffic ia l's  search  was 
not to obtain convictions but to  secu re evidence of the student's m is ­
conduct, which was a right that the school had under its  in loco  
parentis role.
In 1972 a search  and se izu re  case was tried in United States 
17D istrict Court. In Caldwell v. Cannady, som e high school students 
who had been suspended from  school for p o ssessio n  of drugs, brought 
action seeking a permanent injunction against school authorities
^̂ n re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (California, 1970).
^^Caldwell, et a l . v. Cannady, 340 F. Supp. 835 (T exas, 1972)
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restraining them from  interfering with or prohibiting students'
attendance at school. P laintiffs asked for a declaratory judgment
concerning the constitutionality of the sch ool's  policy, and asked the
court to find that the evidence used against the students was illegally
obtained. The search  complained of in th is case was of an automobile
which search  took place without a warrant, but during a tim e that
o fficers could have obtained a warrant. The Court found that as to
two litigants, Caldwell and Jones, evidence used against them  was
found during an illeg a l search  and was unconstitutional. Therefore
th ey  were ordered reinstated in school. As to the student Barrow,
the Court held that search  was reasonable and the evidence properly
obtained, and upheld his expulsion from  school.
In th is case the Court upheld the right of students to be free from
im proper search; the Court upheld the sch oo ls's  policy of expelling
students found in p ossession  of dangerous or narcotic drugs; the
Court found that w arrantless search  of an automobile was unreasonable
where a warrant could have been obtained; and the Court said:
The power to adm inister public education is delegated by 
law to loca l school boards. Those bodies are charged with 
the principal duty of providing quality education which includes 
a proper environment for quality education. This duty 
n ecessa r ily  ca rr ies with it the power to promulgate whatever 




C ases involving a lleged  unconstitutional search  and seizure are 
beginning to appear in appellate courts, as evidenced by three such  
cases reported from  state courts and one from a fed era l court since  
1968. A review  of th ese  published cases reveals the following 
general information:
(1) A court has held that school officia ls have a custodial 
right which em powers them  to search  students' lockers for illeg a l 
m ateria ls.
(2) A court has held that illeg a l drugs obtained from  a w arrant­
le ss  search  of a student's locker may be used as evidence against 
the student because the school has a right in loco parentis to 
secure evidence of a student's m isconduct.
(3) A court has held that search  of a student's locker where 
student was not given n otice  of his right to  counsel or right to rem ain  
silent was lega l and that m arijuana discovered therein  could be used  
as evidence.
(4) A federa l court has held that w arrantless search  of automobile 
is unconstitutional and evidence could not be used against students in 
school's action to expel the students.
(5) A federal court has held that a school has the right to expel 
students for illeg a l p o ssess io n  of dangerous narcotics where the 
evidence is lawfully obtained.
T A B L E  2
CASES INVOLVING A L L E G E D  IN F R IN G E M E N T  OF  
T HE RIGHT TO F R E E D O M  AGAINST U N L A W F U L  
SEARC H AND  SE IZU R E
C a s e
O verton  v. New  York,
249 N, E.  2d 36b (New York,  1969)
_________________   D i s  po s i t io n__________________________
"I^rosecution w h e r e i n  m o t io n s  w e r e  m ade to s u p p r e s s  
e v i d e n c e  and to d i s m i s s  the  in fo r m a t io n .  T he  Mt. 
V ernon  City Court denied  the  m o t io n ,  but th e  S u p r e m e  
Court ,  A p p e l la te  T e r m ,  r e v e r s e d .  An a p p e a l  was  
tak en .  Upon r e a r g u m e n t  the  Court of A p p e a ls  held  
that  w h e r e  p o l ic e  p r e s e n t e d  h ig h  s c h o o l  p r in c ip a l  
w ith  a w a r r a n t  d ir e c t i n g  l o c k e r  s e a r c h  of tw o s tudents  
and w h e r e  r esp on d en t  s tudent ,  a f ter  a s e a r c h  of his  
p e r s o n  y ie ld e d  nothing,  in d ica te d  that m a r i j u a n a  was  
in  h is  l o c k e r ,  the  v i c e  p r in c ip a l  , w h o s e  d ut ie s  inc luded  
e n f o r c e m e n t  of s c h o o l  r u le s  and r e g u la t io n s ,  one of 
w h ic h  prohibited  the  s t o r a g e  of m a t e r i a l  in v io la t io n  
of the  law, had autho ri ty  to c o n s e n t  in the  s e a r c h  of  
r e s p o n d e n t 's  l o c k e r .  O r ig in a l  d e c i s i o n ,  r e v e r s i n g  
o r d e r  of A p p e l la te  T e r m ,  a dh ered  to.
C a ld w e l l  v. Cannady,
340 F .  Supp. 835 ( T e x a s ,  1972)
F o u r  h igh  s c h o o l  s tuden ts  su sp e n d ed  fo r  a l le g e d  v io la t io n  
of p o l ic y  proh ibi t ing  p o s s e s s i o n  of d r u g s ,  brought ac t ion  
to injo in  s c h o o l  f r o m  i n t e r f e r in g  with s tu d en ts '  a t tendance  
at s c h o o l .  The  Court he ld ,  in te r  a l ia ,  that w a r r a n t l e s s  
s e a r c h  of a u to m o b i le  w as  u n r e a s o n a b le  and thus product  
of s e a r c h  could not be c o n s i d e r e d .  S u s p e n s io n  of two  
bo y s  w h o s e  c a r  w as  s e a r c h e d  w e r e  o r d e r e d  r e in st a te d  
in s c h o o l .  S u s p e n s io n  of th ird s tudent was  upheld.
T A B L E  2 - -  Continued
State V.  Ste in ,  456  P .  2d I, 
c e r t ,  den,  90 S. Ct. 966,
25 L, Ed 2d 128 (K an sa s ,  1969)
Defendant w as  c o n v ic te d  in F r a n k l in  County D i s t r i c t  
Court on s e c o n d  d e g r e e  bui'g lary  and grand la r c e n y  
c h a r g e s  f r o m  w hich  he  ap p ea led .  The  S u p r e m e  Court  
held  that no tw ithstand ing  the  fact  that defendant  w as  
not w arne d of h is  right to  r e m a in  s i l e n t  and his  right  
to  c o u n s e l  b e fo r e  h is  l o c k e r  w as  s e a r c h e d  by the  
p r in c ip a l and h is  e f f e c t s  b rou gh t to  th e  s c h o o l  o f f ic e ,  
p r o p e r ty  tak en  f r o m  l o c k e r  w a s  a d m i s s i b l e .
In r e  D o n a ld so n , 75 C al. R p tr . 220
(C a l i fo rn ia ,  1970)
C a se  in v o lv in g  th e  s e a r c h  o f  a s tu d e n t 's  lo c k e r  by
v i c e - p r i n c i p a l  o f  a  s c h o o l  w hen h e  had in fo r m a t io n  
that the  s tudent  w a s  in p o s s e s s i o n  of i l l e g a l  d r u g s .  
The s e a r c h  was without a w a r r a n t  and without the  
s tu d en t ' s  c o n s e n t .  M ar i ju an a c i g a r e t t e s  found in the  
lo c k e r  w e r e  a d m it te d  into  e v id e n c e  by the  court  and 
th e  s tudent  contended that the  court w a s  in e r r o r  
in  s o  doing .  The court  s t a t e d  that th e  p r im a r y  
pu r p o se  of th e  s c h o o l  o f f i c ia l ' s  s e a r c h  w a s  not to 
obtain  c o n v ic t io n s  but to  s e c u r e  e v i d e n c e  of s tu de nt ' s  
m i s c o n d u c t ,  w h ic h  w as  a r ight that the  s c h o o l  had 
under  i t s  in lo c o  p a r e n t i s  r o l e .  Court of  A p p ea ls  
of C a l i f o r n ia  r e n d e r e d  i t s  judg m ent  in  fa v o r  of the  
s c h o o l  and a g a in st  the s tudent .
4̂
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C ases Involving A lleged  Infringement 
of the Right to  Due P r o c e ss  of Law
Until the C ivil War, the major provisions of the Constitution and 
the B ill of Rights protected individuals against fed era l action only. 
With the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth A m end­
m ents, the United States Constitution was provided with far-reaching  
lim itations on state power over the individual. The clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment forbidding sta tes  to deny individuals due 
process of law is having far-reach in g  effects even today. In cases  
involving the constitutional rights of m inors, the due process clause  
is  frequently invoked as a support for the constitutional right under 
litigation. There is ,  in addition, a group of ca ses  in which the 
primary plea is  to the due p rocess clause.
Twenty-two such ca ses  have been reported during the period 
under study, the ea r liest appearing in 1966 (see Table 3, following). 
In general, these law suits involve students who claim  that their 
suspension, expulsion, or other d iscip lin e for m isconduct, is  
unconstitutional in that their rights to due p rocess w ere violated.
The f ir s t  two ca ses  reported occurred within a year of each  
other in the sam e state and obtained exactly opposite resu lts .
Cosme V. Board of Education of the City of New York was tried
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18in state court. Here the petitioner was a mother who wanted to have 
an attorney present at a hearing in which her son's suspension was to 
be d iscu ssed . The Board denied this request and said that under p re ­
vailing law, the Board of Education had the right to set the ru les and 
procedures relating to pupil suspension. The appeal court upheld the 
school board and said:
Respondent is  not statutorily mandated to grant a hearing. 
M oreover, because the hearing or conference is  ad m in istra­
tive in nature, the petitioner is  not entitled to be represented  
by counsel, who might turn the conference into a q u asi- 
judicial hearing.
Respondent is  vested  with d iscretion  in the perform ance 
of its  duties, only a c lear abuse of such d iscretion  is 
review able by a court, and no such unauthorized action  
here appears.
A ccordingly, the petition is  lega lly  insufficient. Furtherm ore, 
any final determ ination--w hich  has not here occurred - -made 
in or a part of a suspension hearing is  review able by the 
Supreme C om m issioner of Education. Consequently, the 
application is  prem ature since adm inistrative rem edies  
by way of review  have not been exhausted. For the reasons  
stated, the motion is  denied and the petition d ism issed .
In Madera v. Board of Education of the City of New York, a
student was suspended from  school and denied an attorney's presence
at a guidance hearing^^ He thai brought suit in United States D istrict
Court. The court's opinion held:
The due p ro cess  clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is  
applicable to  a d istr ict superintendent's guidance conference.
The "no attorney" provision  deprives plaintiffs of their
^^Cosm e V .  Board of Education of City of New York, 270 NYS 2d 
231 (New York, 1966).
19Madera v. Board of Education of City of New York, 267 F . Supp. 
356 (New York, 1967).
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rights to a hearing in a state-in itiated  proceeding which puts 
in jeopardy the m inor's liberty and right to attend public 
sch o o ls .
E stay  V. Lafourche Parish  School is a somewhat different kind
of ca se  w herein a student claim ed that his Fourteenth Amendment
rights w ere violated by a school regulation barring m arried students
from participating in extracurricu lar activ ities , Heard first in
I7th Jud icia l D istr ict Court, the case was affirm ed on appeal. The
court held that the board had authority to adopt such regulation and
that such regulation was neither unreasonable, arbitrary, nor
capricious, and enforcem ent thereof did not deprive the student of
any constitutional rights,
A fed era l d istrict court declared that due p rocess had been
violated in the case of K elley v. M etropolitan County Board of
Education of N ash v ille , where a school's ath letic activ ities  had been
21suspended for a year. The court held that in view of a lack of 
p re-ex istin g  standards and regulations to strengthen any discip linary  
action taken by the school board, and in view of an absence of a 
form al charge, the ath letic program must be reinstated .
Two other federa l c a se s  heard in 1969 involved school disruptions, 
student suspensions, and charges of violation of due p ro cess . The 
first of th ese . Brown v. G reer, was heard by the United States
1969).
2 1
*̂̂ E stay V. Lafourche Parish  School, 230 So. 2d 443 (Louisiana,
K elley  v. M etropolitan County Board of Education of N ashville,
293 F, Supp, 485 (T ennessee, 1969).
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??D istrict Court in M iss iss ip p i. The evidence in the case showed
that the students had used abusive and threatening language toward
the superintendent and others, two teachers had been struck in a
scuffle with four fem ale students, and the students had disrupted
the operation of the school. There had been severa l incidents but
the precipitating one involved severa l students, who reacted with
"frenzy and rage" when the superintendent was taking one of the
g ir ls  to his office for refusing to answer his question. There was
verbal abuse as w ell as threats directed toward the superintendent,
and the students were expelled . A federal court ordered that there
should be a hearing in the ca se , and a hearing was held following
which the expulsion was rescinded  and the students w ere suspended
for the balance of the school year. The case reported here followed
when the students asked the United States D istrict Court to  enjoin
their suspension. The court found that the actions of the students
w ere not protected by any constitutional rights and that the actions
of the school officia ls w ere not racia lly  motivated. In its  opinion
the court said:
The court cannot and w ill not substitute its  judgment for 
that of the Board of T rustees who acted on reasonable 
grounds to maintain order and to insure respect by the 
students for their tea ch ers, principal and superintendent.
This Court w ill not act as a super school board to second  
guess the Board of T rustees and the superintendent in  
this case under the facts and circum stances herein . This
^ ^ B r o w n  V .  G reer, 296 F . Supp, 595 (M ississipp i, 1969).
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Court is  concerned that if actions of the type involved  
herein by the plaintiffs are not punished and discouraged, 
they w ill not only lead to anarchy but w ill result in a 
suppression of the liberty  and autonomy that are the 
lifeblood of a dem ocracy and its  educational institutions.
If our institutions are not allowed to rule th em selves, 
within reasonable bounds, as h ere, then others w ill 
rule them  and w ill destroy  our educational institutions 
and system  which are the touchstone and foundation of 
any progressive dem ocracy, which owes its very  
existence to the fact that it is  a government of laws 
and not of men.
Hobson V. B ailey  involved an individual g ir l, Deborah Lynn 
C leaves, who was suspended from  school after being absent rep eat­
edly in connection with racia l protest and participation in picketing 
23activ ities . The school believed that she was instrum ental in bringing
about a school boycott during which absences went up to as high as
65, 000 daily. The Court was of the opinion that M iss C leaves was
a victim  of a boycott and movement which caused injury to many
person s. In its  opinion, the Court stated:
While th is Court does not believe that its  role is  m erely  
to review  the d iscip linary action of the Board of Education  
with regard to  its  students, the Court does believe that 
its proper function is  to  protect the constitutional rights 
of the c itizen s. Even though the school authorities w ere 
justified in discip lin ing M iss C leaves for her conduct, this 
discip line should have been dispensed at a ll stages in  
accordance with due process of law guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Court ordered that M iss C leaves be allowed to return to school.
Five due process cases are reported for 1970. Four of these
ca ses , a ll heard in federal courts, resulted in decisions against the
^^Hobson V, B ailey , 309 F , Supp. 1393 {T en n essee , 1969).
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student. The one case  tried in state court was decided in favor of 
the student.
R. R. V. Board of Education of Shore R egional High School 
D istrict involved a boy who had been suspended from  school for 
striking another student in that child's hom e. The Supreme 
Court of New Jersey  held that the student, who had been given  
neither a prelim inary hearing nor a fu ll hearing, must be re in ­
stated and provided with extra instruction to help him make up 
the school work that he had m issed . The court found that schools 
do have a right to suspend students for ou t-of-sch ool activ ities , 
but said that the question of due process must be answered. The 
court felt that where sev ere  punishment was to be inflicted , the 
child was entitled to a prelim inary hearing and a full hearing.
A case heard in federa l courts involved a rule of a high school 
athletics association which said  that if a child over the sixth grade 
repeats a grade that he has passed , he w ill lo se  one year of elig ib ility  
for athletic competition.^^ Mtchell v. Louisiana High School A thletics  
A ssociation was fir st heard in d istrict court which court enjoined the 
association  from enforcing the rule. On appeal the United States 
Court of Appeals vacated the decision  of the lower court and found
'̂^R. R. V,  Board of Education of Shore Regional High School 
D istr ic t, 263 A. 2d 180 (N ew  Jersey , 1970).
25M itchell V. Louisiana High School A thletics A ssociation ,
430 F. 2d 1155 (Louisiana, 1970).
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that the rule was neither inherently suspect nor an encroachm ent on
a fundamental right, but rather it was grounded in and reasonably
related to a leg itim ate state in terest. The court noted that the due
p rocess clause does not insulate a citizen  against every injury at the
hands of the state.
Three 1970 ca ses  concern students involved in serious m isconduct
for which they w ere suspended from  school. In one of th ese , Grayson
26
V. Malone, a boy was suspended for disrupting school. He and his
parents w ere advised to contact the superintendent for a hearing
regarding reinstatem ent. They did not do so, but brought suit
instead. The United States D istr ict Court held that their fa ilure to
do so amounted to a w aiver of their  rights to a hearing, and found
that there was no denial of due p ro cess .
The plaintiff in  D avis v, Ann Arbor Public Schools was a high
2?school boy with a record of d iscip line problem s. For such m is ­
conduct as tard in ess , truancy, nonconform ance, and minor arson, he 
was suspended from  school, following which he asked the court to 
enjoin the school so  that he could be reinstated . The court denied 
r e lie f  saying that the standard for determ ining whether one has been 
afforded due p rocess is  whether he has been treated with fundamental 
fa irn ess .
^^Grayson V, M alone, 311 F,Supp, 987 (M assachusetts, 1970), 
^'^Davis V. Ann A rbor Public Schools, 313 F , Supp, 1217
(Michigan, 1970),
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H asson v, Boothby involves three boys suspended for appearing
28on school property with beer on th eir  breaths. In the tr ia l they
claim ed that they did not know that punishment for involvem ent with
alcohol could be handed down by the superintendent and could exceed
exclusion  from  ath letic team s for one athletic season , but they did
know that the conduct would be punished.
In its d ec ision , the court made the following statem ents:
F ir s t, p laintiffs w ere aware that involvem ent with alcohol 
on or off school p rem ises was wrong and would be punished 
by school au thorities. . . .
Second, th is i s  not a case w here punishment under an o v e r ­
broad regu lation  would have the effect of jeopardizing  
F irst Amendment rights. . . .
Third, the nature of the penalty imposed is not so  severe  
as to entitle the plaintiffs to fu ll due p rocess protections.
The requirem ents of due p rocess are flex ib le , and different 
situations w ill require different degrees of procedural 
protection. . . .
The com plaint was d ism issed .
In 1971 s ix  s im ila r  ca ses  w ere heard. A Texas case , Texarkana
Independent School D istr ict v. L ew is, was a class action by next
friend s of eight students who had allegedly participated in major
29disruptive activ ity  at the senior high school. The plaintiffs asked 
the court to enjoin the school d istr ict from  suspending or expelling  
them  and a ll others s im ilar ly  situated for past or future violations
^^Hasson v. Boothby, 318 F.Supp. 1183 (M assachusetts, 1970).
^^Texarkana Independent School D istr ict v. L ew is, et a l . ,
470 S. W. 2d 727 (T exas, 1971).
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of regulations promulgated by the d istr ic t board of tru stees concerning 
disruptive behavior. The D istr ict Court of Bowie County issued an 
injunction against the sch ool d istr ic t saying that the guidelines 
adopted by the school w ere vague and indefinite and that the expelled  
students w ere not afforded procedural due p ro cess . The school 
appealed . The Court o f C ivil A ppeals held that the guidelines 
promulgated by the d istrict with resp ect to  major disruptive activity  
w ere not unconstitutional for vagueness and overbreadth, but that 
the students w ere denied procedural due p rocess in that they were 
not given sp ecific  w ritten notice of the charges against them and not 
allowed sufficient tim e to  prepare a defense. The appeal court also  
held that the c la ss  action  was spurious in that it was im possible for 
a minor or group of m inors to bring a c la ss  action suit or to be 
sued in a c la ss  action su it. As to th is he modified the judgment of 
the lower court; as to the injunction that judgment was affirmed.
The Supreme Court of New J ersey  heard an appeal from a  
decision  by the C om m issioner of Education in which students w ere  
suspended on charges of physical assau lt upon other students.^
In Tibbs v . Board of Education of Franklin Township, the appellate 
court found that the student w itn esses whose statem ents were read 
at the hearing did not appear to  fa ce  the accused nor w ere they named. 
The court would not entertain a plea by the school that to name these
^^Tibbs V,  Board of Education of Franklin Township (Somerset 
County), 276 A. 2d 165, affd. 284 A. 2d 179 (New J ersey , 1971).
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students might subject them  to rep risa ls. The matter was remanded
to the C om m issioner of Education for a rehearing in which the w itnesses
would face the accused.
F edera l courts received  four of the 1971 c a se s . On February 16,
1971, the United States D istr ict Court for M assachusetts issued its
0  1
order in the case  of P ierce  v. School Committee of New Bedford.
The court heard a m otion for prelim inary injunction brought by a 
suspended high school student who claim ed that his federally  protected 
rights w ere violated . His suspension was based on his constant 
disruptions and d isresp ectfu l manner and behavior, as w ell as being 
insolent, defiant, d isresp ectfu l, insubordinate, and persistent in his 
general m isconduct over an extended period of tim e , with the 
precipitating incident a lleged ly  involving m istreatm ent of the American  
flag. He was told the reasons for his denial of readm ission . The 
student claim ed that his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth  
Amendments had been violated in that he was not granted a requested  
postponement of the hearing, and that high school rules prohibiting 
noise and disturbance w ere vague and overbroad.
The Court found that the school board's ruling was com pletely  
consistent with the evidence and that his expulsion was keyed to his 
entire high school career in which there had been fourteen previous 
suspensions. The injunction was denied.
 ̂^P ierce v . School Committee of New Bedford et a l . , 322 F .
Supp. 957 (M assachusetts, 1971).
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F arrell v. Joel is  a case of a young high school girl who was
suspended for taking part in a s it - in  and thereby disrupting school 
32a ctiv ities . She asked for an injunction and said that her suspension  
was a violation of due process because she was not given written  
notice of the charge against h er . The United States D istrict Court 
held, and the United States Court of Appeals affirm ed, that her rights 
w ere not violated in that she knew that the sit -in and consequent 
disruption of school a ctiv ities  was a violation of school ru les and 
that she might be suspended for it.
An action under the C ivil Rights Act was heard in United States 
D istrict Court in M assachusetts when an unm arried, pregnant 
sen ior g ir l brought suit against school officia ls who had inform ed
go
her that she was to stop attending regular c la s se s . The d istrict  
court held that she was entitled to a prelim inary injunction requiring 
school officials to  readmit her on a fulltim e basis since there was no 
showing of danger to her nor a valid educational or other reason to 
justify  requiring her to receive  educational treatm ent not equal to 
that given a ll others in her c la s s .  In th is case , Ordway v. H argraves, 
the court found that the right to attend public school is  a basic personal 
right or liberty, consequently the burden of justifying a school rule 
lim iting that right is  on the sch ool authorities.
^^F a r r e llv. Joel, 437 F . 2d 160 (Connecticut, 1971).
33
Ordway v. H argraves, 323 F . Supp. 1155 (M assachusetts, 1971).
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Lee P erv is  and other students brought a c la ss  action in United
States D istrict Court in Texas against LaMarque Independent School
D istrict asking the court to declare invalid a state statute authorizing
suspension of Incorrigib le students, asking that they be reinstated in
school, and that th eir  d iscip linary records be purged of any reference
34to their suspension. Since th is case assa iled  the constitutionality  
of a state statute, a three-judge federa l court was convened. The 
court found that the two major plaintiffs had a record of many 
discip linary  infractions and that they had used intem perate and vulgar 
language toward the school o ffic ia ls . The court could find no evidence  
that the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs had been violated and 
said:
A careful exam ination of the transcrip t reflects  that th is  
orderly  hearing scrupulously protected the rights of the 
parties and was w ell calculated to  revea l the truth. Indeed, 
in  the aspect of procedural regu larity , it somewhat resem bled  
a judicial proceeding and considerably exceeded the m inim al 
"rudimentary elem ents of fa ir  play" . . .
Judgment was entered for the defendants.
Jackson v. H epinstall, a New York ca se  tried  in federal court,
was an action on behalf of a g ir l suspended because she was involved
in an incident with a teacher in which she refused to pick up a squashed 
35
orange as ordered . The teacher alleged ly  squeezed her neck and arm
^^P erv is  v . LaMarque Independent School D istr ict, et a l . ,
328 F . Supp. 638 (T exas, 1971).
1971).
 ̂̂ Jackson v. H epinstall, et a l . , 328 F . Supp. 1104 (New York,
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in a v ic e -lik e  fashion and brought her before the principal where she
was im m ediately suspended.
The federal judge in th is case was greatly  irr ita ted  at being
brought into the ca se  before state rem edies had been exhausted.
D istrict Judge F o ley  d ism issed  the case after finding that a five-day
suspension was reasonable and not constitutionally d efective . He
denied a motion for  a three-judge court and said:
F or record purposes, if  there is  any m otion open for 
tem porary injunction in behalf of plaintiff, it is  denied 
and d ism issed . The complaint in its entirety  is  d ism issed  
for lack of jurisd iction , or in the alternative for failure  
to state a c la im  upon which re lie f can be granted , . .
Four due p rocess ca ses  have been produced in 1972, one in
state court and the rem aining three in federal courts.
In K elley v . M artin the plaintiff was expelled  from  high school
g L
for distributing drugs to fellow  students. He claim ed that he did 
not know of a regulation against such behavior and said that his 
right to due p ro cess  was violated . The Superior Court of Pim a  
County entered an order reversin g  the school board's ruling, and 
the school appealed. The Board of Appeals held that the court could 
not say that the school abused its  d iscretion  in expelling a student, 
a relative new com er to  the school and a fir st tim e offender, who 
distributed drugs to  other students on the school p rem ises . The 
decision  of the low er court was reversed .
^^K elly v. M artin, et a l . , 490 P . 2d 836 (Arizona, 1972).
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In F lorida the Black Students of North Fort Myers Junior-Senior 
High School brought an action against school officials after they were 
suspended for walking out of the sch ool in a "riotous" manner. They 
claim ed due process was infringed in that they had no prior hearing.
The United States D istrict Court upheld the students and said that 
minimum standards of due process require (1) that written notice  
of charges against student be provided to student and h is  parents 
or guardians, and (2) that student be afforded a hearing with ample 
opportunity to present h is case , and (3) that sanctions, such as 
suspension, should be im posed only on the b asis  of substantial evidence. 
The court noted that whether students walked out of high school peace­
ably or riotously, they w ere s t il l  entitled to due p rocess.
The three day suspension of high school students who created a
disturbance in assem bly against regulations, was found not to violate
the students' rights in the case of Tate v. Board of Education of
38Jonesboro, A rkansas. The fed era l court found that where there 
was no question of the acts involved or the individuals involved, and 
where both notice and opportunity for an inform al hearing w ere given, 
and where there was no indication that the suspension adversely  
affected any student's grades, the students' due process rights were 
not infringed.
37Black Students of North Fort M yers Junior-Senior High School 
ex rel Shoemaker v. W illiam s, 335 F.Supp. 820 (Florida, 1972).
38 Tate V.  Board of Education of Jonesboro, A rkansas, Special 
School D istr ict, 453 F. 2d 975 (Arkansas, 1972).
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Summary
Of the tw enty-tw o cases researched for this section , thirteen  
resu lted  in d ecisions for the school and against the student. In 
eight of th ese  c a se s , the courts decided that the constitutional 
rights of students had been violated.
Certain gen era l facts can be drawn from  a review  of these  
cases:
(1) Courts usually w ill consider the extent and the ser iou sn ess  
of a student's m isconduct when deciding a due p rocess ca se , as in 
Brown, G rayson, D avis, H asson, P ierce , F a r r e ll, P erv is , Jackson, 
and K elley.
(2) The m atter of having an attorney present at a d iscip linary  
hearing is  v iew ed differently by different courts.
(3) A court which held the right to attend school is a funda­
m ental right w ill not in terfere in rulings about extracurricular  
activ ities .
(4) Courts have held for pupils in cases where punishment is  
carried  out without proper notice and without a hearing, as in 
Hobson, Texarkana, and R. R. , if  the punishment is sev ere  as
in expulsion or suspensions lasting long periods of tim e.
(5) A court has upheld the right of a student to be faced by 
his a ccu sers where his punishment may be expulsion or extended 
suspension.
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(6) Courts have held that the right to public education is  
fundamental and that the fact of being unwed and pregnant, or 
being an unwed m other, is  not sufficient reason  to deny a g ir l 
her fundamental right to  g o to  school.
(7) F edera l courts have held that rem edies in state courts 
should be exhausted before a cause is  brought to  federal court.
T A B L E  3
CASES INVOLVING A L L E G E D  IN F R IN G E M E N T  OF 
TH E RIGHT TO DUE PR O CESS
C a se D i s p o s i t i o n
C o s m e  V. B oa rd  of E ducat ion  of 
City  of N ew  Y o r k , 270 NYS 2d 231, 
(New York, 1966)
Made 1 a v. Board  of E du ca t ion  of 
the  City of New York,  267 F .  Supp.  
356 (New York,  1967)
P e t i t i o n e r  wanted to have  an at to rney  p r e s e n t  at a 
h e a r in g  of  the  s c h o o l  board ca l le d  to d i s c u s s  the  
s u s p e n s i o n  of h er  s o n  for  m i s  conduct .  The board  
den ied  h e r  r e q u e s t  and sa id  that under  p re v a i l i n g  law 
the  board of educ at ion  had the  r ight to s e t  the r u le s  
and p r o c e d u r e s  r e la t in g  to pupil s u s p e n s io n .  On app ea l  
the  Court upheld the  d e c i s i o n  of the s c h o o l  board.
Youth r e q u e s t e d  that at a t to rn ey  be p r e s e n t  at the  
f o r m a l  gu idan ce  h e a r in g  w h e r e  h is  s u s p e n s i o n  w as  to  
be c o n s i d e r e d .  His  r e q u e s t  w a s  den ied  and the  boy  
brought  su i t .  The court  held that the  due p r o c e s s  c l a u s e  
of the  F o u rte en th  A m e n d m e n t  i s  a p p l ic a b le  to  a d i s t r i c t  
su p e r in te n d e n t 's  g uid anc e  c o n f e r e n c e  and granted the  
s tudent the  r ight to  have  an at torn ey  p r e s e n t .
E s t a y  V . La F o u r c h e  P a r i s h  Schoo l ,  
230 So, 2d 443 (L ou is ian a,  1969)
A p p l ic a t io n  for  p r e l i m i n a r y  injunction prohibit ing  s c h o o l  
board f r o m  e n fo r c in g  re g u la t io n  b a r r in g  m a r r i e d  h igh  
s c h o o l  s tuden ts  f r o m  p ar t ic ipat ing  in e x t r a c u r r i c u l a r  
s c h o o l  a c t i v i t i e s .  Court of A p p ea l  upheld the  low er  
c o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  that the s c h o o l  board had auth ori ty  to 
adopt s u c h  a ru le  and that it did not d e p r i v e  student of 
any co n st i t u t io n a l  r ig h t s .
T A B L i E  3 -  -  o n t i n u e d
K e lle y  v . M e tr g  C ounty B o a rd  of 
Ed uc at io n  of N a s h v i l l e , 293 E.  Supp.  
485 ( T e n n e s s e e ,  1969)
B r o w n  v. G r e e r ,  296 F , Supp, 595 
(M is s i s s ip p i ,  1970)
H obson  V.  B a i l e y , 309 F .  Supp. 1393 
( T e n n e s s e e ,  1969)
An ac t ion  by a l l  s tu dents  of a l l  N e g r o  high s c h o o l  and 
parents  s e e k in g  injunct ion  aga inst  s c h o o l  board and 
s ta te  s e c o n d a r y  s c h o o l  a th le t i c  a s s o c i a t i o n  who w e r e  
going to  su sp en d  a th le t ic  p r o g r a m  of th e  s c h o o l  f o r  a 
period of one y e a r .  Court held that in  v iew  of lack  
of p r e - e x i s t i n g  s ta n d a r d s  and r e g u la t io n s  to  s t r e n g th e n  
any d i s c i p l i n a r y  a c t io n  taken by the  s c h o o l  board,  and 
in v ie w  of c o n s p ic u o u s  a b s e n c e  of a f o r m a l  ch a r g e ,  
the  a th le t ic  p r o g r a m  m u st  be i e e s t a b l i s h e d .  Act ion  
of board w as  v io la t io n  of due p r o c e s s .
Students  who used  a b u s iv e  and th r e a te n in g  language  
a g a inst  su p er in te n d en t  and o t h e r s , s t r u c k  two fa cu l ty  
m e m b e r s  and d is r u p te d  o r d e r l y  o p e r a t io n  of the s c h o o l  
w e r e  su sp e n d ed  by ac t ion  of board of t r u s t e e s .  The  
United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court su s ta in e d  the  act ion  of 
the  board and s a id  that r ights  under the  F o u r te e n th  
A m e n d m e n t  do not a lw a y s  outw eigh the  i n t e r e s t  of  
the s t a te  in m ain ta in ing  an ed u c a t io n a l  s y s t e m .
M other  brought su it  to enjo in  s c h o o l  o f f ic ia l s  f r o m  
r e fu s in g  to a l low  student  to re turn  to s c h o o l  f r o m  which  
sh e  had been  su sp e n d ed  for  be ing  absent  r e p e a te d ly  and 
taking  part in r a c i a l  p r o te s t  and p ick e t in g .  The  United  
S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held s tudent should  be r e in s ta te d  
b e c a u s e  h e r  right to  due p r o c e s s  had be e n  v io la te d .
O'
TAB LE 3 - -  Continued
R. R. V,  Bo ard  of E ducat ion  of 
S h o re  R e g io n a l  High S c h o o l  D is tr ic t ,  
263 A, 2d 180 (New J e r s e y ,  1970)
M it c h e l l  V. L o u is ia n a  High S ch o o l  
A th le t ic  A s s o c i a t i o n , 430 F ,  2d 1155 
( L o u is ia n a ,  1970)
G ra y so n  v . M a lo n e , 311 F .  Supp. 987 
( M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  1970)
Student w a s  su sp e n d ed  for  a c t iv i t y  o u ts id e  of s c h o o l  
ho ur s  and away f r o m  the  s c h o o l  g ro u n d s ,  and b e c a u s e  
of a l l e g e d  p r io r  m i s  conduct .  The  s c h o o l  w a s  o r d e r e d  
to sh ow  c a u s e  why the s tudent should  not be r e - a d m i t t e d  
to r e g u la r  c l a s s e s .  The S u p r e m e  Court he ld that the  
s tudent should  be re  -ad m it ted  to s c h o o l  and a f f o id e d  
e x t r a  i n s t r u c t io n  n e c e s s a r y  to  h e lp  h im  c a tc h  up with  
his  c l a s s e s  on the  ground that he w as  den ied  h i s  right  
to due p r o c e s s  in that he  had no h e a r in g  b e fo r e  he was  
s u sp e n d ed .
A c t io n s  by p ar en ts  a g a inst  h igh s c h o o l  a th le t i c  a s s o c i a ­
t ion  for injunct ion  prohibit ing  a s s o c i a t i o n  f r o m  e n fo rc in g  
r u le s  c o n c e r n in g  e l ig ib i l i t y  of high s c h o o l  a t h l e t e s .
The rule  i s  that i f  a child over  the  6th gr a de  r e p e a t s  
a gr a d e  that he h a s  p a s s e d ,  he w i l l  l o s e  one y e a r  of 
a th le t ic  e l i g ib i l i t y .  The court found that the  rule  was  
grounded in r e a s o n  and that it did not v io la te  the due 
p r o c e s s  r ights  of  the s t u d en ts .
Boy  s usp end ed  fo r  bad conduct c l a i m s  that h is  due p r o c e s s  
r ights  w e r e  v io la te d .  The court  found that the  parents  
had not contacted  the su per in ten d en t  a lthough told to do 
s o  and that t h e ir  r e f u s a l  amounted to  a w a iv e r  of t h e ir  
right to a h e a r in g .
O '
T A B L E  3 - -  C o n t i n u e d
D a v is  V. Ann A rb o r  P u b l ic  S c h o o l s , 
313 F .  Supp. 1217 (Michigan,  1970)
A boy with r e c o r d  of d i s c i p l i n e  p r o b l e m s ,  suspend ed  
f r o m  s c h o o l ,  sued a sk in g  in ju n ct iv e  r e l i e f .  Court  
found for  the s c h o o l s  and said  that a young c i t iz e n  
d o e s  not s u r r e n d e r  h is  c i v i l  r ights  upon e n r o l lm e n t  in 
public s c h o o l ,  but n e i t h e r  d o e s  su ch  e n r o l l m e n t  c lothe  
h im  with i m m u n i t i e s  not enjoyed by other  c i t i z e n s  of 
the  c o m m u n it y .
H a s s o n  v. B o o th b y , et al ,  318 F .  Supp, 
1183 ( M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  1970)
A c t io n  under C iv i l  R ights  A c t  by high s c h o o l  s tudents  
c h a l le n g in g  ac t io n  of s c h o o l  o f f ic ia l s  in plac ing  
s tu dents  on probation .  The  D i s t r i c t  Court held that  
w h e r e  h igh s c h o o l  s tu den ts  su sp e n d ed  af ter  appearing  
in s c h o o l  p r o p e r ty  with b e e r  on th e ir  b re a th s  did not 
know that punishm ent  fo r  i n v o lv e m e n t  with a lc o h o l  
could  be handed down by su p er in te nd en t  and could e x c e e d  
e x c l u s i o n  f r o m  a th le t i c  t e a m  for  one a th let ic  s e a s o n  but 
did know that the  conduct  would be punished,  s tu dents '  
r ights  under due p r o c e s s  c l a u s e  w e r e  not v io lated  by 
i m p o s i t i o n  of one - y e a r  probation  ev en  though no p r io r  
publ i shed  rule  fo rba d e  su ch  conduct.  Complaint  
d i s m i s s e d .
O'
O'
T ex a r k a n a  Independent Sc h o o l  D i s t r i c t  
V.  V e lm a  L e w i s ,  et a l , 470 S. W. 2d 727 
(T e x a s ,  1971)
C la s s  act ion  by next f r i e n d s  of e ight s tuden ts  who had 
a l l e g e d l y  taken part in m a jo r  d is r u p t i v e  a c t iv i t y  at high 
s c h o o l  to enjoin s c h o o l  f r o m  su sp end ing  or e x p e l l in g  th e m .  
The D i s t r i c t  Court of B o w ie  County en tered  judgment
T A B L E  3 - -  C o n t i n u e d
Tibbs  y . Board of Educat ion  of  
F r a n k l in  Tow nsh ip  ( S o m e r s e t  County ) ,
276 A, 2d 165, affd, 284 A. 2d 179 
(New J e r s e y ,  1971)
that the  g u id e l i n e s  adopted by the board w e r e  vague  and 
ind e f in i te  and that the  s tu de nts  w e r e  not af forded  proced - 
u r a l  due p r o c e s s .  S c h o o l  a p p e a le d .  Court of C iv i l  
A p p e a l s  held that the  g u id e l i n e s  w e r e  not u n c o n s t i t u t io n ­
a l l y  vag u e  and o v e r b r o a d ,  but that the  s tu den ts  w e r e  
denied  p r o c e d u r a l  due p r o c e s s  in that th ey  w e r e  not 
g iv e n  s p e c i f i c  w r i t t e n  n o t i c e  of the c h a r g e s  a g a inst  th em  
and w e r e  not a l low ed  s u f f ic ien t  t i m e  to p r e p a r e  d e f e n s e .  
Judgm ent  of lo w e r  court m od if ie d  and as  m o d if ie d ,  
aff i i 'med.
T his  i s  a p r o c e e d in g  on a p p e a l  f r o m  C o m m i s s i o n e r  of  
E du cat ion ,  T he  S u p e r io r  Court of New  J e r s e y  held  
that e x p u ls io n s  of s tudents  on c h a r g e s  of p h y s ic a l  
a s s a u l t  upon other  s tuden ts  would be se t  a s i d e ,  w h e r e
H e a r i n g  c o n d u c t e d  H y  l o c a l  b o a r d  o f  e d u c a t i o n  o n  c h a r g e s
w a s not p r e c e d e d  by id e n t if ic a t io n  to  e x p e lle d  s tu d e n ts
of s tu den t  w i t n e s s e s  and su c h  w i t n e s s e s  did not a p p e a r  
to t e s t i f y  at the  h e a r in g .  The  m a t te r  w as  r em a n d ed  to  
the  C o m m i s s i o n e r  of E du cat ion  for  a r e h e a r in g .
O '-j
P i e r c e  v. S cho o l  C o m m it t e e  of New  
Bedford ,  et al .  , 322 F .  Supp. 957 
( M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  1971)
A c t io n  a g a inst  s c h o o l  c o m m i t t e e  and p r in c ip a l  by student  
who a l le g e d  that h is  r ights  had b een  v io lat ed  b e c a u s e  of 
in su f f ic ie n t  n o t ic e  b e fo re  his s u s p e n s io n .  The  United  
S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that no t ice  to student that  
d e n ia l  of r e a d m i s s i o n  w as  based on long h i s t o r y  of 
bad conduct w as  su f f i c ie n t ,  and that t h e r e  w as  no 
show in g of d e n ia l  of any f e d e r a l l y  pr otected  right.
T A B L E  3 - -  C o n t i n u e d
F a r r e l l  v . J o e l , 437 F .  2d 160 
(C onnect icut ,  1971)
A p p e a l  f r o m  an o r d e r  of the  United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  
Court fo r  the  D i s t r i c t  of C o nn ec t icu t  denying  injunct ion  
a g a in s t  s u s p e n s i o n  f r o m  high s c h o o l  and holding  that  
s u s p e n s i o n  did not c o n tr a v e n e  s tu d en t ' s  co n s t i tu t io n a l  
I’ig h t s .  The  Court of A p p e a l s  he ld that s u s p e n s i o n  of 
student  f r o m  high  s c h o o l  fo r  10 d a y s  w as  not a v io la t io n  
of due  p r o c e s s ,  e v e n  though student  w a s  not g iven  
w r it t e n  n o t ic e  nor af forded a h e a r in g .
Ordway v, H a r g r a v e s , 323 F .  Supp.  
1155 ( M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  1971)
A c t io n  under  C iv i l  Rights  Act  brought on be ha l f  of 
pregnant  u n m a r r ie d  s e n i o r  at h ig h  s c h o o l  a g a in s t  s c h o o l  
o f f i c i a l s  who had in fo r m e d  s tudent that s h e  w a s  to s top  
attending  r e g u la r  high s c h o o l  c l a s s e s .  P la in t i f f  m o v ed  
fo r  p r e l i m i n a r y  injunction .  The  United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  
Court he ld  that p lainti ff  w as  ent i t led  to  p r e l im i n a r y  
injunct ion  r e q u ir in g  o f f ic ia l s  to r e a d m it  h e r  to  
r e g u la r  c l a s s e s  on a fu l l  t i m e  b a s i s .
O 'oo
P e r v i s  v. LaM arque Independent  
Sc h o o l  D i s t r i c t ,  328 F .  Supp. 638  
( T e x a s ,  1971)
Act.  on to  enjo in s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  f r o m  su sp en d in g  s tudents  
for  inc orI ' ig ib le  conduct  as provided by s t a te  s tatute .
T he D is t r ic t  C ourt h eld  th at th r e e - ju d g e  d is t r ic t  co u rt
would not be convened to  d e t e r m i n e  co n s t i t u t io n a l i t y  of 
s ta tu te  w h e r e  no s u b s t a n t ia l  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  q u e s t io n  was  
p r e s e n t .  Judgm ent  for  de fen dan ts .
T A B L E  3 —  C o n t i n u e d
J a c k s o n ,  et al ,  v. J a m e s  T.  H e p i n s t a l l , 
et al ,  328 F.  Supp. U04 (New York,  1971)
A c t io n  on behal f  of su sp e n d ed  s c h o o l  pupil .  The  
D is t r i c t  Court held that c o m p la in t  at tacking  c o n s t i t u ­
t io n a l i t y  of s ta te  s ta tu te  p e r m it t in g  f i v e - d a y  s u s p e n s i o n  
of s c h o o l  pupil  without h e a r in g  and p r o c e d u r e  of s c h o o l  
a u th o r i t ie s  in f i l ing  ju v e n i le  de l in q u e n c y  c o m p la in t s  in  
f a m i ly  court  during  or a f t e r  inc ident  in s c h o o l s  w as  
subjec t  to d i s m i s s a l  for  la c k  of j u r i s d i c t i o n  and f a i l u r e  
to s ta te  c l a i m  on w hich r e l i e f  could  be grante d.  Due  
p r o c e s s  not v io la te d .
Shu l l  V.  Columbus  M unic ipal  S e p a r a te  
S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t , 338 F .  Supp. 1376 
(Ohio, 1972)
K e l ly ,  et a l .  , v. M art in ,  et a l . , 
490 P .  2d 836 (A rizon a ,  1972)
C l a s s  a c t io n  on beha l f  of o t h e r w i s e  qua l i f ied  lOth 
g rad e  g i r l  de nied  the  right to  attend s c h o o l  b e c a u s e  
she w a s  unwed m o th e r .  Court upheld and granted  
atto i-ney's  f e e s .  Court sa id  that h e r  r ig h ts  to  due  
p r o c e s s  and equ al  p r o te c t io n  w e r e  v io la te d .
S p e c i a l  a c t io n  ch a l le n g in g  s c h o o l  e x p u ls io n  o r d e r .  
S u p e r io r  Court of P i m a  County en te r e d  judgm ent  
r e v e r s i n g  o r d e r  of the  s c h o o l ,  and the  s c h o o l  o f f ic ia l s  
a ppea led .  B oa rd  of a p p e a ls  held that court  could not 
sa y  that s c h o o l  board abused i t s  d i s c r e t i o n  in e x p e l l in g  
s tudent,  a r e l a t i v e  n e w c o m e r  and a f i r s t  - t i m e  
offen der ,  who d is tr ib u te d  dru g s  to  f e l lo w  s tud en ts  on 
s c h o o l  p r e m i s e s  in v io la t io n  of r e g u la t io n .  R e v e r s e d .
O'
vO
T A B L E  3 - -  C o n t i n u e d
B l a ck Students of N o r th  F o r t  M y e r s  
Junior  S e n io r  High S c h o o l  ex r e l  
S h o e m a k e r  v. W i l l i a m s ,  et a l .  ,
335 F .  Supp, 820 ( F lo r id a ,  1972)
Suit by s tud en ts  who w e r e  su sp e n d ed  fo r  walking  out 
of s c h o o l  in a l l e g e d l y  "r iotous"  m a n n e r  c la im in g  that  
they  had not b een  af forded due p r o c e s s .  The court  
ruled in fa v o r  of  the  s tude nts  and sa id  that w heth er  
s t ud en ts  walked out p e a c e a b ly  or r io t o u s ly ,  th ey  w e r e  
s t i l l  en t i t led  to h e a r in g  b e f o r e  they  could be su sp e n d ed .
T ate  V.  B oar d of E ducat ion  of 
J o n e s b o r o ,  A r k a n s a s ,  S p e c ia l  
S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t , 453 F .  2d 975  
( A r k a n s a s , 1972)
T h r e e - d a y  s u s p e n s i o n  of h igh s c h o o l  s tu den ts  under  
reg u la t i o n ,  wh ich in e f fect  prohibited c r e a t i o n  of  
d is t u r b a n c e  in a s s e m b l y ,  for  su c h  s tu d e n ts '  a c t io n s  
in taking  part in a s s e r t e d l y  "quiet" p r o c e s s i o n  f r o m  
pep r a l ly  during  fourth n u m b e r  on p r o g r a m  as p ro te s t  
to  p laying  of tune  "Dixie"  did not v io la t e  due p r o c e s s  
w h e r e  t h e r e  w as  no q u e s t io n  as to a c t s  in v o lv ed  or  
ind iv id u a ls  in v o lved  t h e r e i n ,  both n o t ic e  and opportuni ty  
fo r  an i n f o r m a l  heai' ing wei 'e  g iv en ,  and w h e r e  t h e r e  
w a s  no in d ic a t io n  that any s u s p e n s i o n  c a u s e d  any 
fa i l u r e  or o t h e r w i s e  a d v e r s e l y  a f f ec ted  any s tu d ent ' s  
o v e r - a l l  g r a d e s .  Judgment  fo r  the  s c h o o l .
-j
o
Cases Involving A lleged  Infringement of 
the Right to Freedom  of E xpression  in 
Hair Styles and Clothing
In 1954 Newton Edwards w rote, "Relatively few cases have
com e into the courts testing the authority of school boards to
regulate the d ress and personal appearance of pupils.
Edwards could describe only four related cases in the
Twentieth Century up that tim e. One case  involved a high school
g ir l of eighteen whose suspension for w earing talcum powder on
her face was upheld by the court;'^^ the second was a case in
which the court decided that the refu sa l to wear a cap and gown
41at graduation was not a proper reason to  be denied a diploma;
the third was a case involving the w earing of metal heel plates
42
which dam aged school floors ; and the fourth concerned the 
wearing of school uniform s.
^^Newton Edwards, 568.
^^P uggsley V .  S ellm eyer , 250 S. W. 538 (Arkansas, 1923)
Valentine v. Independent School D istrict of C asey, 183 
N. W. 434 (Iowa, 1921).
‘̂ ^Stromberg v. French, 236 N. W. 477 (North Dakota, 1931).
^^Jones V.  Day, 89 So. 906 (M ississip p i, 1921).
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Until the middle of the 1960's, these cases composed the body of 
litigation regarding d ress  and personal appearance of students. But 
by 1965 the deluge of hair cases  had begun, and since that tim e few 
is su e s  have received  so  much attention in state and federa l courts 
as the issu e  of personal appearance.
Beginning with Leonard v . School Committee of A ttleboro"̂ '̂  in 
1965, sixty-eight hair sty le  and clothing ca ses  have been reported 
from  the nation's high courts. Table 4 lis ts  these ca ses  and briefly  
d escr ib es each.
A review of th ese  law suits revea ls that the plaintiffs appealed 
to the F irst and Fourteenth Amendments for relief, and in som e  
ca ses  claim ed that their rights under the Third, Fifth , Eighth, Ninth, 
and Tenth Amendments had been infringed. In most ca se s , the right 
to wear one's hair and clothing as one p leases was viewed as a right 
s im ilar to freedom  of speech  and protected, therefore, by the F irst 
Amendment.
Leonard v. School Committee of A ttleboro was a "long hair" 
case  involving a seven teen -year-o ld  boy. George Leonard was a 
conscientous, w e ll-d re ssed  and w ell-behaved student who w as, on 
h is own tim e, a popular, high-paid rock m usician. He wanted to 
keep his hair long because his image as a perform er depended partly
'^'^Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro, 212 N. E .2d  468 
(M assachusetts, 19&5).
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upon his appearance. The Supreme Court of M assachusetts upheld
the lower court's denial of his plea and said;
The Court's function in reviewing this type of ruling is  
lim ited in the light of the broad d iscretionary powers which 
this law confers upon a school com m ittee. . . . The 
rights of other students, and the in terests  of the teach ers, 
adm inistrators, and the community at large in a w ell-run  
and efficient school system  are paramount.
F e r r e ll v. Dallas Independent School D istr ic t, decided in 1966,
is possib ly  the f ir s t  "hair" case ever tried  in United States D istrict
45
Court. Here as in Leonard, the boys involved w ere m usicians,
and here a lso  the court ruled in favor of the schools' regulation. In
denying plaintiffs' claim , the court stated:
P laintiffs contend naturally that their primary interest is  
to get an education, but it appears that they want this 
education on their own term s. It is  inconceivable that 
a school adm inistrator could operate his schools s u c c e s s ­
fully i f  required by the courts to follow  the dictates of 
the students as to what their appearance w ill be, what 
they should wear, . . . .  Further, the term s upon which 
a free  public education is  granted in the high schools of 
Texas cannot be fixed or determined by the pupils th em ­
se lv es . . . .
In D allas v. F irm ent, a lso  a federal case , the plaintiff contended
that to be forced to cut h is hair was an infringem ent upon his right of
46freedom  of expression . The court could not see  that the wearing of 
long hair was an expression  of anything other than conduct.
'̂ F̂ e r r e ll v. D allas Independent School D is tr ic t , 261 F. Supp.
545 (Texas, 1966).
46
D avis V. Firm ent, 269 F . Supp. 524 (Louisiana, 1967).
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In 1968 no cases w ere published, but 1969 brought a flurry of 
of personal appearance actions. Four of these su its , B rick v. Board
of Education of School D istr ict No. 1, Denver, C olorado, Crews v. 
C l o n e s , G i a n g r e c o  v . Center School Di s tr i ct , a n d  Shows v. 
F r eem an, were decided in favor of the schools' right to enforce 
reasonable regulations. In each case the court could find no evidence 
that constitutionally protected rights w ere unlawfully infringed. The 
decision  in Crews noted that the right to freedom  of expression  is not 
absolute and said: "It is  invidious discrim ination  which is  prohibited 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. " This statement seem s to reflect the 
tenor of the other three d ecisions.
Two 1969 cases in  federal courts, Breen v. Kahl, and W estley  
52
V.  R ossi, w ere favorable to the students' right t o  wear their hair  
as they p leased . The Breen case was first heard in d istr ic t court 
and affirm ed on appeal. C ertiorari was denied by the United States 
Supreme Court in 1970. The decision of the d istr ic t court included 
th is statem ent:
^^B rick  V. Board of Education, School D istr ict No. 1, Denver, 
C olorado, 305 F, Supp. 1316 (Colorado, 1969).
^^Crew s v. C lones, 303 F.Supp. 1370 (Indiana, 1969).
49
Giangreco v. Center School D is tr ic t, 313 F . Supp. 776 
(M issouri, 1969).
^^Shows V. Freem an, 230 So. 2d 63 (M issippi, 1969).
^^Breen v. Kahl, 419 F . 2d 1034 (W isconsin, 1969).
W estley v. R o ss i, 305 F.Supp. 706 (M innesota, 1969).
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Obviously the relationship of students, faculty, a d ­
m in istrators, and sch oo l board w ill be affected in som e 
degree by a judicial declaration  of invalidity of a school 
board regulation. But if  the regulation is  fa irly  found to 
violate the Constitution, responsib ility  for these c o n se ­
quences rests  with the agency which promulgated the 
regulation. So far as education of young people in 
obedience is  concerned, it is  important for them to 
appreciate the present v ita lity  of our proud tradition  
that although we resp ect government in the exercise  of 
its  constitutional pow ers, we jealously  guard our f r e e ­
doms from its attempts to e x er c ise  unconstitutional 
powers.
A peak of activity in personal appearance cases reached the 
courts in 1970, with th irty-three su its being decided in federal 
courts and state appellate courts.
In tw elve of these 1970 su its, judges viewed freedom  in 
personal appearance as a protected right. In twenty-one ca ses  the 
courts saw reasons to uphold schools in their grooming regulations.
Three of the "pro-hair" cases reached state appellate courts.
53Akin V. Board of Education, Murphy v. Pocatello School D istrict 
No. 2, and Laine v. Ditm ann, a ll found judges who believed that 
the school should carry the burden of justification for a rule which 
encroached upon personal lib er tie s . In the Laine case the young 
plaintiff stated that although he was not making a religious or
53Akin v . B oard of Education, 68 C al. Rptr. 557 (California,
1970).
^^Murphy v. P ocatello  School D istrict No. 25, 480 P . 2d 878 
(Idaho, 1970).
Laine v. Ditmann, 259 N. E. 2d 824 (Illinois, 1970).
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political statem ent by w earing long hair, he felt that soc iety  was 
"very sick" and h is hair sty le  was meant to set him apart from other 
people.
M ustaches (L ovelace v. Leechburg^̂  and C rossen v. Fatsi^^),
58dungarees (Bannister v. Paradis ), and a g ir l student's long bangs 
(Sims V. Colfax^*^) went to federal courts in 1970 to be decided in 
favor of the students. In th ese ca ses  the courts generally  found that 
the school could show no in terference with the educational process. 
A rbitrariness o f rule was viewed with disfavor by these courts.
R ichards v. Thurston, Alexander v. Thompson, Black v. 
Cothren, Cordova v, Chonka, and Dunham v. P u lsifer , w ere  
federa l ca ses  in  which long or exotic hair sty les  were at issu e . In 
each case  the judge could find no evidence that disturbance or
^^L ovelace v . Leechburg A rea School D istr ic t, 310 F, Supp. 579 
(Pennsylvania, 1970).
 ̂ C rossen  V. Fat si, 309 F.Supp. 114 (Connecticut, 1970).
^^Bannister V.  P arad is, 316 F.Supp. 185 (New Ham pshire,
1970).
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Sim s V.  Colfax Community School D istr ict 307 F . Supp. 385, 
(Iowa, 1970).
^^Richards v . Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (M assachusetts, 1970). 
^^Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (California, 1970). 
^^Black V. C othren, 316 F. Supp. 468 (Nebraska, 1970).
f i  ̂
Cordova v. Chonka, 315 F. Supp. 953 (Ohio, 1970).
^"^Dunham V. P u lsifer , 312 F. Supp. 411 (Vermont, 1970).
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discip linary problem s w ere the direct result of long hair, and since  
no com pelling educational in terest could be served  by the hair groom ­
ing regulations, the courts declined to uphold them . The court in 
R ichards made the point that uniformity in hair s ty les  and life sty les  
was not of high m erit in  a com prehensive high school. "From  
different tones come different tunes, " he said.
"Anti-hair" judges got the majority of 1970 cases--tw en ty-on e  
in a ll. One of th ese , Canney v . Board of Instruction, was heard 
in state courts; the rem aining twenty in federa l courts. In each of 
these cases the key word was "reasonableness. " The courts were 
unwilling to enter the internal workings of school system s where the 
disputed regulation did not seem  "unreasonably" to  violate students' 
constitutional rights. A statem ent in the decision  of Neuhaus v. 
T orrey sum m arizes the prevailing view in a ll th ese  cases;^^
In these parlous troubled tim es when d iscip line in certain  
quarters appears to  be an ugly word, it should not be 
considered unreasonable nor regarded as an impingement 
of constitutional prerogatives to require plaintiffs to  
bring th em selves within the sp irit, purpose, and in tend­
ments of the questioned rule.
There w ere twenty-two hair sty le  and clothing cases in 1971, 
tw elve decided in favor of the schools' right to regulate, and ten 
decided in favor of the students' right to  control th e ir  own appearance.
^^Canney v. Board of Instruction, 231 So. 2d 34 (.Florida, 1970). 
^^Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F . Supp. 192 (California, 1970).
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In both groups the question of reasonableness seem ed paramount.
And yet other important points were ra ised .
In Turley v. A del Community School D istr ict, heard in United
States D istr ict Court for the Southern D istrict of Iowa, the sam e
court in  which Sim s v. Colfax was decided, the federal judge said:^^
Most assu red ly , it is  common knowledge and evident to 
a ll  concerned from  the m ass media as w ell as personal 
observation and contact that for whatever reason, men, 
young and old, in every profession  and walk of life , have 
and are changing their personal appearance as it relates  
to  hair growth and sty le  in varying d eg rees. This 
individual right to govern one's appearance is  constitu­
tionally  protected. In the final an alysis, a student is 
entitled to  the sam e protection un less good reasons can 
be shown for som e restriction .
In making his d ecision . Judge Hanson c a s t  som e adverse
reflections upon the doctrine of in loco p aren tis:
The Court firm ly b elieves that it is  the parents who 
are prim arily  responsib le for their child's appearance.
The shop-w orn concept of schools being in loco parentis 
i s  not accepted by th is court. Abnegation of parental 
responsib ility  should not be accepted or condoned. . . .
Of course, as th is and other op in io is hold, there are  
proper areas in respect to  appearance in which the school 
can im p ose reasonable controls rem em bering that the 
school m ust be prepared to dem onstrate the need for 
such ru le s.
A s im ila r  philosophy was reflected  in Berryman v. Hein, an Idaho 
case where the court said:^®
^^Turley v . A del Community School D istr ict, et al. , 322 F . 
Supp. 402 (Iowa, 1971).
^^Berrym an, et a l . , v. Hein, et a l . , 329 F . Supp. 616 
(Idaho, 1971).
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If circum stances w ere shown wherein student hair sty les  
had in fact had an adverse effect on orderly  educational 
procedures, then school officia ls would undoubtedly have 
the power to correct the problem . For these reason s, the 
court d eclin es to hold that the dress code provision here  
involved is  unconstitutional per se . The dress code was 
applied, however, in an unreasonable and unconstitutional 
m anner. The evidence has fa iled  to show that the hair 
of th ese  p lain tiffs, or any other students, either co n sti­
tuted or created any problem s in student health, safety, 
d isc ip lin e , or academ ic effort. Suspension of the 
plaintiffs for no m ore com pelling reason than that the 
hair was long does not comport with due p rocess.
Judge Mann, upholding the right of a student to wear his hair
as he p leased , in the case  of Conyers v . Glenn, made these
statem ents:
It is  one of the m ost difficult tasks of a citizen  in a free  
so c iety  to d ifferentiate those m atters in which the state  
may require com pliance with m ajority w ill and those in 
which it  m ay not. The tendency to  include in the form er  
category those m atters in which we agree with the 
m ajority and in the latter, those in which we do not, 
is  provocative of tension . It is  obvious that tolerance  
is  n ecessa ry  on a ll  s id es in order to p reserve public 
order.
In the group of "hair" ca ses  heard in 1971 and resulting in
d ecisions ad verse  to the long-haired student, a number of judges
exp ressed  im patience with these plaintiffs for asking fed era l courts
to ru le on questions which seem ed to  be m atters for loca l decision .
70In Z eller  v. D onegal School D istrict the court said:
^^Conyers v. Glenn, 243 So. 2d 204 (Florida, 1971).
^^Z eller  v . Donegal School D is tr ic t , 333 F . Supp. 413 
(Pennsylvania, 1971).
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W hile we are in sympathy with the plaintiff's d esire to 
choose his own hair sty le, we nevertheless recognize 
that a public school system  cannot operate without 
regulations uniformly applicable to all its students; 
and that the reasonableness of any regulation con ­
cerning hair style can better be determ ined at the 
loca l level.
Perhaps the most influential opinion which this view was
71expressed  was that of Karr v. Schmidt. This was a Texas case
originating in the federal d istrict court. The d istr ic t court enjoined
the school from  enforcing its hair groom ing rule. On motion of
the school the Court of Appeals for the F ifth  Circuit stayed and
suspended the d istrict court's injunction. The students then filed
a Motion to Vacate a Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal. This motion
was presented to Mr. Justice Hugo Black as a United States Supreme
Court Justice assigned to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Justice B lack wrote an opinion which has since been relied on in a
number o f c a se s . In that opinion Justice Black made this statement:
I refuse to hold for m yself that the federal courts have 
constitutional power to in terfere  in this way with the 
public school system  operated by the s ta tes . And I 
furtherm ore refuse to predict that our Court w ill hold 
they have such power. It is  true that we have held that 
this Court does have power under the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to bar state public schools from discrim inating  
against N egro students on account of their race but we did 
so  by virtue of a d irect, positive command in the F ou r­
teenth Amendment, which, like the other C ivil War Amend­
m ents, was prim arily designed to outlaw racia l d iscrim ina­
tion by the States. There is  no such d irect positive command
^^Karr v. Schmidt, et a l . , 401 U .S . 120, 27 L. Ed. 2d 797, 
91 S. Ct. 592 (Texas, 1971).
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about local school rules with reference to the length of 
hair state school students must have. And I cannot now 
predict th is Court w ill hold that the more or le ss  vague 
term s of the Due P r o c e ss  or Equal Protection  Clause have 
robbed the States of th eir  traditionally recognized power to 
run their school sy stem s in accordance with their own 
best judgment as to the appropriate length of hair for 
students.
The m otion in th is case is  presented to me in a record of 
m ore than 50 pages, not counting a number of exhibits.
The words used  throughout the record such as "Emergency 
Motion" and "harassm ent" and "irreparable damages" 
are calculated to leave the im pression  that this case  
over the length of hair has created or is about to create  
a great national " c r is is . " I confess my inability to 
understand how anyone would thus c la ssify  th is hair 
length ca se . The only thing about it that borders on 
the serious to me is  the idea that anyone should think 
the F edera l Constitution im poses on the United States 
courts the burden of supervising the length of hair that 
public school students should wear. The records of the 
fed era l courts, including ours, show a heavy burden of 
litigation in connection with ca ses  of great im portance- -  
the kind of litigation  our courts must be able to handle 
if  they are to perform  their  responsib ility  to our society . 
M oreover, our Constitution has sought to distribute the 
powers of governm ent in th is Nation between the United 
States and the States. Surely the federal judiciary can 
perform  no greater se r v ic e  to  the nation than to leave  
the States unhampered in the perform ance of their purely  
loca l a ffa irs. Surely few  p o lic ies can be thought of that 
States are m ore capable of deciding than the length of 
the hair of schoolboys. There can, of course, be honest 
differences of opinion as to whether any governm ent, 
state or fed era l should as a m atter of public policy  
regulate the length of haircuts, but it would be difficult 
to prove by reason , log ic , or common sen se  that the 
federa l judiciary is  m ore competent to deal with hair 
length than are the loca l school authorities and state 
leg isla tu res in our 50 sta tes . Perhaps if the Courts w ill 
leave the States free  to perform  their own constitutional 
duties they w ill at least be able su ccessfu lly  to regulate  
the length of hair their public school students can w ear.
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At the tim e of th is writing, four 1972 hair grooming eases  have
been, published, a ll heard by federal d istr ic t courts and one having
reached a United States appeal court. A ll were decided for the student.
Seal V .  M ertz involved the suspension of twenty m ale students
who had been sent from  school to  get haircuts and who met their
72attorney on the school parking lot. The parking lot conference took
place in view  of students in a classroom  and the school claim ed that
the c la ss  was disrupted. The court held that th is incident could not
be considered as justification for hair length regulation because the
incident would never have taken place had there not been such a
regulation. The court stated that a public school student has the
sam e right to liberty  as an adult under the Fourteenth Amendment
except that the law may limit the liberty of students if  it in terferes
with the educational p rocess.
Minnich v . Nabuda, et al. , a Pennsylvania case , resulted in
73
a decision  for the student. The court held that the school's  
hair grooming regulation would in fringe on the student's liberty  
without due p rocess.
A M ichigan high school student in the case  of Church v. Board 
of Education of Saline Area School D is tr ic t , cla im ed  that he grew
^^Seal V.  M ertz, 338 F . Supp. 945 (Pennsylvania, 1972).
1972).
Minnich v. Nabuda, et a l . , 336 F . Supp. 769 (Pennsylvania,
83
his hair long as a protest to  the war in Viet Nam. His long hair, 
he said, was an act of sym bolic expression . The United States 
D istrict Court held that enforcem ent of the school's dress code 
would have a chilling effect on free  speech and the F irst A m end­
ment. The court a lso  noted that although the school is  expected  
to stand in the parent's place in certain a reas during school hours, 
with respect to groom ing and d ress  the school must share that 
responsib ility  with parents.
A North C arolina ca se , M assie et a l. , v. Henry, et a l . , 
was brought by m ale students who had been suspended for their  
deliberate refusal to conform to a hair grooming guideline
recom m ended by the student -facu lty -p aren t com m ittee and
74adopted by the high school principal. The United States D istrict
Court d ism issed  the action and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of
Appeals decided that the guideline was not justified  on the theory
of need for d iscip line and considerations o f  safety. The case
was reversed  and rem anded, and the court said:
Perhaps the length of one's hair may be sym bolic speech  
which under som e circum stances is  entitled to  the protection  
of the F irst Amendment. But the record before us does 
not estab lish  that the minor plaintiffs se lected  the length 
of their hair for any reasons other than personal preference  
For that reason we prefer in  this case  to treat their right 
to wear their hair as they wish as an aspect of the right 
to be secure in one's person guaranteed by the due p rocess  
clause.




Hair s ty le  and personal appearance cases began quietly in the 
middle I960's and reached a crescendo during 1969 and 1970, P la in ­
tiffs  in these c a se s  invoked a variety of Constitutional Amendments 
from  the F ir s t to the Fifteenth to persuade state and federal courts 
that hair groom ing and d ress  codes violated their freedom s.
The courts' resp on ses were alm ost as various as the plaintiffs' 
p rayers. A b rie f review  of the reported cases  revea ls the following:
(1) Of s ix ty -e igh t ca ses  reported, forty decisions have declared  
d ress codes and hair grooming ru les as valid; tw enty-eight d ecisions  
have found such rules to be invalid.
(2) A fed era l court has declared that a purely "com m ercial"  
reason  for growing long hair is not a right protected by the F irst  
Amendment.
(3) Courts have upheld school dress codes as "reasonable"  
infringem ent upon students' liberties.
(4) The courts have held that where no com pelling educational 
in terest is  involved, d ress  codes and hair groom ing regulations are 
unconstitutional infringem ents upon the fundamental rights of students.
(5) Courts have held that the right to wear one's hair as one 
w ishes is  a fundamental right for adults, and therefore for m inors.
(6) Courts have held that the F irst Amendment rights are not 
absolute, and reasonable dress and hair grooming regulations are not 
im proper invasion  of such rights.
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(7) Where disruptive behavior is likely to result from allowing 
long hair, hair regulations are proper.
(8) Courts have ruled that the school must carry the heavy 
burden of justification of regulations which invade freedom s.
(9) Courts have awarded attorneys' fee s , co sts , and dam ages 
to students wrongfully d isciplined for wearing long hair.
(10) A court has ruled that the wearing of dungarees cannot
be prohibited without infringing upon a student's constitutional rights.
(11) A court has held that disruption caused by a hair grooming 
regulation cannot be a valid reason  for having the regulation.
(12) A court has held that where school's reason for having 
a hair grooming regulation was to advance econom ic welfare of 
the students, such regulation is  valid .
(13) A court has decided where shaving is  required on a 
rational basis and not arb itrarily  applied, no constitutional question  
is involved.
(14) Courts have held that school regulation governing boys' 
haircuts deprived pupils of liberty and property without due p rocess  
of law and violated Fourteenth Amendment.
(15' A Supreme Court Ju stice  has refused to hold that the 
federal government has constitutional power to in terfere in such  
school-state m atters as the length of a school boy's hair.
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(16) A United States Court of Appeals has held that hair length 
is  not akin to pure speech and constitutionally protected, but it is
a m atter for school boards to decide.
(17) A court has ruled that in m atters of hair and d r e ss ,  
the school must share its in loco parentis role with the child's  
parents.
(18) The United States Court of Appeals has held that the 
right to wear one's hair as one w ishes is  an aspect of the right to  
be secu re in one's person guaranteed by the due process clause.
As th ese sum m ary statem ents show, the matter of hair and
d ress in high schools is  far from  settled , and for every decision
in favor of d ress codes there can be found an equally com pelling
decision  against them .
The status of hair grooming and d ress code ca ses  may best
be described  by the United States D istrict Court for Pennsylvania
75in the case  of A xtell v. LaPenn;
An exam ination of the "long-hair cases"  to date makes 
clear that each such ca se  must be decided on its  own 
factual background and setting.
^^Axtell V.  LaPenn, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (Pennsylvania, 1971).
T A B L E  4
CASES INVOLVING A L L E G E D  IN F R IN G E M E N T OF  
THE RIGHT TO F R E E D O M  OF EXPRESSION  
AND OTHER RIGHTS
F r e e d o m  of E x p r e s s i o n  in Hair  S t y le s  and Clothing  
C a se ___________________________________________________  D i s p o s i t i o n
L eo n a rd  v . S c h o o l C o m m itte e  of
A t t l e b o r o , 212 N.  E. 2d 
( M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  1965)
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F e r r e l l  v .  D a l l a s  Independent Scho o l  
D i s t r i c t ,  261 F .  Supp. 545 ( T e x a s ,  1966)
S e n io r  boy w a s  su sp e n d ed  f r o m  s c h o o l  unti l  he got a 
hair  cut.  His  p a rents  sued in  S u p e r io r  Court to  
r e s t r a i n  the  s c h o o l  f r o m  e n fo r c in g  i t s  reg u la t i o n .  
When th is  court  upheld the  s c h o o l ,  the f a m i l y  
ap p ea led  to  the  S u p r e m e  Court of M a s s a c h u s e t t s .
The  S u p r e m e  Court upheld the  lo w e r  cour t .
T h r e e  b o y s ,  m e m b e r s  of a r o c k  m u s i c  group,  w e r e  
denied  a d m i s s i o n  to  s c h o o l  b e c a u s e  of t h e i r  long h a ir .  
The par en ts  brought suit  on the  grounds  that th e  bo ys '  
c o n s t itu t io n a l r ig h ts  w e r e  v io la te d . T he U n ited  S ta te s  
D i s t r i c t  Court ruled  in favo r  of the  sc h o o l .
0 0
D a v is  V .  Firm en t  , 269 F .  Supp. 524 
(L o u is ia n a ,  1967)
P la in t i f f ,  su ing  under  the C iv i l  R ights  A ct ,  contended  
that to be fo r c e d  to  cut h is  hair  w as  an in fr in g e m e n t  
upon his  right of f r e e d o m  of e x p r e s s i o n .  The  United  
S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court ruled that the w e a r in g  of long  
hair  was  not an e x p r e s s i o n  of anything ex cep t  conduct.  
Ruling in fa vo i ’ of the sc h o o l .
T A B L E  4 C o n t i n u e d
B r i c k  V,  Board of Educa t ion ,  S c h o o l  
D i s t r i c t  N o . 1, D e n v e r ,  C o lora do  , 
305 F,  Supp, 1316 ( C olor ado,  1969)
N i n e t e e n - y e a r - o l d  s e n i o r  boy i s  su sp e n d ed  f r o m  s c h o o l  
b e c a u s e  of long ha ir .  He s u e s  contending  that ha ir  
l ength or s t y l e  i s  a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ly  p rotec ted  right  
under the  F i r s t  and F o u r t e e n t h  A m e n d m e n t s .  The  
United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court found fo r  the s c h o o l .
C r e w s  V.  C l o n c s , 303 F .  Supp. 1370 
(Indiana, 1969)
P u p i l  sought inju nc t ive  r e l i e f  r e q u ir in g  s c h o o l  o f f ic ia l s  
to a l low  him  to w e a r  h is  h a ir  long s tat ing  that h is  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r igh ts  w e r e  in fr in ged .  The United Sta tes  
D i s t r i c t  Court he ld that h is  r ight of f r e e d o m  of e x p r e s s i o n  
under the  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  w a s  not an a b s o lu t e  r ight .  
V e r d ic t  fo r  the s c h o o l .
oo
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G ia n g r e c o  v. C enter  Sc h o o l  D i s t r i c t , 
313 F .  Supp. 776 ( M i s s o u r i ,  1969)
Shows V.  F re em an ,  230 So.  2d 63 
( M i s s i s s i p p i ,  1969)
P la in t i f f  a sk ed  t e m p o r a r y  injunction,  r e s t r a in i n g  o r d e r  
and p erm anen t  injunction  prohibit ing  s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  
f r o m  r e f u s in g  to  adm it  h im  in h is  s e n i o r  y e a r  fo r  
f a i l u r e  to c o m p ly  with  r e g u la t io n  g o v e r n in g  length  of 
ha ir .  Court held that h is  r ig h ts  w e r e  not a br idg ed .  
M otions  for  t e m p o r a r y  r e s t r a i n in g  o l d e r  and p r e l i m in a r y  
injunct ion  de nied .
A p p e a l  f r o m  d e c r e e  of C h a n c e r y  Court d i s s o l v in g  
t e m p o r a r y  injunct ion  enjo in ing s c h o o l  p r in c ip a l  f r o m  
p r e v e n t in g  s tudent f r o m  at tending s c h o o l  b e c a u s e  he  
v io la te d  p r in c ip a l ' s  hair  rule .  The  S u p r e m e  Court  
of M i s s i s s i p p i  he ld  that rule  w as  not in v a s io n  of f a m i l y  
p r iv a c y .  V erdi  ct in favo r  of the s c h o o l .
T A B L E  4  —  C o n t i n u e d
W e s t le y  v, R o s s i , 305 F ,  Supp. 706  
(M inn eso ta ,  1969)
M aie  student pr even te d  f r o m  attending h igh s c h o o l  
b e c a u s e  of length  of h is  ha ir  sought injunction ag a ins t  
the  s c h o o l .  The  D i s t r i c t  Court held that he could not 
be preven ted  f r o m  at tending public  s c h o o l  b e c a u s e  of  
the  length  of h is  ha ir .  V erd ict  in fav or  of plaintiff .
B r e e n  v. K ahl , 419 F .  2d 1034, 
c e r t ,  den, 90 S, Ct, 1836 
( W is c o n s in ,  1969)
R ic h a r d s  v, Th ui ' s ton , 304 F .  Supp.  
449, affd, 424 E,  2d 1281 
( M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  1970)
T h o m a s  B r e e n  and J a m e s  Anton w e r e  s tuden ts  
who w e r e  su sp e n d ed  b e c a u s e  th ey  would not cut th e ir  
h a ir .  United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court granted judgment  
to p la int i f fs  sa y in g  that the s c h o o l  fa i led  to  c a r r y  the  
h e a v y  burden of j u s t i f ic a t io n  for  the h a ir  g r o o m in g  
ru le  and that the re g u la t io n  invaded a f r e e d o m  which  
d e s e r v e d  a h igh d e g r e e  of p r o te c t io n .  Upheld on appeal .
Student with long h a ir  su sp e n d ed  f r o m  s c h o o l ,  sought  
injunction  on the ground that h is  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  r ights  
w e r e  abridged under  the due p r o c e s s  c la u s e .  The  
U n ited  S ta te s  D is t r ic t  C ourt h eld  that th e boy m u st be  
r e in s t a t e d  in s c h o o l  and granted other  r e l i e f  inc luding  
a t to r n e y s '  f e e s .  U nited  S ta te s  C ourt of A p p e a ls  
upheld the d e c i s i o n .
oo
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T A B L i E  4 - -  C o n t i n u e d
F a r r e l l  v. S m i t h , 310 F ,  Supp. 732 
(Maine , 1970)
T h r e e  boys  e x p e l le d  f r o m  v o c a t io n a l  s c h o o l  b e c a u s e  of 
t h e ir  long hair  a s k  an injunct ion  and c l a i m  in fr in g e m e n t  
of t h e ir  14th A m e n d m e n t  r ig h t s .  The D i s t r i c t  Court  
a g r e e d  that the  right to w e a r  o n e 's  ha ir  in any length  
i s  an e x p r e s s i o n  of p e r s o n a l  l ib e r t y  p r o te c te d  by 
the United Sta te s  C on st i tu t ion ,  but denied  the  r e l i e f  
r e q u e s t e d  on the  grounds  that the  s ta te  had m a de  a 
sho w ing  su f f ic ie n t  to s u s t a i n  t h e i r  s u b s t a n t ia l  burden  
of j u s t i f i c a t io n .  V er d ic t  f o r  the  s c h o o l .
Sc hw a rtz  y .  G a lv e s to n  Independent  
S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t , 307 F .  Supp. 1034 
(T e x a s ,  1970)
P la in t i f f  sued in  United  S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court b e c a u s e  
of a rule  e n fo r c e d  by h is  s c h o o l  a s  to the  length  of his  
h a i r .  The court  d e c l in e d  to in t e r v e n e  in the  a c t iv i t i e s  
of the  s c h o o l  and d i s m i s s e d  the  c a s e .
o
J a c k so n  v. D o r r i e r , 424  F .  2d 213, 
ce r t  den. 91 S. Ct. 55 ( T e n n e s s e e ,  1970)
P u p i l s  sued in United S ta te s  court  b e c a u s e  they  w e r e  
su sp e n d ed  f r o m  s c h o o l  fo r  v io la t io n  of ha ir  g r o o m in g  
r e g u la t io n . T he co u r t h eld  fo r  th e  s c h o o l  and th e  
United S ta te s  S u p r e m e  Court de nied  c e r t i o r a r i .
S i m s  V .  Colfax  C om m unity  S choo l  
D i s t r i c t ,  307 F .  Supp. 385 
(Iowa, 1970)
Suit by g i r l  student  w h o s e  bangs w e r e  too  long to  c o m p ly  
with  s c h o o l  hair  g r o o m in g  re gu la t io n .  The court  found 
that a public s c h o o l  s tud en t ' s  f r e e  c h o ic e  as to  a p p e a r a n c e  
and ha ir  s t y l e  is  c o n s t i t u t io n a l ly  p ro te c ted .
T'ABLiE 4  - -  C o n t i n u e d
S t e v e n s o n  v. W h e e le r  County  
B oa rd  of Education ,  306 F .  Supp.
97,  affd. 426 F .  2d 1154, c e r t ,  
den.  91 S. Ct. 355 (G eorg ia ,  1970)
Akin  V .  Bo ard of E du cat ion ,
68 Cal.  Rptr.  557 (C al i fo rn ia ,  1970)
Students  su sp e n d ed  f r o m  s c h o o l  fo r  r e fu s in g  to  shave  
sued in United St at e s  D i s t r i c t  Court.  The court denied  
h is  suit  on the ground that no c o n s t i t u t io n a l  q u e st io n  
w as in v o lv e d .
A student  w as  denied e n r o l lm e n t  in h igh s c h o o l  so  
long as he  w o r e  a beard.  The a p p e l la te  court  upheld  
the  s c h o o l  board.
M e y e r s  v. A r e a t a  Union High  
S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t ,  75 Cal.  Rptr 68 
(C a l i fo rn ia ,  1970)
Student sued b e c a u s e  of d r e s s  po l ic y  w hic h r eq u ired  
h im  to  cut h is  h a ir .  The lo w e r  court o r d e r e d  that 
the student be r e in s ta te d  in s c h o o l ,  and that ruling was  
upheld by the  a p p e l la te  court  b e c a u s e  of the  
"un co ns t i tut iona l  v a g u e n e s s "  of the  s c h o o l ' s  ruling  
on " e x t r e m e  h a ir  s t y l e s .  "
A le x a n d e r  v. Th o m p s o n , 313 F .  Supp. 
1389 (C al i forn ia ,  1970)
Claude  A le x a n d e r ,  a m in o r ,  s u e s  for  injun ct ion  ag ain st  
high s c h o o l ' s  enfox'cement of i egu lat ion  that s id e b u r n s  
be a c e r t a in  length .  The s c h o o l s  w e r e  enjo ined f r o m  
refxising h im  e n r o l lm e n t  on the  gr ounds  that h i s  hair  
s t y le  did not c o n fo i  m to the  i e gu lat ion .
T A B L i E  4  - -  C o n t i n u e d
Dunham v. P u l s i f e r ,  312 F ,  Supp.  
411 (V erm on t ,  1970)
L o v e l a c e  v. L e e c h b u r g  A r e a  S cho o l  
D i s t r i c t ,  310 F .  Supp. 579 (P e n n s y lv a n ia ,
1970)
B o y  a sk e d  the court  to enjo in  the  s c h o o l  f r o m  e n fo rc in g  
a th let ic  g r o o m i n g  cod e .  The court found that the  rule  
w as not e s s e n t i a l  to  any c o m p e l l in g  i n t e r e s t  of which  
the  s c h o o l  board i s  en tr usted  and i t s  e n f o r c e m e n t  would  
be an in f r in g e m e n t  on the fu n d am en ta l  r ight s  of the  
plaint if f .
High s c h o o l  boy  su sp e n d ed  b e c a u s e  of having a m u s t a c h e  
brought suit  in United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court.  The  Court  
held that the  f a s h io n  code  p r o v i s i o n  prohibit ing  m u s t a c h e  
w as r e a s o n a b le ,  but in th is  c a s e  the  b o y 's  m u s t a c h e  
w a s p r a c t i c a l l y  i m p e r c e p t i b l e ,  and that the  ru le  w as  
a r b i t r a r y .  To e x c lu d e  the  boy f r o m  s c h o o l  fo r  such  
a " non-v io la t io n "  i s  a i 'b i tra ry  and a v io la t io n  of h is  
r ig h t s .
vOtv
G fel l  V.  R ic k e lm a n ,  313 F ,  Supp. 
(Ohio, 1970)
364 Student s e e k s  injunct ion  aga inst  h igh  s c h o o l  d r e s s  code .  
The court  found that t h e r e  w a s  a r e a s o n a b le  r e a s o n  for  
the d r e s s  code  and d i s m i s s e d  the c a s e .
Gri ff in  v, T a t u m s , 300 F .  Supp. 60,  
425 F.  2d 201 (A labam a,  1970)
Student brought suit  in United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court  
c h a l le n g in g  s c h o o l ' s  hair  c o d e .  The Court said  
that the  t o u c h s to n e  for  su s ta in in g  r e g u la t io n s  c o n c e r n in g  
student  hair  s t y l e  and d r e s s  is  sh ow ing that r e g u la t io n s  
a r e  n e c e s s a r y  to  avoid i n t e r f e r e n c e  with ed uc at ion al  
p r o c e s s .  Court upheld the  v a l id i ty  of the  s c h o o l ' s  
r e g u la t io n  re g a r d in g  hair .
T A B L E  4  —  C o n t i n u e d
C o r le y  v. D a u n h a u er , 312 F .  Supp.  
811 ( A r k a n s a s ,  1970)
Grade  s c h o o l  s tude nt ,  12 y e a r s  old,  ch a l le n g e d  s c h o o l  
p o l ic y  with r e s p e c t  to ha ir  length . The  United Sta tes  
D i s t r i c t  Court held that the  public  s c h o o l  s y s t e m  has  
right to r e q u ir e  s tu d e n ts  in s c h o o l  band p r o g r a m  to 
c o n f o r m  t h e i r  ha ir  length to r e a s o n a b l e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
of band d i r e c t o r .  C a s e  d i s m i s s e d .
P r i t c h a r d  v.  Spring B r a n c h ,  
308 F .  Supp. 570 ( T e x a s ,  1970)
B r o w n l e e  v. B r a d le y  C ou nty , 
Te n n e s s e e ,  Board  of E d u c a t io n ,
311 F, Supp, 1360 ( T e n n e s s e e ,  1970)
C r o s s e n  v. F a t s i ,  309 F .  Supp. 114 
(Conne ct icu t ,  1970)
A c t io n  by h igh s c h o o l  boy and h is  fa th er  for  f e d e r a l  
injunct ion  a g a in st  e n fo r c in g  m a l e  ha ir  g r o o m in g  
re g u la t io n .  The  D i s t r i c t  Court held that the  regu la t io n  
w a s  not lacking  for  s p e c i f i c i t y ,  u n i f o r m it y ,  or f a i r n e s s ,  
that s o m e  d i s c r e t i o n  n e e d s  to be lodged in the s c h o o l  
a u th o r i t ie s  in o r d e r  to a c h i e v e  a f l e x i b l e  and e f f e c t iv e  
a d m in i s t r a t io n  and that e n f o r c e m e n t  of the ru le  was  
ra t i o n a l ly  r e la te d  to  the e f f ic ien t  o p e r a t io n  of the s c h o o l .
Student e x p e l le d  b e c a u s e  he did not cut h is  ha ir  sued  
in United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court.  The Court held that 
the re g u la t io n  of the  public  s c h o o l s  w as  ne i ther  
a r b i t r a r y  nor c a p r i c i o u s  and i t s  ap p l ica t ion  to plaintiff  
did not v io la t e  h is  r ight s  under the Consti tut ion .
Student su sp e n d ed  for  w e a r in g  a beard and m u s t a c h e  
c la im e d  in fr in g e m e n t  of f r e e d o m  of e:s p r e s s i o n .  United  
St a te s  D i s t r i c t  Court o r d e r  the boy r e in s ta te d  and 
granted other  r e l i e f  inc luding  h is  c o s t s  in the c a s e .
V .O
OJ
T A B L E  4 - -  C o n t i n u e d
Wood V .  A la m o ,  308 F .  Supp, 570,  
affd. 433 F .  2d 551 ( T e x a s ,  1970)
Neuhaus  v.  T o r r e y ,  310 F .  Supp. 192 
(C al i fo rn ia .  1970)
A c t io n  on b eha l f  of  h igh s c h o o l  student  a sk in g  injunction  
and d a m a g e s  for s u s p e n s i o n  of s tudent f r o m  s c h o o l  
b e c a u s e  of length  of h is  ha ir .  On s tu d en t ' s  m ot ion  for  
t e m p o r a r y  injunct ion  and s c h o o l  o f f i c ia l s '  m ot io n  to  
d i s m i s s  w hich  Court t r e a t e d  as m ot io n fo r  s u m m a r y  
ju d g m en t ,  the D i s t r i c t  Court held that,  w h e r e  h igh  
s c h o o l ' s  w r i t t e n  d r e s s  code  fo r  s tuden ts  w a s  adopted  
a f te r  a c t iv e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  by s tu d e n ts ,  r e g u la t io n  of 
hair  len gth  w a s  v a l id .  M otion fo r  t e m p o r a r y  injunction  
den ied;  s c h o o l  o f f i c i a l s '  m ot io n  for su m m a i 'y  judgment  
grante d.
Suit by h igh s c h o o l  a th le te s  a g a in st  Superintende nt  of 
E d u ca t io n  of s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  for  injun ct ive  and d e c l a r a t o r y  
r e l i e f  a g a in s t  e n f o r c e m e n t  of s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  r e g u la t ion  
which e s t a b l i s h e d  g r o o m in g  r e g u la t io n s  fo r  a t h l e t e s .
On m o t io n  for p r e l i m in a r y  injunct ion ,  the  Court held  
that the  g r o o m in g  s tandard for  m a l e  s t ud en ts  p a r t i c i ­
pating in a th le t ic  c o m p e t i t io n  w a s  r a t io n a l  and r e a s o n a b l e .  
Motion for  p r e l i m i n a r y  injunction  d en ied .
vO
Hatter  v,  Los A n g e l e s  City High  
Sch oo l  D i s t r i c t , 310 F .  Supp, 1309 
(C a l i forn ia ,  1970)
A c t io n  by s tuden ts  c l a im in g  in fr in g e m e n t  of r ights  
by s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  and i t s  o f f ic ia l s  a f t er  s t ud en ts  w e r e  
su sp e n d ed  for  v io la t in g  d r e s s  code .  The court  de c ided  
that the c a s e  r a i s e d  no q u e s t io n s  of co n st i t u t io n a l  
p r o p o r t i o n s ,
T A B L E  4  —  C o n t i n u e d
G e r e  v. Stanley ,  et al .  ,
320 F .  Supp. 852 ( P e n n s y lv a n ia ,
1970)
J e f f e r s ,  J r .  , v .  Yuba City  
Unified S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t ,  et a l .  ,
319 F .  Supp. 368 (C a l i f o r n ia ,  1970)
High s c h o o l  student  who w as  s usp end ed  f i 'om s c h o o l  
fo r  v io la t i o n  of  h a ir  portion  of s c h o o l  d r e s s  co de  
brought  a c t io n  a g a in st  s c h o o l  o f f i c ia l s  c la im in g  
v io la t io n  of h is  F i r s t  and F o u r te e n th  A m e n d m e n t  
r i g h t s .  The  United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that  
h a ir  s t y l e  r e g u la t io n  w as  r e a s o n a b le  w h e r e  s tu d en t ' s  
long h a ir  and g o a t e e  w e r e  a m a t t e r  of p e r s o n a l  t a s t e  
and not a m e a n s  of e x p r e s s i o n .  Complaint d i s m i s s e d .
A c t io n  by su sp e n d ed  high  s c h o o l  s tudents  to have  
c e r t a in  por t ions  of  d r e s s  code  perta in ing  to length  
of m a l e  s t u d e n ts '  h a ir  at high s c h o o l  d e c la r e d  u n ­
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  and to  enjoin de fendants  f r o m  e n fo rc in g  
t h e m .  The United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that h igh  
s c h o o l  ha ir  r e g u la t io n  prohibit ing  bea rd s  and forbidding  
s id e b u r n s  be low  e a r  lobe ,  and h a ir  draping  o v e r  e a r s ,  
sh irt  c o l l a r s  or e y e s  w as  r e a s o n a b ly  and ra t i o n a l ly  
r e la te d  to ed u c a t io n a l  p r o c e s s  and did not d e p r iv e  
s tud en ts  of t h e ir  co n st i t u t io n a l  r ig h t s .  Judgm ent  for  
d e f e n d a n t s ,
'O
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B o u s e ,  et a l . v. H ip e s ,  et al .  , 
319 F .  Supp 515 (Indiana, 1970)
Students  who w e r e  s usp end ed  and ex pe l led  from school  
sought  pe rm anen t  injunct ive  r e l i e f  o r d e r in g  defendant  
s c h o o l  o f f ic ia l s  to r e fr a in  f r o m  denying  a d m i s s i o n  and 
e n r o l l m e n t  to th e m .  The United S ta tes  D i s t r i c t  Court  
held that w h e r e  pla inti ff  s tudents  w e r e  e x p e l le d  and 
su sp e n d ed  for d i s c ip l i n a r y  r e a s o n s  as w e l l ,  no f e d e r a l  
q u e st io n  w as  in v o lv e a .  C la im  d i s m i s s e d .
T A B L E  4 C o n t i n u e d
South ern v.  Board  of T r u s t e e s  for  the  
D a l l a s  Independent Sch o o l  D i s t r i c t , 
318 F .  Supp. 355 ( T e x a s ,  1970)
A ct io n  by s tudent and his m o th e r  ch a l le n g in g  r e f u s a l  
of s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  to  admit  student to high s c h o o l  due  
to  length of ha ir .  United Sta tes  D i s t r i c t  Court held
tHa.t tHe r é g u la t io n  w as  r e a s o n a b ly  n e c e s s a r y  to  insni 'o
e f f e c t iv e  o p e r a tio n  of s c h o o l and p r o m o te  d is c ip l in e
and d e c o r u m  of i t s  s tu d e n ts .  A p p l ica t io n  for  t e m p o r a r y  
injunct ion  d en ied .
C a r t e r  v, H o d g e s , et a l ,  , 317 F .  Supp.  
89 (A r k a n sa s ,  1970)
B a n n is t e r  v. P a r a d i s ,  et al.
316 F .  Supp. 
1970)
185 (New H a m p s h ir e ,
A c t io n  to  enjoin e n f o r c e m e n t  of high s c h o o l  d r e s s  code .
The United  S ta te s  D is t i ' i c t  Court held that d r e s s  code  
and p r o v is io n  t h e r e o f  prohibit ing long hair  w as  r e a s o n a b ly  ^  
r e la te d  to  ed u c a t io n a l  p r o c e s s  and w as  valid and that cr»
st u d e n t ' s  r igh ts  under  F i r s t  and F o u r te e n th  A m e n d m e n t s  
w e r e  not v io la te d .  Injunction and other  r e l i e f  de nied .
A ct io n  by junior  h igh  s c h o o l  student to enjoin e n f o r c e ­
ment of prohibi t ion  of d r e s s  code  ag a inst  w e a r in g  of  
d u n g a r e e s .  The United S ta tes  D i s t r i c t  Court held that 
prohib i t ion  w as  u n co n s t i tu t io n a l  and inv al id ,  in a b s e n c e  
of showing that w e a r in g  of d u n g a r e e s  in any way inhibited  
or tended to inhibit the  ed uca t io n a l  p r o c e s s .  Injunction  
granted .
T A B L E  4  - -  C o n t i n u e d
B la c k  V .  Cothren, et a l .  ,
316 F .  Supp. 468 (N ebrask a ,  1970)
Student denied  continued at ten danc e  at junio r  h igh s c h o o l  
fo r  f a i lu r e  to c o m p ly  with  g r o o m in g  r e g u la t i o n s  sought  
inju n ct iv e  r e l i e f  and d a m a g e s  under  C iv i l  R ights  Act .
The United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that e v id e n c e  
that,  in e n t i r e  s c h o o l  sy; c m ,  half  or s l i g h t ly  l e s s  than  
ha l f  of  t h o s e  who ca u se d  d i s c i p l i n a r y  p r o b le m s  did not 
w e a r  long hair  and that half  or s l i g h t ly  m o r e  than half  
did w e a r  t h e i r  h a ir  u nu su a l ly  long was  not su f f ic ie n t  to  
sh ow  that u nu su a l ly  long ha ir  c a u se d  p r o b le m s  of 
d i s c i p l i n e ,  s o  a s  to ju st i fy  r e f u s a l  to  admit student ,  
who fa i led  to ha ve  h is  h a ir  cut,  on ground that reg u la t io n  
a g a in s t  e x c e s s i v e l y  long ha ir  w as  t ied  d i r e c t l y  to  
d i s c i p l i n a r y  p r o b le m s .  Judgm ent  fo r  pla inti f f .
vO-j
Whits e l l  V . P a m p a  Independent  Sc h o o l  
D i s t r i c t ,  et a l .  , 316 F .  Supp. 852 
( T e x a s ,  1970)
A c t io n  by high s c h o o l  student s e e k in g  inju nc t ive  r e l i e f  
w ith  r e s p e c t  to s c h o o l  reg u la t io n  g o v e r n in g  length of 
s tu d e n ts '  ha ir .  Student c l a i m s  v io la t io n s  of h is  r ights  
under  the  F i r s t ,  T hird ,  F o urth ,  F i f th ,  Ninth,  and 
F o u r te e n th  A m e n d m e n t s .  The United Sta tes  D i s t r i c t  
Court sa id  that the w e a r in g  of long hair  i s  a right  
p r o te c ted  to h igh s c h o o l  s t u d e n ts ,  but the in t e r e s t  of 
the  s ta te  in providing  ed u ca t io n a l  s y s t e m  f r e e  of 
i r t e r f e r e n c e  and d is r u p t io n s  w i l l  o v e r r i d e  su ch  right.  
C om plain t  d i s m i s s e d .
T A B L i E  4 - - C o n t i n u e d
Murphy v. P o c a t e l l o  Sc h oo l  
D is t r i c t  #25 , 480 P ,  2d 878 
(Idaho, 1970)
Canney v. Board of I n s t r u c t io n , 
231 So, 2d 34 (F lo r id a ,  1970)
A c t i o n  a g a inst  s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  fo r  m an d a m u s and for  
d a m a g e s  for a l le g e d  unlawful  s u s p e n s i o n  of p laintiff  
f r o m  at ten da nc e  at c l a s s e s ,  b e c a u s e  of v io la t io n  of 
ha ir  r eg u la t io n .  It ap p eared  that the  r e a s o n  for  the 
r e g u la t io n  was  to a s s u r e  t r a n q u i l i ty  in the  s c h o o l  and 
to  avoid  co nfr o nta t io ns  be tw een  s tudents  w e a r in g  long 
h a ir  and t h o s e  not doing so .  It a pp ea re d  a l s o  that the  
pla inti ff  had c a u s e d  no d is t u r b a n c e .  The S u p r e m e  Court  
of Idaho held that the s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  fa i led  to be ar  burden  
of ju s t i f ic a t io n .  Judgm ent  fo r  p laint if f .
P r o c e e d i n g  on peti t ion for  writ  of  c e r t i o r a r i  to  r e v ie w  
a c t io n  of county  board of in s t r u c t io n  su sp en d in g  p e t i t io ner  
f r o m  high s c h o o l .  The D i s t r i c t  Court of A p p ea ls  held  
that w h e r e  l e g i s l a t u r e  had e m p o w e r e d  s c h o o l  board to  
enact  l e g u l a t i o n s ,  board en ac te d  reg u la t io n  r e g a r d in g  
w e a r in g  of h a ir  and prohibit ing  b i z a r r e  and ex o t i c  s t y l e s ,  
and student  a d m it te d ly  v io la te d  r e g u la t i o n s ,  and was  
s u s p e n d e d  for  ten  days  by p r in c ip a l  and on s a m e  date  
board extended s u s p e n s i o n  upon condit ion  and later  
grante d h e a r in g ,  a m p le  opportuni ty  was  g ive n student  
to c o n fo r m  with sa id  r eg u la t io n ,  and h is  r e f u s a l  to c om p ly  
left board no a l t e r n a t iv e  but to cont inue  his s u s p e n s io n .  
Writ of c e r t i o r a r i  denied .
<x>
T A B L E  4 —  C o n t i n u e d
Laine v. D i tm a n n , et al .  ,
259 N. E .  2d 824 ( I l l in o is ,  1970)
High s c h o o l  ju n io r  brought act ion  ag a ins t  m e m b e r s  of 
s c h o o l  board and s c h o o l  o f f ic ia l s  to enjo in  e x p u ls io n  
f r o m  s c h o o l  for  w ea r in g  h is  ha ir  down to h is  s h o u ld e r s .  
The C ircui t  Court r en dered  judgm en t  a d v e r s e  to the  
student and he a pp ea led .  The A p p e l la te  Court held 
right of student of p e r s o n a l  c h o ic e  in m a t t e r s  of hair  
l ength  can only  be abridged or cu r ta i le d  w h e r e  e x e r c i s e  
of that right c r e a t e s  an ac tu al  d is t u r b a n c e  or d isr u pt io n  
to o r d e r l y  p r o c e s s  of s c h o o l  fu n c t i o n s ,  R e \  e r s e d  and 
re m a n d e d  with i n s t r u c t io n s .
Cordova v.  C hon ko , et a l ,  , 
3Î5 F .  Supp. "9^3 ôÔhio, 1970)
L iv in gs to n  v. Sw anquis t ,  et al.  
314 F. Supp. l ( I l l in o is ,  1970)
A c t i o n  in which high s c h o o l  student sought r e l i e f  f r o m  
his  s u s p e n s i o n  f r o m  s c h o o l  due to h is  ha ir  s t y l e .  United  
S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that s u s p e n s i o n  by high s c h o o l  
p r in c ip a l  den ied  the  s tudent  h is  r ig h t s .  Court a l s o  
aw ard ed  d a m a g e s  of one cent to the plaintiff .
D isp u te  inv olv ing  s c h o o l  d r e s s  code  in which pla inti f fs  
ch ar ged  v io la t io n  of th e ir  c o n st i tu t io n a l  r igh ts  and 
sought equ i tab le  and d e c l a r a t o r y  r e l i e f  and d a m a g e s .
The United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that s c h o o l  d r e s s  
code  did not v io la te  p ro te c t io n  af forded by F e d e r a l  
C on st i tu t ion  and e n f o r c e m e n t  of code  did not d e p r iv e  
pla in t i f fs  of f r e e d o m  of s p e e c h  and e x p r e s s i o n .  R e l ie f  
den ied ,  c a u s e  d i s m i s s e d .
vO
T A B L E  4 - -  C o n t i n u e d
M e r c e r ,  et a l . v.  L o t h a m e r ,  et a l .  , 
321 F .  Supp. 335 (Ohio, 1971)
Pound, et a l . v. Hol laday,  et a l .
322 F .  Supp, 1000 ( M i s s i s s i p p i ,  1971)
A c t io n  in United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court by s tude nts  to 
p e r m a n e n t ly  enjo in  s c h o o l  o f f ic ia l s  f r o m  en forc in g  
p r o v is io n s  of s c h o o l  d r e s s  cod e ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  p r o v is io n  
c o n c e r n in g  a c c e p t a b le  length of h a ir  for  m a le  s tu d e n ts .  
The Court held that s c h o o l  d r e s s  code  p r o v is io n  that  
length  of bo y s '  hair  should not c o v e r  c o l l a r  w as  not  
a r b i t r a r y  and u n r e a s o n a b le  and w a s  r e a s o n a b ly  re la ted  
to  t e a c h in g  prope r  g r o o m in g ,  s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e  and 
et iq ue t te ,  and that su ch  cod e  did not v io la te  s tude nts '  
co n s t i t u t io n a l  r ig h t s .  A p p l ica t io n  den ied .
A c t io n  by h igh s c h o o l  s tude nts  who w e r e  su sp end ed  for  
v io la t io n  of d r e s s  code re la t in g  to  h a i r s t y l e s ,  for  
judgm ent  d e c l a r in g  h a i r s t y l e  r e g u la t io n  u n co ns t i tu t io n a l  
and for an injunct ion  prohibit ing  i m p le m e n t a t i o n  of the  
regu lat ion .  The United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that 
h a i r s t y l e  r e g u la t io n  was  r e a s o n a b l y  n e c e s s a r y  and 
d i s m i s s e d  the act ion .
o
o
T u r le y  v . A d e l  C om m unity  S choo l  
D i s t r i c t ,  et al .  , 322 F .  Supp. 402
(Iowa, 1971)
A ct io n  ch a l le n g in g  co n s t i t u t io n a l i t y  of publ ic  s c h o o l  
re g u la t io n  s e e k in g  to c o n tr o l  l ength  of s tu dents '  hair  
and r e s t r a i n  e n f o r c e m e n t  aga ins t  m in o r  plaintiff .  
The United Sta tes  D i s t r i c t  Court held that the the  
ru le  w as  u n co nst i tu t io n a l  w h e r e  s c h o o l  fa i led  to  
d e m o n s t r a t e  the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  of the hair  ru le .  
Judgm ent  a c c o r d in g ly .
T A B L E  4 - -  C o n t i n u e d
H am m on d s  et al .  v. Shannon,
et a l . , 323 F .  Supp, 
(T e x a s ,  1971)
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A ct io n  for  injunct ive  d e c l a r a t o r y  r e l i e f  r e s t r a in in g  
s c h o o l  o f f ic ia l s  f r o m  e n fo rc in g  d r e s s  code  in high  
s c h o o l .  The  United S ta te s  D is t in c t  Court held that  
r e c o r d  e s t a b l i s h e d  that d r e s s  code w as  r e a s o n a b le  
and val id  in a l l  r e s p e c t s  and v io la te d  no con st i tu t iona l  
r ig h ts  of  p la in t i f f s .  Com plaint  d i s m i s s e d .
A x t e l l  V .  L a P en n ,  et a l .  ,
323 F  
1971)
Supp. 1077 (P e n n s y lv a n ia ,
C iv i l  r ight s  a c t io n  by par en ts  on be ha l f  of s tuden ts  
for  injunction  r e s t r a i n i n g  s c h o o l  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  and 
s c h o o l  board f r o m  e n fo r c in g  s c h o o l  reg u la t io n  p e r ­
t a in in g  to  b o y s '  h a i r  cu ts  and to  r e q u i r e  the  s t u d e n t s '
r e in s t a t e m e n t  a f ter  s u s p e n s i o n  for v io lat in g  the  rule .
The United S t a te s  D i s t r i c t  C our t  held  th a t  th e  code 
w as  u n r e a s o n a b le  and infr inged on fun dam en ta l  r ights  
gu ar an teed  by the  Constitution.
P r e s s  V .  P a s a d e n a  Independent  
Sc ho ol  D i s t r i c t ,  326 F .  Supp. 550 
( T e x a s ,  1971)
L a m b e r t  v. M a rush i ,  et al .
322 F .  Supp. 326 (West  V irg in ia ,
1971)
A c t io n  by e ight gra d e  g i r l  s u sp end ed  f r o m  s c h o o l  for  
w e a r in g  pantsuit  in v i o l a t i o n  of d r e s s  code  and for  
p a rt ic ipa t in g  in d e m o n s t r a t io n ,  for injunc t ive  and 
d e c l a r a t o r y  r e l i e f .  Court gave  r e a s o n s  why a f e d e r a l  
d i s t r i c t  court should a b s ta in  f r o m  en te r in g  into such  
m a t t e r s .  The Court absta ined .
A ct io n  by lo n g - h a ir e d  s tudent c h al le n gin g  s c h o o l ' s  
s u s p e n s i o n  of h im  unti l  he cut h is  h a ir .  The D is t r i c t  
Court held that s c h o o l  o f f ic ia l s  fa i led  to show that h is  
long hair  c a u se d  d is c i p l i n e  p r o b le m s .
T A B L i E  4 - -  C o n t i n u e d
M a r t in , et al.  v. D a v is o n ,  et a l .  ,
322 F .  Supp, 318 (P e n n s y lv a n ia ,  1971)
A c t io n  by pupil and h is  parents  to enjoin s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  
f r o m  e n fo r c in g  s u s p e n s io n  of pupil  for  v io la t io n  of 
re g u la t io n  p e r t a i n i n g  to bo ys '  hail-cuts  and f o r  d e c l a r a ­
t ion  that the r egu la t io n  was  u ncon st i t u t io n al .  The  United  
Sta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that w h e r e  s t y l e  and length  of 
hair  w orn  did not c o n s t i t u te  heal th  p ro b lem  nor d isrupt  
s c h o o l  a c t iv i t y ,  e n f o r c e m e n t  of su c h  reg u la t io n  de p r ived  
pupil of l i b e r t y  without due p r o c e s s .  Order  a c c o r d in g ly .
D a w so n  v. H i l l s b o r o u g h  C ounty , 
F lo r id a ,  Sc h o o l  B o a r d , 322 F .  Supp.  
286 ( F lo r id a ,  1971)
A c t i o n  w h e r e in  s t u dents  sought injunct ive  r e l i e f  req u ir ing  
s c h o o l  board to t e r m i n a t e  t h e ir  s u s p e n s i o n  for v io la t in g  
long ha ir  p r o v i s io n  of s c h o o l  d r e s s  code .  The  United  
S t a t e s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that the  s c h o o l  board fa i led  
to sh ow  that long hair  had ca u sed  d isr u p t io n  or that it 
co n st i t u te d  a hea l th  hazard  and that t h e r e f o r e  i ts  
e n f o r c e m e n t  v io la te d  the c o n st i tu t io n a l  r igh ts  of the  
s tudent .  R e l i e f  gr an te d .
P a r k e r  v. F r y ,  et a l .  ,
323 F .  Supp. 728 (A r k a n s a s , 1971)
A c t io n  for  a l le g e d  v io la t io n  of c i v i l  r ights  of high s c h o o l  
student  su sp en d ed  b e c a u s e  of length and s t y l e  of his hair .  
On p la in t i f f ' s  a p p l ica t io n  for  t e m p o r a r y  injunction  the  
United S ta tes  D i s t r i c t  Court held that showing of d is r u p t iv e  
ef f ect  of high s c h o o l  s tu dent ' s  s h o u ld e r - l e n g t h  ha ir  was  
in su f f ic ie n t  to ju s t i fy  high s c h o o l  ru le  prohibit ing m a l e s  
fr o m  w e a r in g  " e x tr e m e  hair  s t y l e s .  " T e m p o r a r y  i n j u n c ­
tion  grante d .
T A B L iE  4  - -  C o n t i n u e d
Rum 1er v. Bd. of Schoo l  T i 'u s te e s  
fo r  Lex ingto n County D i s t r i c t  No.  One 
S c h o o l s , 327 F .  Supp. 729 (South 
C a ro l ina ,  1971)
Com plaint  by w hich pla inti f fs  sought  judg m en t  d e c la r i n g  
that re g u la t io n  of board of t r u s t e e s  c o v e r in g  a p p e a r a n c e  
of s tud en ts  at tending h igh s c h o o l s  in d i s t r i c t  v io lated  
F i r s t  , E ig hth  and F o u r te e n th  A m e n d m e n t s .  The United  
S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that such  r e g u la t io n  did not 
v io la te  p la in t i f f s '  r ig h t s .  P r a y e r  f o r  r e s t r a i n i n g  o r d e r  
a n d / o r  p e r m a n e n t  injunction  denied;  ac t ion  d i s m i s s e d .
B e r r y m a n  v. Hein,  329 F .  Supp. 616 
(Idaho, 1971)
A c t io n  by high s c h o o l  s tude nts  su sp e n d ed  for v io la t ing  a 
g r o o m in g  r e g u la t io n  r e g a r d in g  length  of ha ir  s e e k in g  
a p e r m a n e n t  injunction  again st  e n f o r c e m e n t  of the  ru le .  
The United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that a g r o o m in g  
r e g u la t io n  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  and t h e r e f o r e  val id only  if  th e r e  
i s  e v id e n c e  that d is r u p t io n  of e d u c a t ion a l  p r o c e s s  w i l l  
r e s u l t  b e c a u s e  s tudents  w e a r  long h a ir .  Injunctive  
r e l i e f  granted.
o
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V a ld e s  v, M onroe  County B oard  of 
P u b l ic  Instruc t ion ,  et al .  , 32 5 F.  Supp.  
S'72 (F lo r id a ,  1971)
A ct io n  by s tu de nts  to enjo in e n fo r c e m e n t  of re g u la t io n  
of s c h o o l  board per ta in ing  to length  of s t u d e n ts '  hair .
The  United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  
of public s c h o o l  board r e g u la t io n s  pe rta in ing  to w e a r in g  
of long hair  did not v io la t e  s tud ents '  co n st i t u t io n a l  r ig h t s .  
C a s e  d i s m i s s e d .
T A B L E  4 - -  C o n t i n u e d
H ow el l  et a l .  v,  WoUF, et a l.  ,
331 F .  Supp. 1342 (G eorg ia ,  1971)
A ct io n  by s tu de nts  who had been  denied e n tr a n c e  to  
high s c h o o l  b e c a u s e  of th e ir  f a i l u r e  to c o m p ly  with  
r u l e s  prom u lga te d  by board of ed ucat ion  r e g a r d in g  
b o y s '  hair  s t y l e s .  The United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court  
held that w h e r e  the rule  w a s  p rom ulgat ed  as aid to  
e f f ic ie n t  o p era t io n  of s c h o o l  s y s t e m ,  the  court  would  
not enjo in  o p e r a t io n  of ru le .  Ju dgm en t  fo r  d e fe nd an ts .
Z e l l e r  v. D o n e g a l  S ch o o l  D i s t r i c t ,
et al .  , 333 F . Supp. 412 ( P e n n s y lv a n ia ,
1971)
P r o c e e d i n g  on m o t io n  of s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  to d i s m i s s  
ac t io n  brought on b eha l f  of student ch a l len g in g  rule  
g o v e r n in g  hair  s t y l e .  The United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  
Court held  that th e r e  i s  lac k  of a s u b s ta n t ia l  f e d e r a l  
q u e s t io n  in v o lv e d .  Motion granted.
o
B is h o p  V .  Colaw,  450 F .  2d 1069 
( M is s o u r i ,  1971)
A c t io n  by s u sp e n d ed  public  h igh s c h o o l  student and his  
p a ren ts  a g a in st  board of ed uc at ion  and s ta te  to obtain  
r e a d m i s  s io n  of student  and a d e c l a r a t o r y  judgment  
o v e r tu r n in g  d r e s s  code r e g u la t io n s  g o v e r n in g  hair  length  
and s t y l e  of m a le  s t u d en ts .  The United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  
Court en te r e d  judgm ent  for  defendant and pla int i f fs  
ap p ea led .  The Court of A p p e a ls  hold that public  
high s c h o o l  d r e s s  code re g u la t in g  h a ir  length  and s t y l e  
w a s  inval id  and u n e n fo r c e a b le  w h e r e  r e g u la t io n  w as  not 
n e c e s s a r y  to c a r r y  out in s t i t u t io n a l  m i s s i o n  of high  
s c h o o l .  R e v e r s e d  and r e m a n d e d .
T A B L E  4  - -  C o n t i n u e d
Kom adina  v. P e c k h a m ,
478 P.  2d 113 (A rizona ,  1971)
M anda m us  to  support o r d e r  d ir e c t in g  that plaintiff  
be r e g i s t e r e d  and e n r o l le d  in  h igh s c h o o l  a f ter  he 
had b een  r e fu s e d  a d m i s s i o n  b e c a u s e  of l ength  of h is  
h a ir .  S u p e r io r  Court of P i m a  County o r d e r  that the  
boy be e n r o l le d  and the  h igh s c h o o l  p r in c ip a l  and board  
of edu cat ion  a pp ea led .  Court of A p p e a ls  held that 
p r in c ip a ls  r e f u s a l  to admit  plainti f f  as s tudent b e c a u s e  
of  length  of hair  w a s  u n r e a s o n a b le  and a r b i t r a r y  and 
a v io la t i o n  of h is  r igh ts  a s  an ind iv idua l .  Judgment  
fo r  s tudent .
Montalvo  v, M adera  Unif ied Sc h o o l  D i s t r i c t  
B oard  of E ducat ion ,  98 Cal.  Rptr . 593 
(C a l i forn ia ,  1971)
A c t io n  by s tudent su sp e n d ed  on account  of v io lat ing  
s c h o o l ' s  hair  g r o o m in g  r eg u la t io n .  The  court  said  
that hail' s t y l e ,  without m o r e ,  i s  not p e r  se  an e x p i ' e s s io n  
of s p e e c h ,  s y m b o l i c  or pur e ,  within  p r o te c t ion  of the  
F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t .  But hair  s t y l e  i s  pr o te c te d  by the 
"liberty" u m b r e l la  of the  F o u r te e n th  A m e n d m e n t ,
D e c i s i o n  for  s tudent .
K arr  v, Sch m idt ,  el a l , , 401 U, S, 120, 
27 L. Ed, 2d 797,  91 S, Ct, 592 
(T e x a s ,  1971)
T his  c a s e  o r ig in at ed  in the United S ta te s  D is t i ' i c t  Court  
fo r  the W e s te r n  D i s t r i c t  of T e x a s  w h ich  held that a rule  
adopted by the  s c h o o l  a u t h o r i t i e s  of E l  P a s o  req u ir in g  
b o y s  not to w e a r  hair  hanging o v e r  t h e i r  e a r s  or c o l l a r s  
or ob st ru c t in g  th e ir  v i s i o n  v io la te d  the  due p r o c e s s  and 
equal  p ro te c t io n  c l a u s e s  of the F o u r t e e n t h  A m e n d m e n t ,  
The D i s t r i c t  Court enjo ined e n f o r c e m e n t  of the rule .
T he  s c h o o l  app ea led  and the Court of A p p e a ls  for the
T A B L E  4  — C o n t i n u e d
Fif th  Circu i t  s ta ye d  and sus pe nd ed the  injunction .  
C erta in  s tu dents  then m ov ed  fo r  v a c a t io n  of the  
Court of A p p e a ls  s ta y .  M r.  J u s t i c e  Hugo B la c k  
as  c ir c u i t  j u s t i c e  denied  the  m ot ion .
C o n y e r s  v. Glenn , et a l . ,
243 So,  2d 204 (F lo r id a ,  1971)
C r a n so n  v. Otero  Sc h o o l  D i s t r i c t
R -1 (Colorado)  ;
F r e e m a n  v. F la k e  (Utah);
White V .  B oar d of E du ca t ion  of 
Hobbs M un ic ipal  Sc h o o l  D i s t r i c t  
No. 16 (New M e x ic o )  ;
448 F ,  2d 258 (1971)
Student su sp e n d ed  f r o m  high  s c h o o l  fo r  fa i l u r e  to cut 
his  long  hair  sought t e m p o r a r y  injunct ion  and h e a r in g  
b e fo r e  s c h o o l  b oa rd .  A fte r  i s s u a n c e  of t e m p o r a r y  
injunct ion  the C ircu i t  Court d i s m i s s e d  co m p lain t  and 
the  s tudent ap pea led .  D i s t r i c t  Court of A p p ea l  held  
that the  student w a s  ent i t led  to  due p r o c e s s  and that  
the  r e g u la t io n  of indiv idu al  s t y l e  and t a s t e  i s  a m a t te r  
for  the ind iv idua l .  R e v e r s e d  and re m a n d e d  with  
d ir e c t i o n s  to r e i n s t a t e  t e m p o r a r y  injunct ion .
T h e s e  t h r e e  c a s e s  inv olv ing  r eg u la t io n  of hair  s t y l e s  
of m a le  s tuden ts  in public  s c h o o l s  a r e  jo ined on appeal  
f r o m  United S t a t e s  D i s t r i c t  C o u rts  d e c i s i o n s .  The  
Court of A p p e a l s  held that the  United S ta tes  Const itut ion  
and s ta tu te s  do not imiDOse on f e d e r a l  c o u r t s  the duty 
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of regulat ing  ha ir  s t y l e s  of m a le  
s tu d en ts  in public  s c h o o l s ,  and the p r o b le m ,  if any,  
i s  one for the s t a t e s  and should be handled thr ou gh  s ta te  
p r o c e d u r e s .  A f f ir m e d  in part,  r e v e r s e d  in part,  
and r em a nded  with d i r e c t io n s .
oO'
T A B L E  4  - -  C o n t i n u e d
L a u ch er  v. S im p s  o n ,
276 N. E. 2d 261 (Ohio, 1971)
Student su sp e n d ed  f r o m  s c h o o l  for  v io la t io n  of d r e s s  
code  l im it in g  le n g th  of  hair  sued in C o m m o n  P l e a s  
Court w hich  upheld the s c h o o l  b o a r d ' s  r egu la t io n  and 
r e f u s e d  to  grant  injunct ion  at the  r e q u e s t  of s tudent .  
The Court of A p p e a ls  held that w h e r e  student knew of 
the adoption of d r e s s  code  l im it in g  length of hair  
s u s p e n s i o n  f r o m  s c h o o l  w a s  p r o p e r .  D e c i s i o n  for  
sc h o o l .
Mas  aie et al ,  v. Henry ,  et a l ,  ,
455 F ,  2d 779 (North  C a r o l in a ,  1972)
A c t io n  by m a l e  student who had be e n  s usp en d ed  for  
d e l i b e r a t e  r e f u s a l  to c o n fo r m  to g u id e l in e  r e g a r d in g  
the length of hair  and s id e  burns .  The  United S ta te s  
D i s t r i c t  Court for  the  W e s te r n  D i s t r i c t  of N orth  
C a r o l in a  d i s m i s s e d  the ac t ion  and the  p la int i f f s  ap pea led .  
The Court of A p p e a ls  held that the  g u id e l in e  w a s  not 
ju s t i f ie d  on th e o r y  of  need fo r  d i s c i p l i n e  and c o n s i d e r a ­
t io n s  of sa fe ty .  R e v e r s e d  and r e m a n d e d .
M inn ich  v,  N ab ud a , et a l ,  ,
336 F ,  Supp, 769 (P e n n s y lv a n ia ,
1972)
A ct io n  by h igh s c h o o l  s tuden ts  and th e ir  guard ians  
se e k in g  to  enjo in  s c h o o l  o f f ic ia l s  f r o m  e n fo r c in g  hair  
l ength  p r o v i s i o n  of d r e s s  co de .  United  S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  
Court held that n e i th er  the  s c h o o l  o f f i c i a l s '  t e s t i m o n y  
that e n f o r c e m e n t  of b oy s '  ha ir  len gth  ru le  per s e  was  
b e n e f i c i a l  a s  an i n s tr u m e n t  for  e n fo r c in g  en t ir e  
d i s c i p l i n a r y  s y s t e m  nor the fact that  p a r e n ts  g e n e r a l l y
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appr ove d of d r e s s  code  w a s  s u f f ic ie n t  to j u s t i f y  r e g u l a ­
tion; in a b s e n c e  of e v id e n c e  that boys '  hair  regu la t io n  
w as n e c e s s a r y  to prev en t  d is r u p t i o n  of e d u ca t io n a l  
p r o c e s s  the r e g u la t io n  w hich  provided that a boy's 
hair  could not extend b e lo w  his e y e b r o w s  in front or  
c o l l a r  in r e a r  would f a l l  as  in fr in g e m e n t  of l i b e r t y  of  
the a f f e c te d  s tudent without due p r o c e s s  of law.
S e a l  V .  M e r tz ,  338 F ,  Supp. 945  
(P e n n s y lv a n ia ,  1972)
Suit by m a le  s t ud en ts  re g a r d in g  r e g u la t io n  of length  
of h a ir .  Having b een sent h o m e  to get hair  c u t s ,  20 
boys  met  in the  s c h o o l  parking  lot to ta lk  to an a t t o r n e y  
r e p r e s e n t i n g  s o m e  of the y o u th s .  T his  d i s t r a c t e d  s o m e  
s tu dents  who w e r e  in a c l a s s r o o m  fa c in g  the  parking  
lot .  H o w e v e r ,  the  United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court said  
that it should not be c o n s id e r e d  a ju s t i f ic a t io n  for the  
ha ir  r e g u la t io n  in that i f  t h e r e  had been no s u c h  rule  
the  in c iden t  would n e v e r  hav e  taken p la c e .  Judgm ent  
for  the  p la int i f f s .
ooo
Church V .  B oar d of Educ at ion  of 
Sal ine  A r e a  Sc ho o l  D i s t r i c t ,
339 F. Supp. 538 (M ichigan,  1972)
A c t io n  by student su sp e n d ed  for v io la t in g  hair  g ro o m in g  
cod e .  The United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that  
the e f f e c t  of e n fo r c in g  d r e s s  code  would have a ch i l l ing  
e f f ect  on f r e e  s p e e c h  and the F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t ,  D e c i s i o n  
for the  s tudent .
C ases Involving Alleged Infringement of 
the Right to Freedom  of E xpression  in 
Armbands and other Symbols
A group of related lawsuits has grown up alongside the hair
grooming and d ress  code ca se s .  These are the cases  in which
students sue for the right to express them selves  sym bolically  by
wearing armbands, buttons, or other item on their  person.
The first two such decisions reported cam e from the same
court in the same state on the sam e day. The details of these  two
cases  are almost identical, but the decisions are  exactly opposite.
Burnside v. Byars involved a group of students who were
suspended because they refused to stop wearing so -ca lled  "freedom
buttons" to school. These buttons bore the letters SNCC in
the center, with the words "one man, one vote" around the edge.
The opinion of the court contained the following words:
The regulation which is  before us now prohibits the 
wearing of "freedom buttons" on school property. The 
record indicates only a mild showing of curiosity  on 
the part of the other school children over the presence of 
some 30 or 40 children wearing such buttons. Even the 
principal te s t i f ie s  that the children were not expelled for 
causing a commotion or disrupting c la s s e s ,  but for violation  
of school regulations. Thus it appears that the wearing 
of the "freedom buttons" did not hamper the school in
^^Burnside v. B yars , 363 F . 2d 744 (M ississ ipp i,  1966).
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in carrying on its regular schedule of activities. Nor 
would it seem  likely that the sim ple wearing of buttons 
unaccompanied by improper conduct would ever do so. . .
. . . school officials cannot . . . infringe on their  
students' right to free and. unrestricted  expression as 
guaranteed to them under the F ir s t  Amendment to the 
Constitution, where the ex e r c ise  of such rights in the 
school buildings and in the school rooms do not materially  
and substantially interfere with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.
77Blackwell v . Issaquena is  the s is te r  case to Burnside.
Students wore the same buttons to school and were suspended for 
doing so. However, in the B lackwell case ,  the students marched 
into c la ssro o m s ,  threw buttons into windows and attempted to force  
buttons on others in the school. The court in this case upheld the 
school officials because of the disturbance and commotion which 
arose out of the wearing of the buttons, and said:
In the instant case ,  as distinguished from the facts 
in Burnside, there was more than a mild curiosity on the 
part of those who w ere wearing, distributing, discussing, 
and promoting the wearing of buttons. There was an 
unusual degree of commotion, boisterous conduct, and a 
collis ion  with the rights of others, an undermining of 
authority, and a lack of order, discipline and decorum.
The proper operation of the public school system is  one 
of the highest and most fundamental responsibilities of 
the state. The school authorities in the instant case had 
a legitim ate and substantial in terest in the school's opera­
tion. In this case the reprehensible conduct was so 
inexorably tied to the wearing of the buttons that the two 
were not separable. In these circum stances we consider 
the rule of the school authorities reasonable.
77 Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F . 2d 
749 (M ississippi, 1966).
I l l
Another "freedom button" case is that o f  Guzick v. Drebus. A 
student asked the United States D istrict Court for injunctive re lie f  
from school authority's refusal to permit him to wear the button while 
attending school, from refusing to reinstate plaintiff, and for d ec la ra ­
tory judgment that rule proscribing wearing of such buttons was 
unconstitutional, and for damages. The district court held that 
where the rule, which prohibited wearing of any buttons or other 
insignia, significantly contributed to the preservation of peace and 
order in the high school, which was subject to racia l tension, and the 
rule was applied uniformly and consistently, the rule was reasonable.
The button in question contained this terminology: "April 5 
Chicago G. I. Civilian Anti-War Demonstration Student M obiliza­
tion Committee. " Court held that invoking the rule against such 
button did not constitute denial of student's constitutional rights.
A portion of the decision stated as follows:
Upholding the Shaw High School rule prohibiting buttons or 
other sym bols does not sound the death knell for student 
freedom of speech. . . ,
The evidence in this case has made it abundantly clear that 
the school authorities have a factual basis upon which to 
forecast  substantial disruption of, or m ateria l interference  
with, school activ ities  if  student behavioral conduct regarding 
the wearing of buttons is not regulated.
The cause was d ism issed .
^^Guzick V. D rebus, 305 F.Supp. 472, affd.  431 F . 2d 594 
(Ohio, 1969).
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In 1969 the United States Supreme Court, for the first time in its
h istory, rendered a decision in a case pertaining to discipline of high
school students where no religious elem ents were involved. The case
of Tinker v. Des Moines has since become one of the most quoted and
7 Qprobably one of the most influential school law cases ever tried.
The background of this h istoric lawsuit is  as follows:
Principals in Des Moines schools becam e aware that certain 
students were planning to wear armbands to school to protest the 
war in Viet Nam. These administrators decided that such behavior 
would be unacceptable and announced that any student wearing such 
armbands to school would be suspended until he returned without it. 
Among other students, John Tinker, age 15; Christopher Tinker, 
age 16; and Mary Beth Tinker, age 13; wore their black armbands 
to school and were suspended.
The parents of the Tinker children appealed to the United States 
D istrict Court for an injunction to restrain the school authorities 
from disciplining the children, although by the time the petition was 
heard the children had already returned to school without their a r m ­
bands, as the protest period had passed. The district court d i s ­
m issed  the complaint and the Tinkers appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
^^Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School D istrict, 258 F. Supp. 
971, 393 U .S. 503 (Iowa, 1969).
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The appellate case affirmed the decision of the lower court, so
the Tinkers took their case to the United States Supreme Court and
asked for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court agreed to hear
the case, and it was now up to that body to decide whether or not the
wearing of black armbands was a form of expression protected under
the First Amendment. In February, 1969, more than three years
after the Tinker children had appeared in school wearing their
symbols of protest, the United States Supreme Court rendered its
decision from which the following excerpt is taken:
. . . /T h e  wearing of armbands/ was entirely divorced from  
actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those p artic i­
pating in it. It was c lose ly  akin to "pure speech" which, 
we have repeatedly held, is  entitled to  comprehensive  
protection under the F irst  Amendment. . . .
F irst  Amendment rights, applied in light of the 
special characteristics  of the school environment, are 
available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued 
that either students or teach ers  shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression  at the schoolhouse  
gate.
The court was very careful in its wording to attempt to leave with the 
schools the authority with which law and custom have invested them. 
It said:
, . . the Court has repeatedly em phasized the need for 
affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and 
of school authorities, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards. . . . Our problem lies in the 
area where students in the exerc ise  of F irst Amendment 
rights collide with the ru les of the school authorities.
Our problem involves d irect, primary F irst  Amendment 
rights akin to "pure speech. "
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Texas courts heard two armband cases  the same year that the
Tinker case was decided. In one of these  cases , Aguirre v. Tah oka
80Independent School District; the court held with Tinker that where 
there was no evidence that wearing the symbols caused disruption  
of the school, the regulation against them was improper,
81In the case  of Butts v. Dallas Independent School D is tr ic t , a
federal court took an opposite view. In its decision denying an
injunction against the school, the court stated;
This is  not a Tinker case  fact situation. The Court 
should not in terfere with the disciplinary actions of the 
School D istr ict  which are designed to prevent disruption.
It would be w ell to note, in closing, one last quote from the 
Tinker ca se .  Justice Portas says of the students that 
" ='= * * they them selves  must respect their obligations to 
the State. " It occurs to this Court that one obligation students 
have to the State i s  to obey school regulations designed to  
promote the orderly educational p rocess ,
Hernandez v. School District No, One is a Colorado case  in
which students, suspended by the high school for wearing black berets ,
g?
sought a declaration that their constitutional rights were violated.
The evidence showed that there were rea l discipline problems in this  
school aggravated by a group of youths calling th em selves  the Black 
Berets, The Court d ism issed  the complaint and said, "Disruptive
^^Aguirre v, Tahoka Independent School D is tr ic t , 311 P, Supp, 
664 (Texas, 1969),
81
Butts V ,  Dallas Independent School D is tr ic t , 306 P. Supp, 488 
(Texas, 1969).
82
Hernandez v. School D istrict No. One, 315 P . Supp. 289 
(Colorado, 1970).
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conduct of the plaintiffs is not immunized by the Constitutional 
guarantee of free  speech. "
Another armband case  was tr ied  in United States District Court
83
for the Eastern D istrict of North Carolina in early 1971. John Hill
and Gary Matson, high school students, brought suit against Robert
Lewis, the principal of their school, for an injunction restraining
him from suspending them from  school. The students claimed that
their constitutional right to wear armbands as a form of symbolic
speech had been infringed by the suspension. In reviewing the facts
of the case ,  the court determined that this school was situated
near an Army base and that more than a third of the students were
from m ilitary fam ilies .  The court determined that the school had
two d iverse factions represented by the black armbands (non-war)
on the one hand, and the red, white and blue armbands on the other.
There was evidence that serious conflict was developing on the
campus and that the presence of armbands and other symbols would
aggravate the situation. The court refused to grant an injunction
and made this statement:
In the balancing of F irs t  Amendment rights the duty of 
the State to operate its public school system  for the 
benefit of a ll its ch ildren must be protected even if 
governmental regulations incidentally limit the un - 
trammeled ex er c ise  of speech, sym bolic or otherwise, 
by those who would impede the education of those who 
desire  to learn.
^^Hill V.  Lewis, 323 F. Supp. 55 (North Carolina, 1971).
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84A sim ilar decision  was reached in Melton v. Young. This 
case was brought by a student who had been suspended for wearing 
to school a shoulder patch consisting of a replica of the Confederate 
flag. Parents of the boy sued on the grounds that the boy's con st i­
tutional rights under the F irst and Fourteenth Amendments had been 
abridged. The court found that although the school's regulation against 
"provocative symbols" was too vague, broad, and imprecise to  be 
constitutional, the principal was correct in suspending the student.
This decision was based on evidence that racial disorders has 
occurred at the school in the previous year, and that wearing of 
the Confederate sym bol might precipitate another such disruption.
Summary
Within a span of five  years federal courts have heard nine cases  
regarding freedom of expression  in the wearing of armbands and 
other symbols. The most significant of these cases  is Tinker v.
Des M oines, the only school discipline case (other than those with 
religious themes) ever to be heard by the United States Supreme 
Court.
D ecisions in these F irst Amendment lawsuits may be summarized  
as follows:
84
Melton V. Young , 328 F. Supp. 88 (Tennessee, 1971)
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(1) A federal appellate court has held that the wearing of "free­
dom buttons" unaccompanied by disruptive behavior, cannot be pro­
hibited without infringing on the students' constitutional rights.
(2) A federal appellate court has held that where the wearing 
of "freedom buttons" is accompanied by commotion, disturbance, 
and a collision with the rights of others, the school will be upheld 
in banning such symbols.
(3) A federal appellate court has held that where school officials  
have a factual basis upon which to forecast substantial disruption 
resulting from the wearing of freedom buttons, the school is correct  
in prohibiting such buttons.
(4) The United States Supreme Court has held that the wearing 
of armbands, unaccompanied by disruption or commotion, is a 
form of symbolic speech protected by the Constitution.
(5) A federal district court has held students' rights to free  
express ion  were not violated when they were suspended for wearing 
black berets  and aggravating severe discipline problems in the school.
(6) United States D istrict Court has held that in a school where 
there w ere strong factions representing d iverse  views on the war, 
the prohibition of armbands was proper and did not violate the rights 
of the children.
(7) A federal court has held that where the wearing of a shoulder 
patch might precipitate a reoccurrence of racia l disorder in a school, 
the principal was correct in suspending the offending student.
T A B L E  4 — C o n t i n u e d
F r e e d o m  of E x p r e s s i o n  in A r m b a n d s  and Othei' Sym bols '
B u r n s id e  v. B y a r s ,
363 F .  2d 744 ( M i s s i s s i p p i ,  
1966)
B l a c k w e l l  v . I s sa q u e n a  County
Bo ard of E d u c a t io n , 363 F .  2d 749  
( M i s s i s s i p p i ,  1966)
Students  su ing  in United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court for  
injunction  a g a in st  s c h o o l ' s  rule  forbidding  the  w ear ing  
of f r e e d o m  buttons w e r e  denied  the r e l i e f  sought  
and a pp ea led  to the United S ta te s  Court of A p p e a ls .
The  a p p e l la te  court found that t h e r e  w e r e  no d i s ­
rupt ions  or c o m m o t io n s  o c c u r r in g  as  a r e s u l t  of 
w e a r in g  the buttons and r e v e r s e d  the lo w e r  court.
Students  su sp e n d ed  for  w e a r in g  f r e e d o m  buttons  
brought suit  in United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court for  
injunction  a g a in st  s c h o o l .  When that court re je c te d  
th e ir  su it ,  the  c a s e  was taken to the  United Sta tes  
Court of A p p e a ls  wh ich found that d is r u p t io n  and 
b o i s t o r o u s  conduct,  un de rm in in g  auth or i ty ,  d i s c ip l i n e  
and d e c o r u m  a c c o m p a n ie d  the w e a r in g  of the buttons.  
D e c i s i o n  in favor  of the sc h o o l .
^ P la in t i f f s  in c a s e s  involv ing  the w e a r in g  of a r m b a n d s ,  f r e e d o m  buttons,  and other  s y m b o l s  plead 
in fr in g e m e n t  of f r e e d o m  of e x p r e s s i o n ,  f r e e d o m  of s p e e c h ,  and othei' C o n st i tu t io n a l  r ig h t s ,  but 
a l l  su c h  c a s e s  a r e  l is ted  h e r e  under F r e e d o m  of E x p r e s s i o n .
T A B L E  4 C o n t i n u e d
Guzick V .  D reb us  , 305 F .  Supp.
472 ,  affd. 4 3 1 F ,  2d 594 (O hio ,  1969)
A ct io n  by a student fo r  injunct ive  r e l i e f  fro .' i  s c h o o l  
a u th o r i ty 's  r e f u s a l  to  p er m it  h im  to  w e a r  button whi le  
attending s c h o o l ,  f r o m  r e fu s in g  to r e i n s t a t e  plaintiff ,  
and for d e c l a r a t o r y  judgment  that ru le  p r o s c r ib in g  
w e a r in g  of su ch  buttons w as  u n co ns t i tu t io n a l ,  and for  
d a m a g e s .  The United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that  
w h e r e  ru le  s ig n i f i c a n t l y  contr ibuted to p r e s e r v a t i o n  
of p e a c e  and o r d e r  in h igh s c h o o l  and was  applied  
u n if o r m ly  and c o n s i s t e n t ly ,  ru le  w as  r e a s o n a b le .
The U, S, Court of A p p ea ls  a f f ir m e d .
T inker  v. D e s  M oin es  Independent  
C o m m u n ity  Sc ho ol  D i s t r i c t , 3 93 U .S .  
503 (Iowa, 1969)
T h is  c a s e  involv ed  an effort  by the  p la int i f f s  to r e c o v e r  
d a m a g e s  and an injunction  a ga in st  e n f o r c e m e n t  of a 
r eg u la t io n  by the s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  which  prohibited  the  
w e a r in g  of b la ck  a r m  bands in the s c h o o l .  The United  
S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court upheld the  s c h o o l  b o a r d 's  r e g u l a ­
t ion  but an a p p e a l  to the S u p r e m e  Court of the United  
S ta te s  brought a r e v e r s a l  of that opinion and of the 
support ing  opinion of the Court of A p p e a ls  for the 
Eighth Cii'cuit .  J u s t i c e  Abe F o r t a s ,  w r i t in g  the  
m a j o r i t y  opinion for  the S u p r e m e  Court sa id that both 
F i r s t  and F o u r te e n th  A m e n d m e n t  r igh ts  a r c  a v a i la b le  
to s tu d e n ts .  J u s t i c e  F o r t a s  said  that the m e r e  a n t i c i ­
pation of d i s o r d e r  i s  not enough on which to deny  
s tu d en ts  the right to e x p r e s s  t h e m s e l v e s .  He d e c la r e d  
the s c h o o l  r e g u la t io n  u n r e a s o n a b le  and un co ns t i tu t iona l .
T A B L E  4 —  C o n t i n u e d
B u t t s  V.  D a l l a s  I n d e p e n d e n t  S c h o o l  
D i s t r i c t , 306 F,  Supp.  488  
( T e x a s ,  1969)
A c t i o n  to enjo in  independent  s c h o o l  d is t r i c t  and s u p e r i n ­
tendent  f r o m  e n fo r c in g  d i s t r i c t ' s  p o l icy  of prohibit ing  
w e a r in g  of b lack a r m b a n d s .  The United S t a t e s  D i s t r i c t  
Court held that the  r e g u la t io n  w a s  d e s ig n e d  to  prevent  
d is r u p t io n  and that a s  suc h it w as  not a v io la t io n  of 
s tu d en ts '  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  r ig h t s .  T e m p o r a r y  
injunction  den ied .
A g u i r r e  v. Tahoka Independent  
Sc ho o l  D i s t r i c t , 311 F .  Supp. 664  
(T e x a s ,  1969)
A c t i o n  by f ive  m in o r  ch i ld r e n  to  enjoin s c h o o l  f r o m  
en fo rc in g  the  d i s t r i c t ' s  reg u la t io n  prohibi t ing  s tudents  
f r o m  w e a r in g  a p p a r e l  d e c o r a t i o n s  which a r e  d is r u p t iv e ,  
d i s t r a c t in g  or p r o v o c a t iv e .  In t h i s  in s t a n c e  the  ch i ld r e n  
w e r e  w e a r in g  bro w n a r m b a n d s .  The  United S ta te s  
D i s t r i c t  Court found that g r i e v a n c e s  of p la int i f f s  w e r e  
worthy of c o r r e c t i v e  ac t ion  and c a m e  within p r o te c t io n  
of the  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t .  Ju dgm en t  fo r  p la in t i f f s .
H ern an de z  v. Sc hoo l  D i s t r i c t  No. One,  
315 F.  Supp. 289 (C olorado,  1970)
A ct io n  by su sp e n d ed  high s c h o o l  s tu den ts  s e e k in g  a 
d e c l a r a t i o n  that t h e ir  co n s t i tu t io n a l  r ights  w e r e  
v io la te d  in that th ey  w e r e  su sp e n d ed  fo r  w e a r in g  b lack  
b e r e t s .  The court  held that it w a s  not a v io la t i o n  of 
theii'  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  r ig h ts  to  f r e e  e x p r e s s i o n  w he re  
su ch  s tudents  had engag ed in d i s r u p t iv e  conduct .  
Com plaint  d i s m i s s e d .
T A B L E  4 - -  Continued
Hill  et al ,  v. L e w i s ,  et al .
323 E,  
1971)
Supp, 55 (North C a r o l in a ,
A c t io n  in w h ich  injunction  w as  sought which would  
r e s t r a i n  h igh  s c h o o l  p r in c ip a l  f r o m  suspen d ing  
pla int i f f s ,  or o t h e r s  s i m i l a r l y  s i tuated  fo r  e x e r c i s e  
of t h e ir  a l l e g e d  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  r ight to  w e a r  a rm ba n ds  
as  f o r m  of s y m b o l i c  s p e e c h  in p r o te s t  a g a inst  Viet N am  
War, United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that w h ere  
d is r u p t iv e  b e h a v io r  a c c o m p a n ie d  the  w e a r in g  of 
a r m b a n d s ,  the r e g u la t io n  was  r e a s o n a b l e .  P r e l i m i n a r y  
injunction den ied .
M elton V,  Young, et al,  
323 F ,
1971)
Supp, 88 ( T e n n e s s e e ,
Suit c h a l le n g in g  co n st i t u t io n a l i t y  of s u s p e n s io n  of 
student f r o m  public  high s c h o o l  for  w e a r in g  a 
C o n fe d era te  s h ou lder  patch aga inst  r egu lat ion  of 
s c h o o l  a g a inst  w e a r in g  " p r o v o c a t iv e  c lothing ,  "
The United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held that reg u la t io n  
w as  too  vag ue ,  broad,  and i m p r e c i s e  to  be a l low ed  
to stand b e f o r e  r e q u i i  e m e n t s  of e i t h e r  F i r s t  or 
F o u r t e e n t h  A m e n d m e n t s ;  h o w e v e r ,  va l id i ty  of p r in c ip a l ' s  
a c t io n  in s u s p e n d in g  student was  not un co ns t i tut iona l  
w h e r e  r a c i a l  d i s o r d e r s  might  have  o c c u r r e d  as  a 
r e s u l t  of w e a l  ing the sh o u ld e r  patch. Order  
a c c o r d in g ly .
to
Cases Involving Alleged Infringement of the
Right to Freedom  of Speech
There is  a sm all group of lawsuits c lose ly  related to the "Freedom 
of Expression" cases  described in the preceding two sections of this 
chapter, except that in this group of cases the speech alleged to have 
been violated was not symbolic in nature. These c a s e s ,  three in 
number, differ greatly from each other in details, but in each case  
the plaintiff appealed to the F irst  Amendment and declared that his 
freedom of speech had been infringed.
The first such case, Whitfield v. Simpson, had as its plaintiff 
a Negro student who had been expelled for gross disobedience. The 
student claimed that his expulsion amounted to an iruringement of 
his right to free speech, and he a lso  claimed that other Negro students 
had been offended in the sam e way. The United States District Court 
heard the evidence in the matter, found that there was "not one 
scintilla" of evidence that the freedom of speech and expression of 
Negro students in the school had been violated, and d ism issed  the 
case.
Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp, 889 (Illinois, 1970).
1 2 2
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State V.  Lundquist, originating in Circuit Court in Maryland, 
concerned a school teacher , who, for h im self  and others, asked  
the court to find unconstitutional a state statute which required all 
students and teachers,  except those objecting for religious reasons,  
to stand, salute the flag, and recite the pledge of allegiance in 
unison. The Circuit Court affirmed the lower court and held 
that such statute unconstitutionally abridged freedom of speech.
Lundquist, the plaintiff teacher, testified that he loved his 
country, respected his flag and the other symbols of the nation.
He said, however, that he was repulsed by the idea that the 
rituals in question should be forced on anyone.
In its  decision  the Court of Appeals said:
Entertaining no doubt that there  is ample authority 
to punish students or teachers who m aterially  disrupt 
proper school activ it ies ,  including voluntary patriotic 
program s, we are far from convinced that the m ere refusal  
to participate in any phase of the pledge of allegiance ritual 
is  punishable. To reach a contrary conclusion would allow  
the schools to discipline such refusal as "an act of d isrespect"  
even though they may not compel this ceremony in the first  
place.
There was another case  in this group where plaintiffs sought 
to enjoin m em bers of the school board from , among other things, 
reinstating the suspension of students who had been involved in a 
s it - in .  The court found that the affected students had disrupted
^^State V .  Lundquist, 278 A .2d 263 (Maryland, 1971).
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c la sse s  by moving noisily  through the halls, had forced the removal 
of a few c la s s e s  from their scheduled locations, and did not th em ­
se lves  attend c la sses  because of the s it- in .
The court found that suspending the students did not violate their  
First  Amendment rights. In denying request for a permanent injunc­
tion, it said:
Where speech  is  mixed with conduct as in the case  of a 
s it - in ,  the state may reasonably regulate the tim e, place, 
and manner of such activity in order to  prevent serious  
interference with normal usage of the fac il ity  or area in 
which the demonstration is  to take place.
Summary
In three d iverse "Freedom of Speech" c a s e s ,  courts have made 
the following decisions:
(1) Expelling a student for gross d isobedience does not amount 
to violating h is constitutional right to free speech.
(2) A statute which required a ll students and teach ers ,  except 
those objecting on religious grounds, to  salute the flag and recite  
the pledge of allegiance unconstitutionally abridged freedom  of speech,
(3) Students expelled for disrupting schools ' activ ities  during 
s it - in  demonstration did not have their F irst Amendment rights 
violated.
T A B L E  5
CASES INVOLVING A L L E G E D  IN F R IN G E M E N T  OF  
F R E E D O M  OF S P E E C H  AND OTHER RIGHTS
Whitf ie ld  v. S im p so n ,
312 F .  Supp. 889 ( I l l in o i s ,  1970)
N e g r o  s tudent  e x p e l l e d  for  g r o s s  d i s o b e d i e n c e  c l a i m s  
that s u s p e n s i o n  w a s  u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l  and that h is  f r e e ­
dom  of s p e e c h  w a s  in fr in g e d .  Court found no e v id e n c e  
that the  f r e e d o m  of s p e e c h  had been v io la t e d .  D i s m i s s e d ,
State V . Lun dq uis t ,
278 A .  2d 263 (Maryland,  1^71)
A c t io n  ch a l le n g in g  s tatute  w h ich  r equ ired  a l l  s tudents  
and t e a c h e r s ,  e x c e p t  t h o s e  ob jec t ing  fo r  r e l i g io u s  
r e a s o n s ,  to s tand,  sa lu te  the  f lag ,  and pledge  a l l e g ia n c e  
in un iso n.  The C ir c u i t  Court e n te r e d  d e c l a r a t o r y  d e c r e e  
inv al id at in g  key  p r o v i s io n s  of su ch  s t a tu te ,  and s tate  
a p p ea led .  Court of A p p e a ls  held that such s tatute  
un c o n s t i t u t io n a l ly  abr idge d f r e e d o m  of s p e e c h .  D e c r e e  
a ff i i  m e d .
Noi
Gebert  et al,  v. Hoffman, et al .
336 F . Supp 694 (P e n n s y lv a n ia ,  1972)
C l a s s  a c t io n  s e e k i n g  to enjo in  m e m b e r s  of s c h o o l  board  
f r o m  r e in st a n t in g  t e m p o r a r y  s u s p e n s i o n s  of students  
who had taken part in s i t - i n  and d e m o n s t r a t io n s .  D i s t r i c t  
Court held that su c h  b e h a v io r  had be e n  d is r u p t iv e  to  the  
schoolsf  ed u c a t i o n a l  p r o g r a m  and that the a c t io n s  of 
s c h o o l  o f f ic ia l s  in te r m in a t in g  the  s i t - i n  by s u s  pending  
the s t ud en ts  involv ed  did not v io la te  the F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  
r ig h ts  of the s tu d e n ts .  R equ est  for  permanent injunction  
de nied .
C ases Involving Alleged Infringement of
the Right to Freedom  of P r e s s
Scoville  V. Board of Education of Joliet Township High School
District 204, tried  in federal district court in  Illinois, is one of
the earliest  freedom of press cases  to come out of a public high 
87school. The facts in the case are as follows: Raymond Scoville  
and Arthur Breen, 17-year-old  high school students, distributed to 
other students and faculty at the high school sixty copies of a 
mimeographed journal entitled "Grass High. " A part of the publi­
cation was cr it ica l of the school's administration and it urged 
students to refuse to accept or to destroy all "propaganda" that 
the administration published.
The two boys w ere expelled from school and otherwise disciplined. 
They brought action for declaratory and injunctive re lie f  against the 
school and its o ff icers .  The court found that dissemination of "Grass 
High" under the circum stances alleged was reasonably found by the 
Board of Education to constitute gross  misconduct, and that the board 
had a right to make such a finding. The court found and stated:
. . . where speech takes the form of immediate incitement 
to d isregard of legitimate administrative regulations n ecessary  
to orderly maintenance of a public high school system , and
^^Scoville v. Board of Education of Joliet Township High School 
D istrict No. 204, 286 F.Supp. 987 (Illinois, 1968).
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where the speech occurs, not on a street or on a public 
park, where the rights of free speech are virtually abso­
lute, but rather on the very  property dedicated to a special 
public use, the education of younger citizens; and where 
the speech is  d irected to an audience, which, because of 
its  immaturity, is  m ore likely than an adult audience to  
react to the detriment of the school system , then it is the 
opinion of this Court that the interest in maintaining the 
school system  outweighs the protection afforded the 
speaker by the F irs t  Amendment,
The court issued judgment for the defendants in the case .
A sim ilar case was heard in United States District Court in
New York in 1969. Schwartz v. Schuker was an action on behalf
of a high school student suspended for bringing on school prem ises
0 0
copies of a newspaper published off campus. When asked to
surrender the papers, Jeffrey Schwartz refused to do so . He was
suspended for his actions after which suspension he brought action
against the school.
The court noted "a pattern of open and flagrant defiance of
school discip line, aided and abetted by his parents' encouragement. "
In its decision the court quoted Madera v. Board of Education where
Judge Moore said;
Law and order in the c lassroom  should be the responsibility  
of our respective educational sy stem s. The Courts should 
not usurp this function and turn disciplinary problems, 
involving suspension, into criminal adversary proceedings, 
which they definitely are not.
^%chwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238 (New York, 1969).
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In denying the student's request for an injunction, the court made
this statement:
While there is  a certain aura of sacredness attached to the 
First Amendment, nevertheless  these F irst  Amendment rights 
must be balanced against the duty and obligation of the state 
to educate students in an orderly and decent manner to 
protect the rights not of a few but of all the students in 
the school system . The line of reason must be drawn s o m e ­
where in this area of ever expanding perm issibility . Gross  
disrespect and contempt for the official of an educational 
institution may be justification not only for suspension but 
also for expulsion of a student,
89Baker v. Downey was tried in a California federal court in 
1969 and resulted in a decision  in favor of the school which had 
suspended two students for publishing and distributing off-campus  
a newspaper called OINK, The newspaper contained artic les  
critical of the school's  administration as well as artic les  and pictures  
which were considered to be profane and obscene.
The superintendent and principal of the school said that they 
believed the newspaper threatened the educational program of the 
school and would diminish control and discipline, so they removed  
the two boys from  their school offices and suspended them for ten  
days. The students, asking for injunctive relief, claimed that their  
rights to free speech  under the F irst  Amendment were violated, and 
that they had not been accorded due process of law.
The United States D istrict Court denied the injunction saying:
Due process  is  not a fixed inflexible procedure which 
must be accorded in every situation. It varies  with the
^^Baker v. Downey, 307 F. Supp. 517 (California, 1969).
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circum stances involved. In the instant case ,  the school 
officia ls were charged with the conduct of the educational 
program and if the temporary suspension of a high school 
student could be not accomplished without f irst  preparing 
specifications of charges, giving notice of hearing, and hold­
ing a hearing, or any combination of these procedures, the 
discip line and ordered conduct of the educational program  
and the moral atmosphere required by good educational 
standards would be difficult to maintain,
. , , freedom of speech i s  not the right to say anything 
one may please in any manner or place. The rule that the 
constitutional right to free  speech and assem bly  may be 
infringed by the State, if there are compelling reasons to 
do so, must a lso  be considered.
90
The ca se  of Vought v. Van Buren, another student newspaper 
eu it tried in federal court, had a different outcome from the one 
just described. The plaintiff in this case  was a s ix teen-year-o ld  
boy, David Vought, who was told to leave the school, and then 
was informed by letter that the board of education had recommended  
that he be expelled for the remainder of the school year. His offense 
was being in possess ion  of a publication entitled "Argus" which 
contained certain four-letter words that w ere objectionable to the 
principal.
In the tr ia l it was determined that the plaintiff's expulsion was 
not based on the general content of the Argus, or its  literary quality 
or lack thereof, but solely on its containing the disagreeable four - 
letter words and variations of them. In court the plaintiff's attorney 
introduced as an exhibit a copy of The Catcher in the Rye , a novel
Vought V. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 
Michigan, 1969).
130
required or approved for ninth and tenth grade English c la sse s  in the 
Van Buren schools. The novel was shown to contain the same four-  
letter words which caused Vought's expulsion from school.
The judge in this case  found the facts in this case to be very c o n ­
fusing, s ince the boy was severe ly  punished for reading in the Argus 
what he was required to read in English c la ss .  Judge Thornton made 
these comments:
If we, as a trial court, are confused, what are  we to suppose 
is  the state of mind of a student subjected to such a double 
standard ? If the Argus is obscene within the meaning of 
the school principal's "directive, " then surely  "The Catcher 
in the Rye" and the Harper's artic le  /another exhibit taken 
from the school's library/ must a lso  be obscene. And if  the 
student is  invited and/or required to  read the latter two, 
what can the school authoriti- s have in mind in expelling him 
for p ossess ion  of the form er ?
We are compelled to reject the position of the defendants 
in this case because it is  preposterous on its face . It is 
contrary to any sen se  of fa irn ess  or con cistency--a  student, 
placed in the situation in which this school has placed this 
student, is  required to make a judgment that we, as a court, 
would find it difficult to make.
. . . .  We make the observation that even though plain­
tiff test if ied  he realized  he might be considered in violation 
of the "directive, " the drastic incident, carrying as it does 
a lifetim e stigma, is  hardly punishment fitting the crim e.
The court declared that the inconsistency in this case  was so in h er ­
ently unfair as to be arbitrary and unreasonable, constituting denial 
of due p rocess ,  and he ordered that the plaintiff's expulsion be set 
aside.
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Sullivan v. Houston Independent School D is tr ic t ‘d  ̂ was an action 
for an injunction and for declaratory re lie f  in connection with the 
expulsion of two high school boys for publishing a newspaper which 
they entitled "Pflashlyte. " Sullivan and F ischer w ere both good 
students and typical young American men of high m oral character.  
They became concerned because the school would frequently indict 
a student for violating "regulations" although there were no written  
regulations in ex istence . Concern for this problem led to a rally  
which was broken up by the coaches who threw books around the 
park, ripped up students' notebooks, and accused students of being 
Communists and F a sc is ts .
The newspaper "Pflashlyte" was drafted as a response to these  
events and to  cr it ic ize  school polic ies. The evidence showed that 
any interruptions of c lass  periods caused by the newspaper were 
minor and relatively  few in number. It was also  shown that expulsion  
of the boys was without hearing or other due p rocess .
In finding that the school's action was a violation of F irst  Amend­
ment rights and a denial of due p rocess ,  the court said:
. . , the Court is  well aware of the problems in the school  
system , of discipline. I am also aware of the fact that 
young men, one or two years older than these  two young 
boys, for the last 175 years about every 25 years are called  
upon to give their lives to protect the F irst Amendment 
rights.
Sullivan v, Houston Independent School D istr ict,  307 F, Supp. 
1328 (Texas, 1969).
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In 1970 som e students in Stamford, Connecticut, brought an 
action against the Board of Education challenging the board's right 
to require that the contents of student new spapers be approved by 
the adm inistration before it could be distributed. This case, E isner
92V, Stamford Board of Education, was tried on one issu e  only:
Is it constitutionally valid for the sch oo l to require prior approval 
of literature before it can be distributed?
The affected students authored a newspaper called "The Stamford 
Free P r e ss . " They had d istributed  three is su es  of the paper, but 
were warned that if they tr ied  to circu late a fourth, they would be 
suspended.
The court viewed this case  as a c la ss ic  example of prior 
restraint of speech  and p ress constituting a violation of the F irst  
Amendment. In its  decision  the court declared that there was not 
"a sc in tilla  of proof which would justify  the infringement of the 
students' constitutional rights to be free  of prior restraint in their  
w ritings. " The court a lso  noted that student newspapers are valuable 
educational tools which serv e  to aid sch ool adm inistrators by p ro­
viding them  with an insight into student thinking and student problem s. 
A judgment was rendered for the p la in tiffs.
The case of Katz et a l. v . M cAulay et a l.^̂  was an action in 
federal d istr ict court to enjoin school officia ls from preventing
^^E isner v. Stamford Board of Education, 314 F.Supp. 832, 
(Connecticut, 1970 ).
93Katz V. M cAulay, 324 F.Supp. 1047 (New York, 1970).
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plaintiffs from  distributing leaflets on the school grounds. The le a f­
lets in question so lic ited  funds to aid in the tria l of the "Chicago Seven, 
Pursuant to a resolution  of the Board of Regents of the State of 
New York which prohibits the solic iting of funds from  school children  
the defendant school offic ia ls forbade plaintiffs to  distribute the 
leaflet in question. The one exception to the "no-soliciting" rule 
allows the A m erican Junior Red Cross to come to  the school for 
that purpose.
In this suit, the plaintiffs declared that the p o lic ies , regulations 
and actions of the defendants are unconstitutional, d iscrim inatory, 
and a violation of th e ir  right to freedom  of speech.
In its d ecision  the court disposed of the claim of d iscrim ination  
by noting that the school had stated that it would no longer allow  
solic itations of any kind, not even the Junior Red C ross, In 
dealing with the c la im  of violation of freedom  of speech, the court 
pointed out that the leaflet was banned only because it asked for 
money. Finding no precedent regarding the solicitation of funds, 
the court reached its  own d ecision  that the school's regulation  
prohibiting such activ ity  was reasonable and did not infringe on the 
F irst Amendment rights of the p laintiffs. The motion of the plain­
tiffs was denied. Court of Appeals affirm ed this decision.
The complaint of a group of high school students in Houston, 
Texas, seeking a restrain ing order against their school to prevent 
their being d iscip lined  for distributing an unauthorized newspaper
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at the school, was d ism issed  by a United States D istrict Court. 
Graham v. Houston Independent School D istr ic t94 was a c iv il rights 
case which claim ed that the students' F ir s t Amendment rights were 
infringed, and that the students w ere not accorded due p rocess . In 
denying the plaintiffs' application, the court stated.
I conclude that the school authorities do have the 
power to d iscip line students who d isregard  school rules 
and adm inistrative d irectiv es . It must be added that 
since the students knew they w ere violating school policy, 
and because they w ere offered a hearing before the principal, 
and because I do not agree that the school d istrict rule. . . 
is  void, th ese  plaintiffs w ere not denied due process  
of law.
Summary
Twelve ca ses  having to do with printing, publishing, or 
distributing written m ateria ls on or near school grounds to students 
and faculty, have come before the courts within le s s  than four 
y ears' tim e. While these ca ses  varied  greatly in details, in 
general the plaintiffs appealed to the F ir s t  Amendment, alm ost 
a ll claim ing that their right to freedom  of speech had been abridged.
The f ir s t  three ca ses  reported resu lted  in decisions for the 
school and against the student. In at lea st two of these early cases, 
the newspaper which was brought onto the high school campus 
contained extrem ely vulgar and obscene statem ents critica l of the 
school's adm inistration.
Q4
Graham v. Houston, 325 F.Supp. 1164 (Texas, 1970).
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A number of subsequent ca ses  w ere decided in favor of the 
plaintiff students.
A review  of a ll ca ses  with regard to freedom  of p ress reveals  
that the follow ing decisions have been rendered:
(1) A fed era l court has decided that d issem ination  of a student 
newspaper w ill not be protected under the F irst Amendment where 
its effect is to incite d isresp ect and encourage disobedience.
(2) A fed era l court has found that where a student has a 
history of flagrant defiance of school d iscip line and has shown 
gross d isresp ect and contempt for the school, his suspension for 
bringing on campus a forbidden newspaper, w ill be upheld.
(3) A fed era l court held that where student distributed a 
newspaper containing profane and ob scen e a r tic les  cr itica l of a 
schools' adm inistration, his suspension is  proper.
(4) A fed era l court held that were a boy was expelled because  
a publication he had at school contained fo u r-le tter  w ords, which 
words w ere a lso  contained in school-approved literatu re, his 
expulsion was a violation of his constitutional rights.
(5) A fed era l court held that students expelled without a 
hearing for publishing and distributing a newspaper in which they  
questioned sch ool p o lic ies , w ere denied their rights under the 
F irst Amendment and were denied due p ro cess .
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(6) A federal court found that a requirem ent by a school that 
all publications be read and approved by the adm inistration before 
distribution was prior restraint of speech  and p ress.
(7) A federal court decided that where a school has regulation  
against solicitations on school grounds, its  prohibition of a leaflet 
asking for money to a s s is t  in raising defense funds for a group of 
"activists"  cannot be considered a violation of freedom  of speech.
(8) Where students knew they w ere disobeying school rules 
and regulations in distributing a newspaper at school, federal court 
found that their right to due process was not violated.
T A B L E  6
CASES INVOLVING A L L E G E D  IN F R IN G EM E N T OF  
F R E E D O M  OF PR E SS  AN D OTHER RIGHTS
C a se D i s  pos i t ion
S c o v i l l e  V .  B oard of Educ at ion  
of J o l i e t  T ow n sh ip  High S c h o o l  
D i s t r i c t  204,  County of W i l l , 
State of I l l in o is ,  286 F .S u p p .  
987 (I l l ino is ,  1968)
A c t io n  for  d e c l a r a t o r y  and inju nc t ive  r e l i e f  a g a inst  
s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  w hich  ex p e l l e d  a s tudent  for  d i s t r i ­
buting a student publ icat ion .  The  Court held that  
d i s c i p l i n e  and e x p u ls io n  of student for  d is tr ibu t in g  
jo u r n a l  urg ing  s t u dents  to r e f u s e  to a c c e p t  or to  
d e s t r o y  m a t e r i a l s  published by the s c h o o l ,  did not 
v io la te  right to  f r e e  s p e e c h .  C a s e  d i s m i s s e d . OO
S ch w a rtz  v. Sc hu ke r ,  298  F .S u p p .  
238 (New York, 1969)
B a k e r  v. D o w n e y , 
(C al i fo rn ia ,  1969)
307 F .S u p p .  517
A c t io n  on beha l f  of high s c h o o l  s tudent for  judgment  
and injunction to r e in s t a t e  h im  as s tudent and for  
other  r e l i e f  a f ter  he had been su sp en d ed  for br inging  
a fo rb idden  n e w s p a p e r  on c a m p u s .  The United S ta te s  
D i s t r i c t  Court found no v io la t io n  of h is  F i r s t  A m e n d ­
ment  r ig h t s .  C a s e  d i s m i s s e d .
A c t io n  by tw o s tu dents  who w e r e  su sp e n d ed  and o t h e r ­
w i s e  d is c ip l i n e d  b e c a u s e  th ey  publi shed an o f f - c a m p u s  
n e w s p a p e r  ca l led  OINK. The Court held that t h e ir  
r ig h ts  w e r e  not v io la te d .  Injunctive  r e l i e f  den ied .
T A B L E  6 - -  Continued
Vought V.  Van B uren  S c h o o l s ,
306 F .S u p p .  1388 (M ichigan,  1969)
Su l l iva n  v. H ouston Independent  
S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t , 307 F ,  Supp, 1328 
( T e x a s ,  1969)
E i s n e r S ta m fo rd  B o a r d  of
E d u ca tio n , 314 F . Supp. 832 ,
a ffd , in  p a rt, m od . in  part
440 F .  2d 803 (C onnect icut ,  1970)
S i x t e e n - y e a r - o l d  boy w a s  e x p e l le d  f r o m  s c h o o l  for  
the r e m a in d e r  of the  y e a r  fo r  having  p o s s e s s i o n  on 
the s c h o o l  grou nd s  of a publ icat ion  c a l le d  A r g u s  
which conta ined c e r t a in  f o u r - l e t t e r  w o r d s .  The  
United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court found the  e x p u ls io n  to  
be ba se d  on a c t io n s  by the  s c h o o l  w h ich  w e r e  
in c o n s i s t e n t ,  a r b i t r a r y  and u n r e a s o n a b le  and w hich  
con st i tu te d  d e n ia l  of due p r o c e s s .  Judgm ent  fo r  the  
s tudent.
A c t io n  fo r  injunct ion  r e in s ta t i n g  two high s c h o o l  s tu de nts  
and for  d e c l a r a t o r y  r e l i e f  a g a in s t  r e g u la t io n s  of s c h o o l  
d i s t r i c t .  The  United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court found that  
the  e x p u ls io n  of the  two boys  for pr oducing  and d is t r ib u t in g  
a n e w s p a p e r  c r i t i c a l  of  the  s c h o o l  w a s  a v io la t io n  of 
t h e i r  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  r igh ts  and of th e ir  right to  
due p r o c e s s ,  Inj unct ion gran te d .
A c t io n  by h igb  s c h o o l  s tu d e n t s  cha l len g ing  r ig h t  of
B o a rd  of E d u ca tio n  to  r e q u ir e  a p p r o v a l o f co n ten t of 
student  n e w s p a p e r  b e fo r e  d is t r ib u t io n .  On c r o s s  
m o tio n s  for  s u m m a i y  jud gm en t ,  the d i s t r i c t  court  
d e t e r m in e d  that r e g u la t io n  w a s  on i t s  f a c e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  
inval id  as  prov iding  unjust i f ied  p r io r  r e s t r a in t  of s p e e c h  
and p r e s s .  Judgm ent  for  p la int i f f s .
U)
oo
T A B L E  6 - -  C o n t i n u e d
Katz et al .  v. M cA ula y ,  et a l .  ,
324 F .  Supp. 1047 (New York,  1970)
A c t io n  by p la int if f  s tude nts  for  d e c l a r a t o r y  r e l i e f  and 
injunct ion  r e s t r a in in g  s c h o o l  o f f i c i a l s  f r o m  pr ev en t ing  
pla int i f f s  f r o m  d is t r ib u t in g  l e a f l e t s .  P l a in t i f f s  moved  
for  p r e l i m i n a r y  injunction .  The  United S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  
Court held that s c h o o l  r e g u la t io n  w a s  not intended to  
prev en t  e x e r c i s e  of f r e e d o m  of s p e e c h  and w a s  r e a s o n ­
a b le .  Motion de nied .
Graham, et al ,  v. Houston
Independent S ch o o l  D i s t r i c t ,  et al .  , 
325 F .S u p p  1164 ( T e x a s ,  1970)
C i v i l  r ig h ts  a c t io n  by student s e e k in g  in junc t ion  aga ins t  
s c h o o l  o f f i c ia l s  to  preven t  d is c ip l i n in g  of s tu d en ts  for  
d is tr ib u t in g  a n e w s p a p e r .  Th e  United  S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  
Court h e ld  that s c h o o l  a u t h o r i t ie s  have  pow er  to  
d i s c i p l i n e  s tud en ts  who d i s r e g a r d  s c h o o l  r u le s  and 
that s t u d e n ts '  co n s t i t u t io n a l  r ig h ts  w e r e  not inf r inge d .  
A p p l ic a t io n  denied;  co m pla in t  d i s m i s s e d .
U)v£>
Sul l ivan v. Houston Independent  School
D i s t r i c t ,  et al .  , 333 F .  Supp. 1149 
(T e x a s ,  1971)
Student m o v e d  for  o r d e r  r e q u i i  ing s c h o o l  o f f i c i a l s  to  
show c a u s e  why they  should  not be held in contem pt  of  
cour t  f o r  th e ir  a l le g e d  v io la t io n  of p r io r  injunct ion  
(307 F .  Supp. 1328). The Court found that s c h o o l  board  
r e g u la t io n  prohibit ing  pub l icat ion  w hic h a d v o c a t e s  
i l l e g a l  conduct  or d i s o b e d i e n c e  to publ i shed r u l e s  was  
void a s  be ing in d ir e c t  v io la t i o n  of c o u r t ' s  pr io r  
injunct ion .  The  Court i s s u e d  an o r d e r  supplementing  
and c la r i f y in g  i t s  o r d e r  in the e a r l i e r  c a s e .
T A B L i E  6 - -  C o n t i n u e d
Q u a r t e r man v. B y r d ,  et al .  ,
453 F ,  2d 54 (North C a r o l in a ,  1971)
A c t i o n  for  a d e c l a r a t o r y  judg m ent  that a h igh s c h o o l  
r u le  re q u ir in g  p e r m i s s i o n  of p r in c ip a l  fo r  d is tr ib u t io n  
of printed  m a t e r i a l  w a s  v i o la t iv e  of F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  
and fo r  in ju n ct iv e  r e l i e f .  Th e  United  S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  
Court for  the  E a s t e r n  D i s t r i c t  of N o r th  C a r o l in a  de n ied  
ap p l ica t io n  for  in ju nct iv e  r e l i e f  and pla int i f f  ap peale d .  
The Court of A p p e a ls  he ld  that s c h o o l  ru le  was  inva l id  
on i t s  f a c e .  O r d e r  of D i s t r i c t  Court v a c a te d  and c a u s e  
r e m a n d e d  for  en tr y  of r e l i e f  in a c c o r d a n c e  with opinion.
R i s e m a n ,  et al.  v. S c h o o l  C o m m it t e e  
of  the City of  Quincy,  et a l . , 439  F .  2d 
148 ( M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  1971)
P la in t i f f ,  a h igh s c h o o  1 jun io r ,  sought  p e r m i s s i o n  
f r o m  the  S c h o o l  C o m m i t t e e  to  d is t r ib u t e  an a n t i - w a r  
l e a f le t  and w as  de n ied .  He s u e d  in United States  
D i s t r i c t  Court and h is  r e q u e s t  w as  den ied  as  to d i s t r i b u ­
t ing  within  the  s c h o o l ,  but the Court enjo ined the  s c h o o l  
f r o m  pr ev ent in g  h im  f r o m  doing  s o  ou ts id e  the s c h o o l .
He app ea led  to  the  U. S. Court of A p p e a ls  w hich r e v e r s e d  
and r e m a n d e d  the  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t ' s  judg m ent .
o
E g n e r  v. T e x a s  City Independent  
S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t , 338 F . S u p p .  931 
( T e x a s ,  1972)
A ct io n  by h igh s c h o o l  s tudent  ch a l le n g in g  s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  
fo r  su sp en d in g  h im  for  d is tr ib u t in g  c e r t a in  l i t e r a t u r e .  
A c t io n  w a s  c o m m e n c e d  in a s ta te  court w h e r e in  a 
r e s t r a in i n g  o r d e r  w a s  e n te r e d .  B e f o r e  h e a r in g  in s t a te  
court on the  m e r i t s ,  de fen dan ts  r e m o v e d  the  suit .  
P la in t i f f s  f i l e d  a m o t io n  to re m a n d .  The United St at es  
Dist i ' i c t  Court he ld  that s t a t e  ju d ic ia l  r e m e d y  had not been  
e x h a u s te d .  C a s e  r e m a n d e d  to  s ta te  court .
Cases Involving Alleged Infringement of the
Right to Freedom of Religion
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishm ent of 
religion , or prohibiting the free ex er c ise  thereof. " This admonition 
from the F irst Amendment to  the Constitution of the United States, 
made applicable to the sta tes by the Fourteenth Amendment, has been 
the subject of many cases at law during the Twentieth Century, In 
1947 the Supreme Court of the United States said : "The First 
Amendment has erected a w all of separation between church and 
state. That wall must be kept high and im pregnable.
The effort to keep that w all high, esp ecia lly  with regard to the 
schools, has produced a number of significant court cases  during 
the period under study.
The United States Supreme Court has rendered a number of fa r -  
reaching decisions in the past decade. A pair of th ese , involving 
prayer and Bible readings in the sch ools, have set precedents for  
numerous other d ec ision s.
Previous to these Supreme Court d ecision s, three state ca ses  were 
published. The fir st of th ese , Carden v. Bland, was destined to be
^^Everson v Board of Education, 330 U .S . I (New Jersey , 1946),
^^Carden v . Bland, 288 S. W, 2d 719 (T ennessee, 1956)
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nullified in effect som e six  yea rs  later by a decision of the United 
States Supreme Court. The Carden case was a test of a state law 
requiring Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's P rayer at the 
opening of the school day. The State Supreme Court found that the 
statute was constitutional and the p ractices were proper,
A Florida case , Brown v. Orange County Board of Instruction, 
disputed school o ffic ia ls' right to  distribute the King Jam es Bible in  
public schools and claim ed that such distribution was d iscrim inatory. 
The court held that this p ractice did tend to im pair the rights of 
plaintiffs and their children to be from  from  government action in 
the practice of religion and that it was d iscrim inatory,
M itchell V ,  McCaU^® concerned a young g ir l who, because of 
her religious b elie fs , refused  to  wear a prescribed uniform  in her 
physical education c la s s e s . Her school conceded that she could 
come to the c la ss  in attire of her own choosing, but required her to 
take part in the activ ities  of the c la ss . Her father objected to that 
arrangement because it would set his daughter apart from  the others 
and make her appear "a speckled  bird, ” He asked the court to require 
the school to offer a separate c la ss  for his daughter and those who 
shared her belief.
^^Brown v. Orange County Board of Instruction, 128 So, 2d 181,
93 ALR 2d 986 (Florida, I960).
'^^Mitcheil v. M cCall, 143 So, 2d 629 (Alabama, 1962),
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The Supreme Court of Alabam a denied the plaintiff's plea and 
made this statem ent:
All c itizen s, in so far as they hold view s different 
from  the majority of their fe llo w s, are subject to such 
inconveniences and this is  esp ecia lly  true of those who 
hold relig ious or m oral b e lie fs  which are looked upon with 
disdain by the m ajority. It is  p rec ise ly  every  c itizen 's  
right to be a "speckled bird" that our constitutions, 
federal and state, seek to in sure. And so lace  for the 
em barrassm ent that is attendant upon holding such beliefs  
must be found by the individual citizen  in h is own m oral 
courage and strength of conviction, and not in a court of 
law.
In 1962 the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear a
case which originated in New York and which involved a state-w ritten
prayer .'^The facts in the case are these: The Board of Regents of
th e  State of New York com posed a prayer which they recom mended
to the schools of the state in th eir  publication, "Statement on Moral
and Spiritual Training in the Schools. " The Board of Education of
Union Free School D istrict No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York,
adopted the prayer and directed the principal to  cause it to be said
aloud in the p resence of a teacher in each c la ss  at the beginning of
each school day. The prayer contained these words:
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, 
and we beg Thy b lessin gs upon us, our parents, our teach ers, 
and our country.
Ten parents from  the school d istr ic t brought suit saying that the prayer 
was contrary to  their beliefs and that it was unconstitutional in that it
^^Engel V .  Vitale, 176 N. E. 2d 579, 370 U .S . 422, 8 L. Ed. 2d 601, 
(New York, 1962).
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violated the F irst Amendment which commands that C ongress shall 
make no law respecting an estab lishm ent of religion. The New 
York Court upheld the prayer so  long as it was voluntary. The 
plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court which reversed  
the state court and said:
We think that by using its  public school system  to 
encourage recitation  of the Regents' prayer, the State of 
New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with 
the Establishm ent C lause, There can, of course, be no 
doubt that New York's program  of daily classroom  invoca­
tion of God's b lessings as prescribed  in the Regents' prayer  
is a relig ious activity. It is  a solem n avowal of divine 
faith and supplication for the b lessings of the Almighty.
The nature of such a prayer has always been relig iou s. . .
A Pennsylvania case , Abington Township v. Schempp, and a
Maryland case , Murray v. C urlett, w ere joined for consideration
by the Supreme Court in 19b^. Schempp was a case in which
parents brought suit in the United States D istrict Court for the
E astern  D istrict of Pennsylvania to enjoin enforcem ent of a
Pennsylvania statute requiring reading without comment at the
opening of each school day v e r s e s  from the Bible and recitation of
the Lord's Prayer by the students in unison. In th is case the lower
court held for the parents and the appeal was brought by the school.
The Murray case  was a petition for mandamus to compel re sc iss io n
of the rule of the Baltim ore schools requiring Bible reading and
prayer as a part of the day's e x e r c ise s . The Maryland Court of
^^^School D istrict of Abington Township v. Schempp (Pennsylvania) 
and Murray v. Curlett (Maryland), 374 U .S . 203 (1963).
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A ppeals rendered its  decision in favor of the school, and the parent 
brought an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Pennsylvania  
d ecision  and rev ersed  the decision  of the Maryland Court of A ppeals, 
holding that required Bible readings and recitation  of prayer as a 
part of the sch oo l's  daily exerc ises  was a violation of the Establishm ent 
C lause of the F ir s t  Amendment as applied to the sta tes through the 
Fourteenth Am endm ent.
The Engel, Schempp and M urray c a se s  began to have an effect 
alm ost im m ediately  upon litigation. A review  of ca ses  published  
in 1964 revea ls  five  law suits testing state statutes requiring relig ious  
e x e r c ise s  in public sch oo ls.
In D elaw are the case  of Johns v. A llen^^̂  resu lted  in a permanent 
injunction which d eclared  the state statute requiring relig ious e x e r c ise s  
daily in state sch oo ls to be unconstitutional.
The d ecision  in S ills  v. Board of E d u c a t i o n declared un­
constitutional statutes of New J ersey  which required Bible readings 
and prayer.
A F lorida ca se , Chamberlin v . Dade County Board of Instruction  
in which F lorid a 's  suprem e court found the sta te's statute to  be 
lawful, was rev ersed  by the United States Supreme Court.
^^^Johns V. A llen , 231F.Supp. 852 (D elaware, 1964).
^^^S ills  V. Board of Education, 200 A . 2d 615 (New J ersey , 1964).
^^^C ham berlin v . Dade County Board of Instruction, 377 U.S.
402, 12 L .E d . 407 (F lorida, 1964).
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Adams v. Engelking^^  ̂ brought in United States D istrict Court 
challenged Idaho's statutes requiring Bible readings and prayer in 
the schools. The decision  of the court was that the statute was 
unconstitutional.
In M assachusetts a mandamus suit to com pel the school com m ittee
to comply with a statute respecting B ible readings culminated in a
decision  by the Supreme Judicial Court of M assachusetts that such
105statutes were unconstitutional.
Another action involved a m unicipality and its requirem ent of 
Bible readings and prayer in the public sch ools. Attorney General 
V. School C om m ittee of North B r o o k f i e l d ^ was a proceeding on 
petition to enjoin the com m ittee from  ordering continuation of Bible 
readings and prayer. The Supreme Court of the state issued an 
injunction as prayed for by plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court of the United States refused to  hear the 
case of Stein v. O shinsky^^  ̂ in  the m atter of a New York elem entary  
school principal who had ruled that kindergarten children should not 
recite in school the prayer "God is  great, God is  good, and we thank 
him for our food. " The Supreme Court's refusal to hear the cas e
104
Adams v. EngeIking, 232 F . Supp. 666 (Idaho, 1964).
^^^Waite V.  School Committee of Newton, 202 N . E .  297 
(M assachusetts, 1964).
^^^Attorney G eneral v. School Com m ittee of North Brookfield, 
199 N. E. 2d 553 (M assachusetts, 1964).
^^^Stein V . Oshinsky, 382 U .S. 957 (New York, 1965).
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had the effect of upholding the principal's ruling that such a prayer 
was im proper even when voluntary.
1 DRP lain tiffs in Reed v. Van Hoven instituted suit under the F irst  
and Fourteenth Amendments claim ing that certain p ractices in the 
school violated free  e x e r c ise  clause and establishm ent clause of 
the F ir s t  Amendment. The court here attempted to accom m odate 
those students whose free  ex er c ise  of religion  might be violated if 
they w ere prevented from  entering into voluntary relig iou s e x e r c ise s  
at school. The court ordered that those students who w ish to say  
prayer or read scrip tu res according to their choice in morning 
before school begins and after the school day ends, should be p e r ­
mitted to do so, provided that they meet in a room other than their  
regular home room , and com plete their ex erc ise  at least five  
m inutes before c la s s e s  start or end. No bell is  to ring to signify  
the start of the prayer e x e r c ise , and if a prayer is  to  be said  at 
lunch tim e, it is  to be a s ilen t prayer.
In explaining th is unusual order, the federal judge said:
This approach is  by no m eans a final judgment of the court, 
nor should it be taken as a prelim inary indication of a 
fin a l judgment. In suggesting this plan the court is  
m erely  trying to arr ive  at an interim  accom m odation, 
having forem ost in mind the natural, God-given rights 
of each parent to determ ine the course of relig ious educa- 
aton for his child, but a lso  considering the fact that the 
present proposal of the school board does relate to a 
seriou s effort to recon cile  divergent opinions in an area
^^^Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F.Supp. 48 (Michigan, 1965).
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where rigid, dogmatic positions too often abound, with the 
effect that a problem  of continuing im portance resu lts  in 
increased  misunderstanding and b ittern ess, a situation  
which must certain ly be regretted by a ll, regaad less of 
religious affiliation, or lack of it.
The Engel and Schempp c a se s , supra, w ere decided on 
the basis of the establishm ent clause of the F irst Am end­
ment. The accommodation suggested in th is opinion is  
an attempt to avoid the nexus between o ffic ia l authority 
and religion  which constitutes a violation of the e sta b lish ­
ment clause.
The judge noted that he would follow the events in the school to see  
if  the plan he was proposing constituted a solution to the school's 
problem s. In the m eantim e, he declined to grant an injunction, 
although he reserved the right to  do so if  it becam e n ecessary .
Epperson v. Arkansas^ '̂̂  an action by a teacher in the Arkansas 
public schools challenges the validity of state statutes prohibiting 
the teaching of evolution in state supported sch oo ls . Susan Epperson, 
a tenth grade biology teacher, charged that the statute which made 
it illega l for a teacher to "teach the theory or doctrine that mankind 
ascended or descended from  a low er order of anim als, " or to adopt 
or use in any school a textbook that teach es th is theory, was un­
constitutional. The Supreme Court of A rkansas refused to declare  
the law unconstitutional, but noted that it had becom e m ore of a 
"curiosity than a v ita l fact of life . "
Justice Abe P ortas, speaking for the Supreme Court of the 
United States, declared the law unconstitutional in that it offended
lO^Epperson v. A rkansas, 393 U .S . 97, 98 S. Ct. 266, 21 L .E d. 
228 (Arkansas, 1968).
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the Establishm ent C lause. In h is words: "The overriding fact is  
that A rkansas' law se le c ts  from  the body of knowledge a p articu lar  
segm ent which it p roscr ib es  for the so le  reason that it is  deemed to 
conflict with a particular relig ious doctrine; that is ,  with a particular 
interpretation of the Book of G enesis by a particular religious group. " 
He further stated:
The State's undoubted right to p rescribe the curriculum  
for its  public schools does not carry  with it the right to 
prohibit, on pain of crim inal penalty, the teaching of a 
sc ien tific  theory or doctrine where that prohibition is  
based upon reasons that v io late the F irst Amendment. It 
is  much too late to  argue that the State may im pose upon 
the teachers in its  schools any conditions that it chooses, 
however re s tr ic tiv e  they may be of constitutional gu a ra n tees .. . .
A case  involving se x  education in the public schools was brought
to court under the E stablishm ent of Religion clause. Cornwell v.
State Board of Education,^̂  ̂ Maryland ca se  heard in federal d istrict
court, asked the court to  prevent im plem entation of a program of
sex education in county schools on the grounds that to do so would
deny the free  ex e r c ise  of relig ion  to the plaintiffs and would in fact
estab lish  relig ious concepts. Applying the principles of the Epperson
case , the Schempp c a s e , and others, the court said:
. . .  it is  quite c lea r  to th is Court that the purpose and 
prim ary effect of the bylaw here is  not to estab lish  any 
particular relig ious dogma or precept, and that the bylaw 
does not d irectly  or substantially  involve the state in 
relig iou s ex e r c ise  or in the favoring of the religion or 
any particular relig ion . The bylaw may be considered  
quite sim ply as a public health m easure.
110
Cornwell v. State Board of Education, 27 L.Ed. 246 (Maryland,
1969).
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The Court further stated that the state's interest in  the health  
of its children outweighs claim s based upon religious freedom  and 
the right of parental control. The case  was d ism issed .
A unique case involving freedom  of speech and freedom  of relig ion  
was tried in United States D istr ict Court in New York. Three 
students, Mary F  rain, Susan K eller, and Raymond M iller brought 
suit through their parents, asking a prelim inary injunction against 
their sch oo ls . T hese students, who did not believe in reciting the 
Pledge of A lleg ian ce, refused to leave the c la ss  room during this 
ritual as the school required them  to do because they considered  
exclusion from  the room to be a punishment for their ex e r c ise  of 
constitutional rights.
The tw o g ir ls , both tw elve years old, were in accelerated  
c la sse s  at Junior High School 217Q; Raymond Miller, a black boy, 
was a sen ior at Jam aica High School. A ll refused to  rec ite  the 
Pledge because of a b e lie f that the words "with liberty and justicei 
for all" are  not true in A m erica today. One of the students was 
an atheist who a lso  objected to the words "under God. "
These words w ere a part of the court's opinion:
T hese c iv il rights actions are significant because  
they pit popular ideas of patriotism  and the authority of 
school adm inistrators against students' rights of free  
exp ression . The particular controversy is  minor, 
involving the refu sa l of three students to leave their  
"homerooms" during the daily Pledge of A llegiance, as a 
condition for exerc is in g  their undoubted constitutional
 ̂  ̂ F̂rain  v. Baron and M iller v. Schuker, 307 P. Supp. 21
(New York, 1969).
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right not to participate in the pledge. The resulting  
co llision  is  serious because it involves suspension from  
school as one a lternative, and a court injunction against 
the school authorities.
Referring to the Tinker case , the court said "it is  now beyond 
dispute that the Constitution goes to  school with the student, . . . "  
The injunction was granted.
A case testin g  anti-evolution statutes in M ississip p i was in s t i­
tuted by M rs. Arthur G. Smith against the state and the board of 
1 12
education.  ̂ Smith asked an injunction against enforcement of
the statutes. Chancery Court, in which the action was begun,
sustained dem urrers filed  by the defendants. M rs. Smith appealed
to the state's suprem e court. That court, in  reversing and remand-
the case , said:
The d ecisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
which interpret the Constitution of the United States 
are binding upon us and we have no choice other than to  
follow such d ec is io n s . Therefore we find that the anti- 
evolution statutes are unconstitutional.
Vaughn v. Reed^ in  the United States D istrict Court for the 
W estern D istrict of V irginia, was an action to enjoin religious  
education program s in elem entary sch ools. These program s were 
conducted by teachers who w ere sent to the school by outside
112Smith V. State of M iss iss ip p i and State Board of Education, 
242 So. 2d 692 (M ississip p i, 1970).
^ Vaughn v. Reed, 313 F. Supp. 431 (Virginia, 1970).
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private organizations. They purported to teach  about religion rather
than indoctrinating students. A lso , students whose parents who had
not signed cards were excused for study period during the relig ious
program . The federal court granted an injunction and in its  decision
quoted Illin o is ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education^
H ere not only are the sta te's tax supported public school 
buildings used for the dissem ination of relig ious doctrines.
The State a lso  affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid 
in that it helps to provide pupils for th eir  religious c la sse s  
through use of the state's com pulsory school m achinery.
This is  not separation of Church and State,
The court a lso  said:
^We sustain7 the position of plaintiff that no religious  
education program should be conducted in the public 
schools which em ploys m aterial or p ractices which would 
amount to an indoctrination of religion . At the sam e tim e  
the court holds that a program  encom passing a ll students 
controlled by the school authorities and practices without 
indoctrination of religion is  not unconstitutional, . , ,
The facts in this case suggest that the state is aiding 
relig ion  in violation of the Establishm ent Clause of the 
F ir s t  Amendment,
In 1971 the Alabama Civil L iberties Union brought suit against 
the Governor of Alabama, et a l , , attacking the constitutionality  
of Alabama statutes requiring daily  readings from  the Bible in 
the public sch o o ls . This case is the latest published case which
114Illinois ex  rel McCollum v . Board of Education, 333 U.S.
203 (Illino is, 1948),
 ̂^^Alabama Civil L iberties Union, et a l , , v, George C. W allace, 
et a l , , 331 F . Supp, 966 (Alabama, 1971).
153
was found during this research  testing the constitutionality of B ib le-
reading statutes. The federal court in Alabama ruled as follow s:
Order, Judgment, and D ecree of th is Court that 
Defendant, Alabama State Board of Education, within a 
reasonable time notify a ll local Superintendents of Education, 
who w ill in turn notify a ll public school principals and 
teach ers, that Code of Alabama . , . requiring daily  Bible 
reading in public school has been declared unconstitutional 
and void, and that an injunction has issued  enjoining the 
daily reading of Bible v erses for relig ious purposes in the 
public schools of Alabama,
An Idaho action brought in state court challenged a statute which 
provided for busing of children to parochial schools.^ Epeldi v. 
Engelking was a c la ss  action for declaratory judgment declaring  
such stati te to be unconstitutional. The D istr ict Court entered  
a judgment upholding th ese statutes, but upon appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Idaho, that decision  was reversed . The appellate court 
held that the L egislature shall not make any appropriation or pay 
m onies to help support or sustain any school controlled by any 
church,
A sim ilar  case was tried  in United States D istrict Court in
M issouri, Bruska v. State of M issouri ex r e l State Board of Educa- 
117tion, however, was a suit by parents of children who attended 
parochial schools. These parents sought to have declared
116
Epeldi V, Engelking, 488 P , 2d 860 (Idaho, 1971),
117 Bruska v. State of M issouri ex re l State Board of Education, 
332 F, Supp, 275 (M issouri, 1971),
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unconstitutional a state statute forbidding the use of public funds
to aid d irectly  or ind irectly  relig ious or sectarian  schools. The
plaintiffs reasoned thusly; In com pliance with M issouri's compulsory
school attendance law, parent-p laintiffs have the constitutional right
to se lec t the school of their choice according to the dictates of their
con scien ces and the practice of their relig ion , and such freedom of
choice is  "abridged, dim inished and destroyed" by denying tax
supported educational benefits to  those who do not choose to send
th e ir  children to free public sch oo ls .
On motion to d ism iss , the th ree-ju d ge d istrict court held that
the statutes im plem enting M issou ri's  Constitution establishing and
providing for funding of a free  public school system  do not violate
either constitutional right to  free  ex er c ise  of religion  or the right
to equal protection. The action was d ism issed .
The United States Supreme Court has recently  issu ed  its
decision  in a case  which m ay have far-reach ing influence on public
education, and perhaps on A m erican  soc iety  as w ell. State v.
Yoder has been in litigation since 1968 when the State of Wisconsin
brought suit against Jonas Yoder and others for crim inal violation
118of the com pulsory education laws of W isconsin. Yoder,
118
State V. Yoder, et a l . , 182 N. W. 2d 539, cert. gr. 91 S. (Ct.
2173, 29 L .E d. 2d 160 (W isconsin, 1972).
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a m em ber of the A m ish faith who b e liev es  that higher education 
of any kind is  a deterrent to salvation , was convicted in a state 
court. He appealed to W isconsin’s Supreme Court and h is con­
viction was subsequently reversed . The State then appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
On May 15, 1972, the Supreme Court issu ed  its  decision in favor 
of Yoder and the other A m ish and said:
Enforcem ent of the sta te 's  requirem ent of compulsory 
form al education after the eighth grade would gravely 
endanger if not destroy the free  e x e r c ise  of respondent's 
relig ious b elie fs .
The Court pointed out that the sta te 's  in terest in universal educa­
tion is  by no means absolute to the exclu sion  or subordinance of 
all other in terests . However, the Suprem e Court gave no support 
to those who would challenge the valid ity  of compulsory education 
laws generally . Chief Justice W arren E . B urger, speaking for the 
Court, said , "It cannot be overem phasized  that we are not dealing 
with a way of life  and mode of education by a group claiming to 
have recently d iscovered  som e 'p rogressive' or more enlightened 
p rocess for rearing children for m odern life . "
Summary
C ases at law regarding the right to freedom  of religion have 
been brought in both state and fed era l courts during the period 
under study. The Suprem e Court of the United States has granted
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certiorari in a number of actions and has issued  decisions which 
have striking effect upon public schools throughout the nation,
A review  of cases  investigated revea ls  the following important 
findings from  the nation's courts:
(1) The United States Supreme Court found that sta te-prescribed  
prayers for use in public schools are unconstitutional, in that such 
prayers violate the Establisiim ent of R eligious Clause of the First 
Amendment.
(2) The United States Supreme Court found that required daily 
Bible reading and recitation  of the L ord's prayer in public schools 
is  unconstitutional and that th ese  procedures violate the E stab lish ­
ment of R eligion C lause.
(3) State statutes requiring Bible reading and prayer daily  
in the public schools have been tested  in  both state and federa l 
courts and have been declared unconstitutional.
(4) R eleased tim e statutes have been found to be constitutional.
(5) The Supreme Court of the United States has found that 
statutes prohibiting the teaching of evolution in state support 
schools and co lleges is  a violation  of the F irst Amendment and 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
(6) By denying certio ra r i, the Supreme Court affirm ed a 
decision  that sex education program  in a public school did not 
violate the F ir s t  Amendment and was not an establishm ent of 
relig ion .
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(7) Federal court found that requiring children who refused  to 
rec ite  the Pledge of A lleg iance to leave the room during that ritual 
was a violation of their constitutional rights.
(8) A federal court has found unconstitutional the practice of 
allowing outside teachers to com e to  school and conduct re lig iou s  
se rv ic e s ,
(9) A state suprem e court has held that it is unconstitutional 
to provide aid to parochial schools in  the form  of tran sportation.
(10) A federal court has upheld the constitutionality of state  
statutes which forbid the u se of state funds for relig ious or 
sectarian  education.
(11) The United States Supreme Court has upheld the right of 
m em bers of the A m ish relig ion  to rem ove their children from  the 
public schools after the eighth grade on the grounds that com pelling  
them  to remain in school would endanger their relig ious freedom .
T A B L E  7
CASES INVOLVING A L L E G E D  IN F R IN G E M EN T  
RIGHT TO F R E E D O M  O F RELIGION
C arden v. Bland,  288 S, W. 2d 718 
( T e n n e s s e e ,  1956)
B r o w n  v. Orange  County Board  
of I n s tr u c t io n , 128 S o . 2d 181, 93 
A L R  2d 986 (F lo r id a ,  I960)
M it c h e l l  V .  M c C a l l , 143 So.  2d 629  
(A labam a,  1962)
P r o c e e d i n g  by c i t i z e n  and t a x p a y e r  a g a inst  City Board  
of E du ca t io n  to  enjoin board m e m b e r s  and o th e r s  f r o m  
en gag ing  in c e r t a in  p r a c t i c e s  pe r ta in ing  to r e l ig io n  
and to  obta in judgm en t  d e c l a r i n g  s ta tu te  to be u n ­
c o n st i tu t io n a l .  C h a n cery  Court he ld that s tatute  was  
not u n con st i tu t io na l .  S u p r e m e  Court a f f ir m e d .
A c t io n  by parents  ag a inst  s c h o o l  o f f i c ia l s  au th or iz in g  
King J a m e s  B ib le  to be dis tr ibuted in public  s c h o o l s .  
The court  he ld that d is t r ib u t io n  tended to  im p a ir  
r ig h ts  of p la int i f f s  and t h e ir  c h i ld r e n  to be f r e e  f r o m  
g o v e r n m e n t a l  a c t i o n  in p r a c t i c e  of r e l ig io n .
D e c i s i o n  for  p la in t i f f s .
C a s e  in w h ic h  f e m a l e  child had r e fu s e d  to w e a r  the  
p r e s c r i b e d  u n i for m  in a req u ir e d  p h y s i c a l  educat ion  
c l a s s  sa y in g  that it was  a g a in st  h e r  r e l ig io n .  The  
s c h o o l  c o n c e d e d  that they  would not r e q u ir e  he r  to  
w e a r  the u n i f o r m ,  but she  would have  to  attend the  
c l a s s .  H er  fa th e r  sued b e c a u s e  the  s c h o o l  would  
not pr ovide  a s e p a r a t e  c l a s s  fo r  h e r  and t h o s e  who 
s h a r e d  h e r  b e l i e f .  The S u p r e m e  Court denied  the  
pla int i f f ' s  c l a i m .
U1
oo
T A B L E  7 C o n t i n u e d
E n g e l  V .
370 U. S, 421, 8 
(New York,  1962)
V it a le , 176 N.  
L. Ed.
E,  2d 579,  
2d 601
This  w as  a c a s e  to d e t e r m in e  the  C o n st i tu t io n a l i t y  of 
N ew  York Sta te  c o m p o s e d  and a d m i n i s t e r e d  2 2 -word  
n o n - d e n o m in a t io n a l  p r a y e r  in public  s c h o o l s .  The  
S u p r e m e  Court of the United S ta te s  held "The New  York  
law s  o f f i c i a l l y  p r e s c r i b i n g  the  R e g e n t s '  p r a y e r  a r e  
in c o n s i s t e n t  with both th e  p u rp o se  of the  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  
C la u se  and with the  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  C la u s e  i t s e l f .  "
A bington  Sch oo l  D i s t r i c t  v.  S c h e m p p  
(P e n n sy lv a n ia )  AND  
M u r r a y  v. C urlet t  (Maryland)
374 U . S .  203,  10 L . E d  2d 844 (1963)
Two c a s e s  co m bin ed  fo r  r e v i e w  by United S ta te s  
S u p r e m e  Court .  The c a s e  w a s  to  e s t a b l i s h  c o n s t i t u ­
t io n a l i ty  of P e n n s y l v a n i a ' s  s ta tu to r y  r e q u ir e m e n t  of 
rea d in g  t e n  v e r s e s  f r o m  H oly  B ib le  in public  s c h o o l s  
and M a r y la n d 's  p r a c t i c e  of d a i ly  B ib le  read ing  and 
L o r d 's  P r a y e r  r e c i t a t i o n  in public s c h o o l s .  S u p r e m e  
Court held that a l l  t h r e e  p r o c e d u r e s  v io la te d  the  
E s t a b l i s h m e n t  of R e l i g i o n  C la u s e  of the  United States  
C on st i tut ion .
An►43
A tto rn ey  G e n e r a l  v. S c h o o l  C o m m it t e e  
of  N orth  B r o o k f i e l d , 199 N. E .  2d 553 
( M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  1964)
P r o c e e d i n g  on pe t i t ion  to enjoin s c h o o l  c o m m i t t e e  f r o m  
o r d e r in g  cont inuat ion  of B ib le  read ing  and p r a y e r  in 
public  s c h o o l s  of a m u n ic ip a l i t y .  The  C o m m it t e e  was  
s o  enjoined by the  S u p r e m e  Court of the  State .
T A B L E  7 —  C o n t i n u e d
Johns et a l. v. A l le n ,  et a l . ,
231 F , Supp. 852 (D e la w a r e ,  1964)
P r o c e e d in g  to  enjoin  rea d in g  of v e r s e s  of B ib le  and 
r e c i t a l  of L o r d 's  Pr-ayer in u n ison  by p up ils  in public  
s c h o o l s .  U nited S ta te s  D is t r ic t  Court held  that  
s ta tu te  r e q u ir in g  rea d in g  of B ib le  v e r s e s  w as  u n c o n ­
s t i tu t io n a l  and p r a c t ic e  of r e c i t in g  L o r d 's  P r a y e r  
in u n ison  c o n st itu te d  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of r e l ig io n  by 
s ta te  o f f i c e r s  in  v io la t io n  of F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t .  
P e r m a n e n t  in ju n ction  i s s u e d .
S i l l s  V .  B oard  of E d u ca tio n  of 
H aw thorne, New  J e r s e y , 200 A . 2d 
615 (New J e r s e y ,  1964)
P r o c e e d in g  in v o lv in g  p r a c t ic e  of r e l ig io u s  c e r e m o n ie s  
in  public  s c h o o l s .  T he S u p e r io r  C ourt, C h a n cery  
D iv is io n ,  d e c la r e d  s ta tu te s  r e q u ir in g  B ib le  read in g  
at opening of s c h o o l  w a s  u n c o n st itu t io n a l  and enjo ined  
s c h o o l  board fr o m  a u th o r iz in g  or  p r a c t ic in g  c e r e ­
m o n ie s  in  p ub lic  s c h o o l s .  A p p ea l  w as ta k en . The  
S u p r e m e  Court of N ew  J e r s e y  upheld the  lo w e r  court  
and d e c la r e d  that s ta tu te s  w e r e  u n c o n st itu t io n a l .
o
D i lg e r  v . S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t  24, 
352 P . 2d 564 (O regon, 1964)
A c t io n  fo r  judgm ent adjud icating  r e s p e c t iv e  r ig h ts  and 
d u tie s  of p aren ts  and s c h o o l  d i s t r ic t  under r e l e a s e d  
t im e  s ta tu te .  A d v e r s e  judgm ent by low ei' c o u r t ,  parent  
ap p ea led  to  S u p r e m e  Court of the s ta te .  A lthough  
C ourt held  that th e  s ta tu te  w a s  not u n c o n st itu t io n a l ,  
it sa id  that a d m in is tr a t iv e  p o w e r s  m u st be en tru sted  
to the  s c h o o l  board .
T A B L E  7 —  C o n t i n u e d
C h a m b er lin  v. Dade County Board  
of P u b lic  In stru c t io n , 12 L. Ed. 407,  
377 U, S. 402 (F lo r id a ,  1964)
A d a m s v. E n g e lk in g , 
(•Idaho, 1969)
232 F .  Supp. 666
The S u p r e m e  Court of F lo r id a  i s s u e d  a judgm ent u p h o ld ­
ing s ta te  public  s c h o o l  B ib le  r e a d in g s  and p ra y er  
r e c i t a t io n s .  S u ch  judgm ent w as va ca ted  by United S ta te s  
S u p r e m e  C ourt, and the  S u p r e m e  Court then  r e a f f ir m e d  
i t s  ju d gm en t. On ap p ea l,  the S u p re m e  Court of the  
United S ta te s  r e v e r s e d  the ju d gm en t on the ground  
that su ch  a c t iv i t i e s  a r e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  im p e r m is s ib l e  
in the public s c h o o ls  of a s ta te .
C la s s  a c t io n  to  d e c la r e  in v a l id ity  o f Idaho s ta tu te  p r o ­
v id ing  fo r  c o m p u ls o r y  d a ily  rea d in g  o f B ib le  in  public  
s c h o o ls  and to  r e s t r a in  e n fo r c e m e n t  th e r e o f .  The  
U nited S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court held  that the s ta tu te  w as  
u n c o n st itu t io n a l  as  v io la t io n  of E s ta b l is h m e n t  C la u se  
of F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t .
W aite, et a l .  v. S c h o o l  C o m m itte e
of N ew ton , et a l .  , 202 N. E . 2d 297  
( M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  1964)
S te in  V .  O sh in sk y , 382 U .S .  957 
(New Y ork , 1965)
M andam us p r o c e e d in g  to  c o m p e l  s c h o o l  c o m m it te e  to  
c o m p ly  w ith  s ta tu te  r e s p e c t in g  B ib le  read in g  in public  
s c h o o l s .  S u p rem e  Court of M a s s a c h u s e t t s  e n te r e d  it s  
o r d e r  o v e r r u l in g  d e m u r r e r  and d i s m i s s i n g  p e t it io n .  
P e t i t io n e r s  ap p ea led  and the  S u p re m e  J u d ic ia l  Court 
held that s ta tu te  r eq u ir in g  B ib le  read in g  in  public  
s c h o o ls  w ithout w r it te n  note or co m m e n t  i s  u n c o n s t i tu ­
t io n a l .
T h is  c a s e  r e s u lte d  in upholding a ru lin g  by a p r in c ip a l  
that a c h i ld r e n 's  p r a y e r  in v e r s e  fo r m  could not be 
r e c i te d  even  v o lu n ta r i ly  by public  s c h o o l  c h i ld r e n .
T A B L E  7 —  C o n t i n u e d
R eed  v. Van H o v e n , 237 F . Supp. 
48 (M ich igan , 1965)
P a r e n t s  of public  s c h o o l  c h i ld r e n  brought su it  a g a in st  
su p er in ten d en t  of s c h o o ls  and m e m b e r s  of s c h o o l  
board  to  enjo in  r e l ig io u s  e x e r c i s e s  in the public  
s c h o o l s .  The cou rt d e c l in e d  to  grant an in ju n ction  
s a y in g  that p o s t - s c h o o l  or  p r e - s c h o o l  s e s s i o n s  
i f  c h i ld r e n  wanted su c h  s e s s i o n s  s o  long a s  th ey  
did not m e e t  in  t h e ir  h o m e  r o o m s ,  no b e l l s  rang to  
s ig n a l  su ch  s e s s i o n s ,  and th e y  w e r e  c o m p le te d  at 
l e a s t  f iv e  m in u te s  b e fo r e  s c h o o l  began , w e r e  not 
u n c o n st itu t io n a l .  Injunction d en ied .
E p p e r so n  V .  A r k a n s a s ,  393 U .S .  97,
98 S. Ct. 266 , 21 L .E d .  228 (A r k a n sa s ,
1968 )
The S u p r e m e  Court held  that th e  A r k a n sa s  s ta tu te s  
fo rb id d in g  the  te a c h in g  of e v o lu t io n  in  public  s c h o o ls  
and c o l l e g e s  supported  in w h o le  or  in part by public  
funds w e r e  c o n tr a r y  to  the  f r e e d o m  of r e l ig io n  
m andate  of the F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  and in v io la t io n  of  
the  F o u r te e n th  A m e n d m e n t .  Judgm ent fo r  p la in t if f .
C o rn w ell  v. B oard  of E d u ca tio n , et a l .  , 
340, affd. 428 F .  2d 471,314 F . Supp 
c e r t ,  den , 91 S. Ct. 240, 400 U .S .  942, 
27 L .E d .  246 (M aryland , 1969)
C o r n w e ll  and o th e r s  brought a c t io n  fo r  t h e ir  m in o r  
c h i ld r e n  a sk in g  court to  p r ev en t  im p le m e n ta t io n  of 
p r o g r a m  of s e x  ed u ca tio n  in  county  s c h o o l .  United  
S ta te s  D is t r ic t  C o u it  held  that p la in t i f f s '  F i r s t  and 
F o u r te e n th  A m en d m en t r ig h ts  w e r e  not v io la ted ;  
A p p ea l Court a f f ir m e d ;  S u p r e m e  Court of the United  
S ta te s  d en ied  c e r t io r a r i .
T A B L E  7 —  C o n t i n u e d
F  ra in , et a l . v. S ch u k er , et a l. , 
307 F .  Supp.~ 27 (New Y ork, 1969)
S ta te  B oard  o f  E d u c a t io n  v . B o a r d
of E d u c a t io n  of N e tc o n g  , 
(New J e r s e y ,  1970)
262 A , 2d 21
C iv i l  r ig h ts  a c t io n s  brought by s tu d e n ts  who r e fu se d  
to  le a v e  th e ir  s c h o o l  r o o m s  during d a i ly  p ledge  of 
a l le g ia n c e  as  con d it ion  for  e x e r c i s in g  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
right not to  p a r t ic ip a te  in p led g e .  The court held  
that c o n c lu s io n a r y  a s s e r t i o n s  in d e fe n d a n ts '  a f f i ­
d a v its  of r e a l  and p r e se n t  th re a t  to  m a in te n a n ce  of 
d is c ip l in e  and fe a r  of d i s o r d e r  w ould  not support  
find ing  o f s e r io u s  h a r m  to  s c h o o l  a u th o r i t ie s  and 
would not ju s t i fy  r e f u s a l  to  grant p r e l im in a r y  
in ju n ction  to  s tu d e n ts .  P r e l im in a r y  in junction  
gra n ted .
A c t io n  by s ta te  o f f i c e r s  s e e k in g  d e c la r a t o r y  judgm ent  
and in junction  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  p r o g r a m  of lo c a l  board  
of ed u cation  fo r  "period fo r  f r e e  e x e r c i s e  of r e l ig io n "  
in public  s c h o o l s .  The ap p e lla te  court found that the  
c h i ld r e n  w e r e  a c tu a l ly  "captive"  of th e  p r o g r a m  
and that su ch  p r o g r a m  w as u n co n st itu t io n a l  e s t a b l i s h ­
m ent of r e l ig io n .
O '
O J
S m ith  V.  State of M is s i s s ip p i  and 
State  B oard  of E ducation , 242 So, 2d 
692 ( M is s i s s ip p i ,  1970)
P la in t i f f  sought injunction  a g a in s t  e n fo r c e m e n t  of a n t i ­
ev o lu t io n  s ta tu te s  in C h a n cery  Court w h ich  den ied  
in junction  and su s ta in e d  d e m u r r e r s  of d e fen d a n ts .  
P la in t i f f  ap p ea led  to  S u p rem e  Court of A i-kans as  w hich  
found that s ta tu te s  w hich  proh ib ited  the  te a c h in g  of 
e v o lu t io n a r y  th e o r y  as being in  v io la t io n  of f r e e d o m  
of r e l ig io n  m andate  of F ir s t  A m e n d m e n t .  R e v e r s e d  
and rem a n d ed .
T A B L E  7 - -  C o n t i n u e d
Vaughn v. R eed , et a l .  ,
313 F .  Supp. 431 ( V ir g in ia ,  1970)
A ct io n  to  enjo in  r e l ig io u s  ed u ca tio n  program, in 
e le m e n t a r y  s c h o o l s .  The United S ta te s  D is t r ic t  
C ourt he ld  that w e e k ly  c l a s s e s  w h ich  w e r e  conducted  
by t e a c h e r s  sen t  to  s c h o o l  by o u ts id e  p r iv a te  
o r g a n iz a t io n s  and purported  to  t e a c h  about r e l ig io n  
r a th e r  than to  in d o c tr in a te  s tu d en ts  and f r o m  w hich  
s tu d e n ts  w h o se  p a ren ts  had not s ign ed  c a r d s  w e r e  
e x c u s e d  fo r  study period  v io la te d  the F ir s t  
A m e n d m e n t .  O rd ered  a c c o r d in g ly .
A la b a m a  C iv il  L ib e r t ie s  Union, 
et a l.  , V .  W allace , et a l.  ,
331 F .  Supp. 966 (A labam a, 1971)
Suit w as  brought a g a in s t  s ta te  o f f ic ia l s  a ttack ing  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l i ty  o f A la b a m a  s ta tu te s  req u ir in g  
d a i ly  i ea d in g s  fr o m  the B ib le  in the  public  s c h o o l s .  
On m o tio n  fo r  s u m m a r y  judgm ent the United S ta te s  
D is t r i c t  Court held  that su c h  s ta tu te s ,  as  w e l l  as  
the  p r a c t ic e  of conducting  B ib le  rea d in g s  in the  
public  s c h o o l s ,  v io la te d  the F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t .  
Injunction i s s u e d .
%
E p e ld i  V .  E ngelk in g ,  
(Idaho, 1971)
488 P . 2d 860 C la s s  a c t io n  fo r  d e c la r a t o r y  judgm ent in v o l \  ing  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l i ty  of s ta tu te  p rov id ing  for  busing  of 
p a r o c h ia l  s c h o o l  c h i ld r e n .  D is t r ic t  Court en tered  
judgm ent upholding c o n s t i tu t io n a l i ty  of s ta tu te  and 
d efen d a n ts  a p p e a le d . S u p r e m e  Court of Idaho held  
that it w as u n c o n st itu t io n a l  to  p rov id e  su ch  aid to  
p a r o c h ia l  s c h o o l s .  R e v e r s e d .
TABLiE 7 - -  C ontin ued
B r u sk a  v. S tate  of M is s o u r i
ex  r e l  S tate  B o a rd  of E ducation ,  
332 F .  Supp. 275 (M is s o u r i ,  1971)
State  V. Y o d e r , 182 N. W, 2d 539, 
c e r t .  gr . 91 S. Ct, 2173, 29 L. E d. 160 
(W isc o n s in ,  1972)
A c t io n  by p a ren ts  of s c h o o l  c h i ld r e n  s e e k in g  in ju n ctiv e  
and other  r e l i e f  b a se d  on a s s e r t e d  in v a l id ity  of p r o ­
v i s i o n s  of M is s o u r i  C on st itu t io n  and im p lem en tin g  
s ta tu te s  g o v e r n in g  u s e  of public  funds fo r  r e l ig io u s  or  
s e c t a r ia n  e d u ca tion . On m o tio n s  to  d i s m i s s ,  the  
th r e e - ju d g e  U n ited  S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court h e ld  that 
s u c h  C o n st itu t io n a l  p r o v is io n s  and im p le m e n t in g  
s ta tu te s  do not v io la t e  e i th e r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r ig h ts  to  
f r e e  e x e r c i s e  o f r e l ig io n  or  eq u a l p r o te c t io n .  A ct io n  
d i s m i s s e d .
T h is  a c t io n  w a s  begun in  s ta te  c o u r ts  w h e r e  p a r e n ts ,  
m e m b e r s  of the Amidh fa ith ,  w e r e  c o n v ic te d  fo r  
r e f u s a l  to  se n d  t h e ir  c h i ld r e n  to  th e  lo c a l  h ig h  s c h o o l  
a fte r  c o m p le t io n  of the  e igh th  g r a d e .  The A m is h  
r e s i s t e d  on the  grou n d s that th e ir  r e l ig io u s  d o c tr in e  
h old s  that h ig h er  ed u ca tion  o f any kind i s  a d e te r  rant 
to  sa lv a t io n  and to o k  the c a s e  to  the  S u p r e m e  Court 
of the United S ta te s .  On M ay 15, 1972, C h ie f  J u s t ic e  
W arren  E. B u r g e r  sp ea k in g  fo r  the  C ourt, r u led  
that m e m b e r s  of the  A m is h  r e l ig io u s  s e c t  a r e  not 
su b je c t  to  s ta te  c o m p u ls o r y  ed u ca t io n  la w s on the  
grou n d s that e n fo r c e m e n t  of su ch  la w s w ould  endanger  
i f  not d e s t r o y  the  f r e e  e x e r c i s e  of th e ir  r e l ig io u s  





Restatement of the Problem
The problem for this investigation is (a) to discover and analyze 
the significant recent legislation and judicial decisions relating to  
selected  basic hum an-civil rights of students in the public schools, 
and (b) to identify possible legal trends and directions in the in te r ­
pretation of these rights, and to analyze their implications for the 
behavior of public schools.
Summary
The public schools touch and influence the life of almost every  
Am erican citizen. At the sam e time, the schools are them selves  
influenced by movements afoot in the society  at large.
Traditionally, the power of the public schools over their pupils 
has gone almost without challenge. Today, however, precipitated 
in part by unrest among college age students, high school and even
1 6 6
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elementary school children are challenging rules and regulations 
that infringe on their rights as human beings. In many instances, 
these challenges become actions in the nation's courts.
One hundred and fifty-two decisions rendered by state and 
federal courts on the hum an-civil rights of public school students 
are reviewed in this study. That th ese  ca ses ,  plus perhaps hundreds 
more in other areas of c iv i l  rights, have occurred in le s s  than 
twenty years suggests that students, parents, and other citizens see  
the courts as a solution to problems which cannot be resolved on 
a local level.  The trend toward "going to court" seem s fairly well 
established.
None of the cases  investigated occurred in or was begun in an 
Oklahoma court. While this does not mean that Oklahoma did not 
have such litigation in its  lower state courts and in the United States 
District Courts for Oklahoma, it does mean that it had no such 
litigation which judges considered of sufficient import to be sent to 
the National Reporter System for publication.
A review of Oklahoma's school laws reveals carefully drawn 
statements on the administration of schools and upon discipline and 
control of students. No definite conclusion can be drawn from the 
absence of hum an-civ il  rights litigation with regard to Oklahoma's 
schools; however, it is  a fa irly  new state, relatively le ss  populous, 
and rural in tradition, and these may be contributing factors.
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Any conclusions to be based on a study of the ca ses  reviewed are 
limited since the facts in any case at law are n ecessar ily  different 
from those in any other case. Additionally, there are the influences 
of ear lier  precedents, d iverse jurisdictions, and d iss im ilar  statutes. 
The projection of trends and directions is  an even more uncertain  
undertaking than that of drawing conclusions. However, keeping in 
mind these limitations, certain general conclusions may be drawn 
and general directions discerned from the body of cases  in each 
of the selected  human-civil rights:
Conclusions 
( 1) The right to be secure in the person
Based on the fact that no reported case has questioned the teacher's  
right to inflict reasonable physical punishment upon the child, there  
appears to be no trend away from the courts' affirming the use of 
such punishment as a form of discipline,
(2) The right to protection against search and seizure
More and m ore students are testing the schools' practices in 
search and se izure , and the tendency of court decisions has been to 
place some limitation on the right of the school to conduct 
search and se izure . The number of cases recently reported and 
the variant opinions rendered indicate that cases  revolving around 
this right may appear more frequently in the nation's courts.
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(3) The right to due process
Schools are under the obligation to develop reasonable and 
clearcut rules and regulations relating to student conduct and behavior, 
and to provide procedural due process to students, including notice  
of hearing, presence of legal counsel, and confrontation by an 
accusing witness.
(4) The right to freedom of expression
The federal courts are clear with regard to the right of students 
to wear armbands and other symbols, and the schools should make 
no rules regarding these. On the other hand, in cases relating to 
personal appearance and d ress ,  the issu e  is  not resolved; school 
rules and regulations regarding personal appearance are subject 
to the test  of reasonableness.
(5) The right to freedom of speech
Court decisions seem  to indicate c lear ly  that freedom of speech  
and freedom of expression must be accorded to students, where the 
freedom  is used in a responsible manner and is  not disruptive of 
the school's purposes.
(6) The right to  freedom of p ress
Court decisions seem  to indicate more freedom  in the production 
and distribution of student newspapers so long as these actions and 
activities  are not disruptive to the school and antagonistic to its  
purposes.
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(7) The right to freedom of religion
It seem s  clear from  the ca se s  reported that the direction of the 
courts is  toward maintaining a wall of separation between church and 
school, and public schools  therefore should refrain from activities  
or practices relating to religion.
In addition to th ese  conclusions directed toward the specific  
hum an-civil rights, five general conclusions seem  justified:
(1) Students of a l l  ages, supported by their parents, are 
challenging what s e e m  to them to be discrim inatory, arbitrary, and 
unreasonable rules and regulations of the public schools.
(2) The society  at large and the courts in particular are dem on­
strating that they view  minor children as "persons" entitled to the 
hum an-civil rights due an adult citizen.
(3) F ed era l and state courts have demonstrated a w illingness  
to review disputes which in. the past would have been rejected,
(4) Litigation regarding hum an-civ il rights of students increased  
strikingly during the last decade of the period under study.
(5) Many of these  cases arose  because school administrators  
were not prepared for situations which might have been foreseen  




The courts are not always definite in their interpretation of 
students' rights, nor do they always render decisions consistent with 
other s im ilar ca ses .  A lso , c itizens in different parts cf '"he nation 
seem  to hold slightly  divergent views about " perm iss iven ess” versus  
"control” of minor children. N evertheless, a movement toward 
full c iv il rights for students s e e m s  well-defined.
In view of these facts ,  certain general, recommendations bas ed 
on the litigation and literature reviewed during this study may be 
made for the school and its offic ia ls and for parents and students:
(1) Every school official ought to be thoroughly informed about 
the Constitution and the rights of students under it, and all school 
actions and rules should comply with the Constitution.
(2) School teachers  ought to be trained to accept children as 
human beings entitled to full human rights.
(3) Teacher education institutions ought to provide opportunities 
for teach ers  and other educators to understand and gain commitment 
to basic  human rights and the need for effective human relationships.
(4) School adm inistrators should review rules and regulations  
periodically  to  discard the outmoded and irrelevant, and to restate  
those that are vague and overbroad.
(5) Friendly rapport and communication between faculty and 
student body should be fostered  so that problems may be aired  
before they becom e insurmountable.
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(6) Where possib le , school rules and regulations ought to be 
a joint effort with faculty and students.
(7) Schools have the responsibility  to establish the machinery  
and processes ,  including grievance machinery, by which students 
and teachers participate in the matters and decisions which affect 
them in the school.
(8) Careful provisions should be made for according due process  
to  students who are charged with misbehavior that may result in 
sev ere  punishment.
(9) Administrators would do well to encourage lines of co m ­
munication between home and school so that parents w ill fee l free  
to talk about problems before they become serious,
(10) Students should be taught to accept their responsibility  
for the efficient and productive operation of the school.
(11) Regulations of d r e s s ,h a ir  style, and personal conduct 
which is not disruptive to the school, ought to  be avoided in that 
such regulations may cause m ore trouble than they prevent.
(12) While corporal punishment, suspension, and expulsion 
have been sanctioned by courts, the use of these sev ere  penalties 
ought to be avoided in favor of democratic solutions.
(13) D iscrim ination of any kind should be  scrupulously avoided 
in the handling of school children.
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(15) While adherence to the law and the Constitution may prevent 
many lawsuits, true regard for children as human beings and for 
providing them with an atmosphere in which to absorb democratic  
principles at work, will be the best preventative for severe problems 
that may wind up in court,
(16) A ll  public schools should evaluate their institutional 
behaviors and practices with regard to the degree to which they may 
or may not infringe upon students' rights.
(17) A ll  public schools ought to establish procedures by which 
they can develop a handbook or guide, identifying student rights 
investigated in this study, as well as other important rights. These  
publications should emphasize student responsibility in the ex er c ise  
of these rights.
These recommendations are admittedly subjective, but adherence 
to them might have prevented a large percentage of the human-civil 
rights cases  which have reached our courts in such large numbers 
in recent years .
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a judicial proceeding; a law suit.
a tribunal with the power to review the 
Tie proceedings of another, either as 
to law or to fact, or both,
a contested quest' in in a court of 
justice.
a method of review of the action taken 
by a lower court.
the enjoyment of the guaranties con­
tained in constitutional or statutory 
provisions designed to prevent 
discrimination in the treatment of 
a person.
physical punishment such as whipping 
or slapping.
the report of a conclusion reached; 
especially the conclusion of a court 
in the adjudication of a case.
the administration cf laws equally 
applicable to all under established  
rules which do not violate fundamental 
principles of private rights.
the process by which a legislative bill 
becomes a law. Creating a law, that 
is giving it an existence .
A United States Court; a court upon 
which the judicial power of the United 

















a form al command of the court ordering 
persons named therein to refrain from  
doing certain specified acts.
one who has taken a position in reference  
to a child of that of a lawful father;
"in place of the parent. "
an action or suit; a ser ie s  or group of 
related suits or actions.
a command by order or writ issuing  
from a court of law requiring the 
performance of a particular duty 
therein specified. A coercive writ ; 
one that commands performance, not 
desistance.
a decision or determination of a point 
of law made by a court in a case to be 
followed by a court of the sam e rank or 
of a lower rank in a subsequent case  
presenting the sam e legal problem.
for so much; for as far as it goes; to 
such an extent.
not extrem e; not arbitrary, capricious  
or confiscatory.
a repeal; an abrogation.
that to which a person has a just and 
valid cla im , whether it be land, a thing, 
or the privilege of doing something or 
saying something.
an act of the legislature of an organized 
body.
the tr ia l courts of the federal system ,  
one for each federal judicial d istrict,  
their jurisdictions and venue of actions 
prescribed  by the United States Code.
